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 This dissertation focuses on the historical problem of false prophecy—or, more generally, 
the need to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate forms of contact with the divine—as it 
influences then-innovative and now-pervasive attitudes toward language and knowledge in early 
enlightenment England. Against the prevalent senses that the history of popular religion can be 
characterized either in terms of false consciousness or disenchantment, I argue that the 
vernacular Bible empowered unauthorized subjects (the poor, women, heterodox thinkers) to 
challenge dominant English culture in the theological vocabulary of the prophet. This power led 
to a reaction—which I call counter-enthusiasm—which both polemicized popular prophets as 
“enthusiasts” beyond the reach of reason, and developed new categorical understandings of 
experience in order to redefine relations of spirit, body, and word so as to avoid the problem of 
unlicensed spiritual authority. I concentrate on three counter-enthusiasms—as articulated by 
Henry More, John Locke, and Jonathan Swift—which fundamentally rethink the links between 
humanity, divinity, and language, in light of--and in the ironically occupied guise of—the figure of 
the enthusiast. I argue further that the discourse of enthusiasm contributed centrally to the 
process known as “the rationalization of society,” which involved the distinction of the categories 
of self, society, and nature. 
 
KEYWORDS: prophecy, enthusiasm, rationalization, enlightenment, language theory, religion, 
mimesis, hermeneutics, materialism, totality, irony, satire, English Civil War, Interregnum, 











 I want to acknowledge three people in particular without whom I cannot imagine this 
project existing. 
 First, I must thank Sharon Achinstein for her guidance in bringing this dissertation from 
conception to fruition. I am flooded by gratitude for her patience, knowledge, wisdom, warmth, 
generosity, and brilliance. Thank you immensely, Sharon, for everything. 
 This project began with a remark by Frances Ferguson. In a seminar during my first 
semester at Johns Hopkins, she observed that the rise of the novel might be explained in terms of 
a cultural transition from prophecy to prediction. This sentence caught so many of my interests at 
once—including some I did not recognize as mine until that moment—that I knew I had to write 
about it. I never made it to prediction, or to the rise of the novel, but I owe the impetus of this 
account of prophecy to Frances, and wish to express my gratitude for that and the many other 
insights into history and language that she has shared. Here’s to more!   
 Chris Westcott has been for me, for years, an interlocutor from another dimension. His 
insights into class, nature, representation, and ethics have been deeply important for my thinking 
in this project and well beyond. This thesis could not have taken shape without his willingness to 
hear my inchoate thoughts and his quickness to seek and find the heart of the matter.  
 I am extremely grateful to many others at Johns Hopkins and elsewhere who have 
improved my project in too many ways to enumerate. I would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, 
Yaser Amad, Amanda Anderson, Isobel Armstrong, Hadji Bakara, Pearl Brilmyer, Jacob Chilton, 
Drew Daniel, Taylor Daynes, Jonathan Dollimore, Simon During, Joe Haley, Richard Halpern, 
 iv	  
Jared Hickman, Jonathan Kramnick, Chris Latiolais, Paul Lewakowski, Molly Lynch, Roger 
Maioli, Doug Mao, Chris Nealon, Katarina O'Briain, Ben Parris, Jesse Rosenthal, Grant Shreve, 












































I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTS  
1. Prophecy and Rationalization     2 
2. What Was Enthusiasm?      42 
 
 
II. THREE VERSIONS OF COUNTER-ENTHUSIASM 
  3. Allegories of Enthusiasm: Incarnation and Inspiration  
      in Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists   87 
  4. The Arbitrary Word: Locke Reads Paul    136 
  5. Swift’s Two Enthusiasms      190 
 
III. EPILOGUE 
  6. Enthusiasm, History, and Secularity     234 
 
IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY       248 
V. APPENDICES       267 






LIST OF FIGURES 
 
2.1  Frontispiece to The Great Bible (1539)     268 
2.2  Frontispiece to Daniel Featley, The Dippers Dipt (1645)   269 
 
2.3  From John Taylor, A Swarme of Sectaries (1641)    271 
 
2.4  From John Taylor, A tale in a tub (1641)    271 
 
2.5  From Anon., A Nest of Serpents discovered (1641)   272 
 
2.6  From Anon., The ranters religion (1650)     272 
 
2.7  From Anon., A Declaration of a Strange and Wonderful Monster (1646) 273 
 


















LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
2.1  The frequency and percentage-to-total publications of “Enthusias*”  
in Seventeenth-Century English: A search conducted through  












































1. PROPHECY AND RATIONALIZATION 
 
       And the LORD said unto Moses, See, I have  
       made thee a god to Pharaoh: and Aaron thy  
       brother shall be thy prophet. (Exodus 7.1)1 
 
1. Prophet Hunt 
 On May 7, 1640, a lay preacher named James Hunt appeared before the Court of the 
High Commission—the supreme Ecclesiastical court in England from its founding under Henry 
VIII until its violent dissolution in 1641 in the first throes of the English Civil Wars. Prophet 
Hunt, as he was known, was described by his arresting officer as “a fanatiq, frantiq person … a 
husbandman, & alltogether illiterate … [who] tooke upon him to … preach and expound the 
Scriptures, & was lately taken absurdly preaching on a stone in Paulls Churchyard.”2 The court 
sentenced Hunt to an indefinite term in Bridewell. Within the year he was out again preaching, 
and now publishing unlicensed sermons, starting with The Sermon and Prophecie of 1641, which 
(according to its subtitle) “hee hath endeavoured to deliver in most churches in and about 
London, but since delivered in the Old-Baily.”3   
 Prophet Hunt’s many accusers habitually emphasize his ludicrous insignificance: his low 
birth, his illiteracy (which only meant that, like most academics today, he didn’t know Latin and 
Greek), and (as one contemporary puts it) “the weake madnesse of his giddy-braine.”4  But these 
accusations of weakness confess the opposite. Hunt—and many religious dissidents like him—
had tremendous power at his disposal, and this power was expressly decoupled from traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I cite the 1611 Authorized Version of the Bible (King James Version) throughout, unless otherwise noted. 
Specifically, I use The Bible: Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha, introduction and notes by Robert Carroll and 
Stephen Prickett (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
2 Ian L. O’Neill, “Hunt, James (bap. 1591?, d. 1649x66),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; online edition, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/74524, accessed 12 March 2015] 
Subsequent uses of this resource cited as DNB.  
3 James Hunt, The sermon and prophecie of Mr. James Hunt of the county of Kent. Who professeth himselfe a prophet, which hee hath 
endeavoured to deliver in most churches in and about London, but since delivered in the Old-Baily (1641). Accessed using Early 
English Books Online. Subsequent uses of this database – which has proved invaluable for this project – cited as EEBO.  




politics and learning. When the Mayor of London, Richard Gurney, asked Hunt in a heated 
interrogation “how he dare presume to preach having no warrant for the Ministeriall function,” 
Hunt declared “he had sufficient warrant from God, for he knew that he was his Messenger.”5 
He was, in brief, a prophet—and thus that weak vessel, his body, was lifted up by God to the 
lofty task of reforming England and preparing the way for the Kingdom of God. This is a central 
motif of Biblical prophecy—apparent, for example, in the well-known cadences from Isaiah, later 
echoed in Luke: “Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low: 
and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain.”6 Hunt’s writings are full of 
celebrations of the strength of his apparent weakness, framed in the institutional vocabulary of 
his particular historical moment. Hunt writes: “For you have so many false doctrines rais’d, / By 
your Latine tongue and Greeke phrase, / That now I trust in our glorious God, / The plaine 
English tongue will win the praise. / […] / For the deepest scholler in Cambridge Schoole, / 
May be taught wisdom by Christs foole.”7 For Hunt, church, state, and school were institutions 
of the dead letter, conducted in dead languages. His own body, moved by the spirit of God, 
vocalizing in “the plaine English tongue,” was better fitted to give life to the sacred word. He was 
a living sign of a new dispensation of spirit. 
 So this is what made this self-proclaimed fool of Christ, and others like him, at once such 
a laughing-stock and such a threat. This is what made his doggerel bark. This study begins with 
the simple observation that the rhetorical power of unlicensed preaching stems—as Hunt’s 
nickname suggests—from the self-authorized assumption of the role of prophet. This title signals 
an attempt to appeal to other human beings through a language touched and licensed by God, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 An order from the high court of parliament, which was read on Sunday last, in every church, being the 19 day of December, 1641. 
Cited in O’Neill, “Hunt, James,” DNB.  
6 Isaiah 40.4; Luke 3.5. 
7 James Hunt, The spirituall verses and prose of James Hunt concerning the advancment of Christ his glorious and triumphing church: 





and so to bypass the hierarchies of church and state which traditionally mediate between ordinary 
humans and the divine. Prophet Hunt thus practiced a radical form of communication—one 
which draws upon the institutional authority of the scriptures (that is, the power to institute 
power) while evading the institutional authority of church and state. He wished not merely to 
understand others and be understood. He wished to express and impart, through the newly 
spiritualized vernacular tongue, the divine authority necessary to alter common human reality.  
 A closer look at Hunt’s language might sharpen this point. Hunt writes: “Again, take the 
sword of the spirit which is the word of God, the sword I understand and prove, that it signifieth 
Christ and his word, for in the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the 
word was God, Christ is the word, and Christ was with God, and Christ is God, for the word of 
God is quick and powerfull, and sharper then any two edged sword.”8 Consider the variety of 
Biblical reference in this passage. Of course there’s the well-known opening of the Gospel of 
John: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” At 
the same time, he echoes Ephesians 6.17: “And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of 
the Spirit, which is the word of God.” And Hebrews 4:12: “For the word of God is quick, and 
powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword.” The force of this language belongs not to 
Hunt, but (for early modern ears and eyes) to the apostles St. John and St. Paul, and beyond them 
to God. Thus he participates in a prophetic chain of resonances. He has become a prophet of 
prophets. And he invites his listeners and readers to do likewise—to draw power from these 
Biblical phrases and thus to reinvigorate the spiritual state of England. Prophecy, in Hunt’s view, 
is not just radically connected to God through history’s long chamber of sacred voices—what’s 
more, its power is communicable in the present.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







 Hunt’s interpretation of prophecy was by no means idiosyncratic. He knew, as virtually 
everyone at the time knew, that prophecy was more than one theological feature among many, on 
equal footing with particular practices like infant baptism, doctrinal beliefs like the substantial 
nature of the Eucharistic host, or other forms of verbal divine-human contact like prayer. These 
were all particular contents carried in this one sacred vessel of revelation. They were only known 
because knowledge of them has been relayed from God to humans by a prophetic vessel. A 1583 
translation of the commonplaces of Peter Martyr Vermigli, an Italian convert to Protestantism 
whose writings greatly influenced the early English Reformation, defines prophecy as “a faculty 
given unto certain men by the spirit of God … whereby they are able certainly to know things 
heavenly, high, and secret, and to open the same unto others for edifying of the church.”9 
Prophecy, then, was about much more than the prediction of the future. It was about the 
theorization of the means of communication between immanence—this world—and 
transcendence—the next—in order to edify the world. It was about, in the words of the 
astrologer and physician Richard Saunders, “a manifesting by divine inspiration, of hidden or 
secret things, whether past, present, or to come.”10 It was about talking to God. Indeed, the 
prophet’s knowledge of past, present, and future things relied on the notion that God, the author 
of time and being, had shared with them some small part of his omniscience, either directly (as 
happened to Moses, with whom God communicated “face to face”) or through one of his angels 
(as happened to the rest of the prophets).11 As Aquinas writes, “The future cannot be known in 
itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, 
forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time.”12 The prophet shared 
and reflected for the wider community, for the transcendent moments during which he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Pietro Martire Vermigli, The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr, trans. and ed. 
Anthony Marten, (London, 1583), 19. EEBO.  
10 Richard Saunders, A balm to heal religions wounds applied in a serious advice to sober-minded Christians that love the truth, and 
are well-wishers to reformation (London, 1652), 100. EEBO.  
11 Exodus 33.11. 
12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicæ 1.86.4, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, second 
edition (1920). Accessed at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html, July 28, 2014. 
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participated in the divine message, this eternal glance. Thus the prophetic word, for the early 
modern centuries, bore the truth that saved or damned every human soul. Its importance for 
human self-understanding at every level, and at every level all at once, was immeasurable.  
 Obviously, given the role of prophecy in mediating between everyday appearances and 
“things heavenly, high, and secret,” the theological-political importance of distinguishing between 
true and false prophecy long predates the seventeenth century. One finds it implicitly in Moses’ 
encounter with the magicians in Pharaoh’s court (Ex. 7.22).13 It is codified in Deuteronomy, 
where Moses proposes a pair of logic gates for determining true prophets. The first gate, the 
hardest, is doctrinal—true prophets must be of our religion (Deut. 13.1-3); the second gate, is, 
one might say, scientific—they must actually be correct in their predictions (Deut. 18.22). This 
Mosaic standard remained in place into the early modern era.14 Doctrinal conformity preceded 
natural philosophical evidence. In other words, the monopoly on revelation was interpreted by 
way of a monopoly on doctrine. Prophets who rose up—as many did—and articulated 
theological positions that were not orthodox, could be dismissed regardless of their scientific 
talents, predictions, or miracles. Likewise prophets who rose up in the church’s name but failed 
to predict events or perform miracles could be dismissed either as lamentably delusional or 
blasphemously ambitious.15  
 Prophet Hunt is called both of these things. But this does not stop him. Indeed, the 
accusations and persecutions leveled from “Cambridge Schoole” help legitimate him. His 
example raises a difficult question: how does one handle prophets who rise up during a time 
when there is no really existing monopoly on doctrine—when the articles of the established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Simon During emphasizes the cultural importance of this encounter in Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of 
Secular Magic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4-7. 
14 For an extended study of the influence of Mosaic Law on early modern politics, see Graham Hammill, The Mosaic 
Constitution: Political Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), passim. 
15 For a particularly useful studies of medieval heresy, false prophecy, and the meaning of medieval belief, see Steven 
Justice, “Did the Middle Ages Believe in their Miracles?” Representations 103.1 (2008): 1-29. 
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church have been suspended? Who decides then which logic gates count in determining the 
provenance of prophetic speech, and in which order? Prophet Hunt’s assumption of this power 
was obviously a political problem for his moment—most immediately because Hunt and many 
others like him used scriptural language to carry quite troubling tenors: down with the scholars, 
down with the bishops, and down with the king. But beyond such problems of content, which 
could be (and were) forcefully countered with alternative readings of the scriptures, there was the 
more pressing issue of form. What was there to stop others from emulating Hunt, and insisting 
that the vernacular Bible facilitated extraordinary communication within them as well? How was 
one to return prophecy to its traditional bounds within a few special vehicles?  
 Prophet Hunt is not, of course, a unique case. The work of the historians Christopher 
Hill, E.P. Thompson, Ann Taves, David Cressy, and many others has documented the rise of “a 
nation of prophets” (to borrow Milton’s phrase) in the decades of religious war that divide the 
English seventeenth-century.16 One might add to this list the work of the literary critics Sharon 
Achinstein, Nigel Smith, and Misty Anderson, among others.17 These scholars have amply 
demonstrated the abundance of popular prophecy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and its significance for political and literary forms alike. The present project builds on this 
tradition of scholarship but assumes a new perspective on the issue of popular prophecy. Rather 
than account for the perspective of prophetic revolutionaries like Hunt (or Gerrard Winstanley, 
or George Fox, or Margaret Fell, or Abeizer Coppe, or Joanna Southwell), I focus on the 
perspective of seventeenth-century reactionaries—that is, those who react to the problem of 
popular spiritual authority and re-articulate, in innovative and lastingly important ways, the lines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1966); Christopher Hill, The World 
Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (London and New York: Penguin, 1984); Ann Taves, Fits, 
Trances, and Visions: Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experience from Wesley to James (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999); David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640-1642 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
17 Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England, 1640-1660 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994); 
Sharon Achinstein, Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Misty 
Anderson, Imagining Methodism in Eighteenth-Century Britain: Enthusiasm, Belief, and the Borders of the Self (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2012). 
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separating true from false prophets. I find that vernacular spiritual authority was too big a 
problem to solve with the discursive paradigm inherited from the feudal middle ages, which 
relied on a stable distinction between orthodoxy and heresy. Such a distinction, always difficult, 
particularly in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, became simply unworkable by the 
middle of the seventeenth century, when literally every theological position held in England was 
regarded as absolutely damnable by some near neighbor. This does not mean, of course, that 
writers of the time stopped thinking in terms of heresy. As recent work by David Loewenstein 
and others has shown, the concept of “heresy” continued to occupy the cultural consciousness of 
England through the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries.18 At the same time, uses of 
the term were highly unstable; in the words of Christopher Marsh, “orthodoxy and its opposites 
were very much in the eye of the beholder” during this period.19 I suggest that “heresy” became 
less and less useful as a polemicizing term during the seventeenth century, as its central 
presupposition—that there is a stable doctrinal orthodoxy reflecting both God’s moral will and 
the natural laws of creation from which it is damnation to deviate willfully by entertaining untrue 
opinions (the etymological sense of “heresies”)—became more and more obviously untenable. 
The concept of “enthusiasm,” in my view, works to address this instability in the post-
Reformation understanding of heresy by shifting the emphasis from the examination of what a 
false prophet believes to the examination of how a false prophet uses language. The emphasis 
was once, “What doctrines are heretical?” It comes to be, “What uses of language are 
enthusiastic?” I trace this broad paradigm shift—which I call the shift from heresy to 
enthusiasm—in the following chapter. In the chapters that follow that one, I trace the process 
whereby a new counter-discourse of spiritual authority centered on the re-theorization of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See David Loewenstein, Treacherous Faith: The Specter of Heresy in Early Modern English Literature and Culture (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
19 Christopher Marsh, “‘Godlie matrons’ and ‘loose-bodied dames’: heresy and gender in the Family of Love,” Heresy, 
Literature and Politics in Early Modern English Culture, edited by David Loewenstein and John Marshall (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,2006), 59. 
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language developed in order to preserve the traditional prophetic monopoly within a context of 
theological confusion. I follow prior scholars, including Jon Mee, in calling this “the discourse of 
enthusiasm.” I see this discourse as engineered by counter-enthusiasts: thinkers who both define 
enthusiasm from without, and imitate enthusiasm from within.20 
* 
2. We were never enthusiasts 
 Previous studies of “the discourse of enthusiasm,” particularly those of Michael Heyd and 
Jon Mee, have been invaluable in shaping the terms of this project.21 However, it is important to 
state at the outset how my approach here differs from these studies. These have tended to focus 
on the ways in which “enthusiasm,” understood to be a manic condition of religious madness, 
was an actual, diagnosable disorder among seventeenth-century religious believers in England and 
beyond. This study emphasizes the degree to which the enthusiast—and enthusiasm, his 
malady—is a philosophical-allegorical heuristic for working out the major issues beneath the 
legitimation crisis spurred by the spread of popular prophetic appropriations of vernacular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is worth stating briefly why I chose this term over the more frequently used “anti-enthusiasm.” Simply put, I feel 
that “counter” captures the rhythm of this discourse more accurately. This discourse is not about simply opposing 
something out there—being anti-enthusiasm. It is about countering a move in a political-theological field—the 
appropriation of scriptural authority without license—with another move—the construction of this appropriation in 
such a way as to refuse to legitimate the claims to spiritual power stemming from radical interpretations of vernacular 
scripture. Further, counter-enthusiasm connotes the way this construction involved the occupation of a quasi-
enthusiastic position—not fully enthusiastic (indeed, as we’ll see, according to the rules of this discourse, no one can 
call themselves enthusiastic, they can only be called so from without) but provisionally enthusiastic. The counter-
enthusiast acknowledges that the rules of the game have changed. Legitimation can no longer be limited to the fiat of 
hierarchical authority. It must be shared with the illiterate (i.e. those unschooled in Ancient languages), at least in 
theory. But it cannot be shared on their terms; it has to create new terms, a new sort of enthusiasm which reproduces 
in part their claims to authority without allowing them a full stake in this reproduction. That said, even as counter-
enthusiasm is, I feel, a terminological improvement on anti-enthusiasm, it still is not ideal. It does not capture the 
way in which enthusiasm itself is created before it is countered—hence how counter-enthusiasm defines itself against 
a force that it has itself named and categorized. Nevertheless, it is the best term I could find for the purposes of this 
project. 
21 Michael Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable”: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries 
(Leiden: Brill, 1995); Jon Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation: Poetics and the Policing of Culture in the Romantic 
Period (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The phrase, “the discourse of enthusiasm,” can be found in Mee, 
passim. 
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scripture.22 Enthusiasm tells us little about those called enthusiasts; it tells us much more about 
those calling others enthusiasts.23  
 Enthusiasm, then, is not a real condition. It is not, in other words, an actually diagnosable 
turn toward “mania,” or “frenzy,” or “fanaticism” evident in some religious believers and not in 
others. This might seem obvious when put so simply. But most previous scholarship on the 
question does not stress this point.24 It sees enthusiasm in more or less the way that counter-
enthusiasts want people to see enthusiasm—as a hermeneutic infection raging among the lower 
classes, diagnosable in terms of a disorderly literary style, and strange grimaces, and quakings, and 
transports, and so on. Hence Clement Hawes sees enthusiasm as a rhetoric of mania cultivated 
among the revolutionary classes during the English Civil Wars.25 Shaun Irlam sees enthusiasm 
similarly—as a poetic attitude originating in the mid-century troubles, stifled during the 
succeeding century, and revived during the Romantic turn to revolution.26 Jon Mee takes issue 
with this reading, perceiving (correctly) that enthusiasm is a regulatory constant in the eighteenth 
century, a sort of conceptual synecdoche for the uncivilized self which is held in check by rational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A note on the use of the masculine pronoun: I have decided to use “he/him/his” as default pronouns throughout 
this project when discussing “the prophet” or “the enthusiast” in the abstract. This is a difficult and inevitably 
unsatisfactory choice, especially given how inflected the discourse of enthusiasm—and false prophecy more 
generally—is by the politics of gender. Enthusiasm, as we will see, is regularly associated with weak, feminine, false 
prophecy as opposed to strong, masculine, true prophecy. At the same time, the enthusiast is almost always imagined 
as a male abstraction in both the pathologizing and rehabilitating strains of the discourse of enthusiasm. This is 
significant, and explicable largely because the alternative conceptual vocabulary for denouncing false prophets—the 
vocabulary of witchcraft—is still alive and well in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the witch is of 
course strongly figured as female. The enthusiast, in short, can be thought of as a sort of male witch—and with 
differences (even privileges) allotted to his gender. Above all, where the witch can be thought of as possessing a 
“hard” subjectivity which one cannot imagine oneself into, the enthusiast provides an ideal avatar for representing 
subjectivity. He might be insane, but he is heuristically useful in a way a witch is not for thinking through the pitfalls 
and dangerous extremes of belief and epistemology. In this way the enthusiast is quietly sympathetic, or at least 
available for exploration from the inside out. Hence to reflect (if only subtly) this important gendered dimension of 
the enthusiast I have relied on the male pronouns.  
23 Heyd, 22. 
24 Important exceptions include Heyd and Taves. Lawrence Klein also anticipates this emphasis to some degree: “the 
‘enthusiast’ was a character type: a creature of passions, verging on madness, capable of contrary extremities (of 
heat/zeal/fervor/fire and cold/sobriety/gravity), extravagant and unsociable.” See Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and 
the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 162. 
25 Clement Hawes, Mania and Literary Style: The Rhetoric of Enthusiasm from the Ranters to Christopher Smart (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
26 Shaun Irlam, Elations: The Poetics of Enthusiasm in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999). 
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subjectivity; but even he conflates the enthusiast with the disorderly body of the religious 
fanatic.27 And Jordana Rosenberg sees the enthusiast as a vehicle for Weberian secularization—a 
person who modulates a frenzied drive to worship God into a frenzied drive to accumulate 
profit.28 
 Thus all of these studies treat enthusiasm as an actual condition affecting a certain sort of 
religious believer—overly pious, overly emotional—in the early modern era. The problem with 
such a conflation is simple. There is little evidence to suggest that the people called enthusiasts 
were doing anything all that different from those calling them enthusiasts. So many sorts of 
believers were called enthusiastic—and in a way so deeply marked by polemical interests—that 
the word has little value as a descriptor for any particular sort of religious practice.  
 This fact is clear from the sheer variety of its deployment. For Catholics, Lutherans (and 
all Reformers spawned from Luther) were clearly enthusiasts throwing down the established 
Christian authorities; indeed, they are the archetypal enthusiasts railing against the Church on no 
basis but that of their own force of assertion.29 For Lutherans and Calvinists, Radical Protestants 
were enthusiasts. Further, accusations of enthusiasm flew between groups rhetorically lumped 
together as Radical Protestants. For Baptists like John Bunyan, Quakers were enthusiasts.30 For 
Quakers and Diggers, meanwhile, Ranters were enthusiasts.31 Enthusiasm is a rhetorically 
reversible charge. Many pamphlets of the seventeenth century might be summarized either as 
stating, “We’re not enthusiasts! You are!” or, “We’re not enthusiasts! They are!” (More interesting 
are the late-century pamphlets, written mostly by Quakers, which diverted the accusation of 
enthusiasm into an investigation of the philological structure of the term: “You call us enthusiasts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Mee. 
28 Jordana Rosenberg, Critical Enthusiasm: Capital Accumulation and the Transformation of Religious Passion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
29 See, e.g., John Fisher, The answer unto the nine parts of controversy proposed by our late sovereign (1626): “Wherefore 
Protestants […] approve Enthusaisme and immediat revelation …” (43 ff.). EEBO.  
30 Christopher Hill, A Turbulent, Seditious, and Factious People: John Bunyan and his Church (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 75 ff.  
31 Hill, World, 231-58; Gerrard Winstanley, Fire in the bush. the spirit burning, not consuming, but purging mankinde (1650), 4. 
EEBO. 
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We’re going to take that as a compliment, and here’s why.”)32 And the accusation of enthusiasm 
was not, of course, limited to groups; many individual figures influential in defining enthusiasm 
and condemning enthusiasts—including Luther, Descartes, Henry More, and Jonathan 
Edwards—found the term turned against them.33 It is often assumed that enthusiasm is passed, 
as it were, to the left—from high- to low-church forms of belief. (In contrast, “superstition” and 
“formalism” are traditionally seen as opprobria passed from low to high.)34 But even this isn’t 
reliable as a schema. Catholics were regularly accused of enthusiasm from the Protestant 
perspective.35 Indeed, a subgenre denouncing Catholic enthusiasts and connecting them 
genealogically to Anabaptists—which, as we will see, goes all the way back to Luther—was 
particularly popular in the late seventeenth century panic inspired by the Popish Plot.36 
 This volatility in the term is clear when one considers the experience of Anne Conway—
the philosopher and colleague of the very influential counter-enthusiast Henry More. Conway 
was regularly ill and bedridden, hence in need of nursing and attendance. Toward the end of her 
life, she hired some Quaker women to do this work. Stocked with long conversations with More 
on the subject of Quakerism, Conway expected them to be enthusiasts—frenzied, rhetorically 
exuberant, melancholic, etc. She was surprised to find them, on the contrary, “so still, and very 
serious.” She writes:  
 [T]he particular acquaintance with such living examples of great patience under  
 such sundry heavy exercises, both of bodily sickness and other calamities… I find  
 begets a more lively faith and uninterrupted desire of approach to such a behavior  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See especially the works of George Keith, including Divine immediate revelation and inspiration, continued in the true church 
(1668). EEBO. 
33 Heyd, 109-43.  
34 Swift, in A Tale of a Tub, and David Hume, in his essay, “Superstition and Enthusiasm,” are important for 
crystallizing this distinction. It is an important dimension of the self-mythogizing of the Anglican perspective as 
navigating the Scylla of enthusiasm and the Charybdis of superstition. See Hume, Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 38-42. 
35 Consider Luther, below. See also Edward Stillingfleet’s writings against Catholic enthusiasm, beginning with A 
Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion (1665) and ending with Several Conferences Concerning the Idolatry of the 
Church of Rome (1679). These occasioned many furious rebuttals. 
36 See Stillingfleet, The Mischief of Separation (1680). EEBO.  
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 in like exigencies, then the most learned and rhetorical discourses of resignation  
 can do […] I pray God give us all a clear discerning between Melancholy  
 Enthusiasm and true Inspiration that we may not be imposed on to believe a lie.  
 The great difference of opinion in this point amongst the learned and experienced  
 occasions much perplexity in minds less exercised, and not so well fitted for  
 judging.37 
Led to expect mere rhetoric, Conway found them leading by practice. Led to expect them to 
exhibit nervous energy, she found them calm and still. She still defers, at the end of the letter, to 
“the learned and experienced” who have discerned (albeit in very different ways) the signs of 
“Enthusiasm” as distinct from “true Inspiration”—but one might also detect here a wry note. 
She perhaps finds the learned doctors constructing their false prophets—one among whom is her 
correspondent—more exhausting than any Quaker. One might also hear in her allusion to their 
“many opinions” a distant suggestion that they too might be seen as so many heretics arguing 
baseless beliefs.  
 This project takes Conway’s experience of a disconnection between virtual and actual 
“enthusiasts” to have been the rule rather than the exception. Enthusiasm was not a real 
condition. It was a virtual condition. But this does not mean that enthusiasm was not a real 
problem—or, rather, was not constructed to address a real problem: the crisis of spiritual 
legitimacy growing from the wide dissemination of the vernacular Bible, and the subsequent 
growth of unlicensed popular spiritual authority. As we’ve already seen in the example of Prophet 
Hunt, this truly was a threat to power, and not one easily managed. The discourse of enthusiasm 
attempts to do just this—to manage a real threat by constructing an imaginary one. 
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37 Anne Conway to Henry More, Ragley, 4 February 1675[6], in Marjorie Hope Nicholson, ed., The Conway Letters: 
The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their Friends, 1642-1684, revised by Sarah Hutton 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 422. 
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3. Enthusiasm and mimesis 
 Thus enthusiasm was always projected outward from a self-proclaimed unenthusiastic 
center position. In naming enthusiasts, one declared—or attempted to declare—oneself free 
from enthusiasm.  
 In this way, the discourse of enthusiasm had much in common with other discourses that 
construct and attack upstart pretenders to the monopoly on spiritual authority—the discourses of 
heresy and witchcraft.38 These too defined an orthodox center against and in terms of a 
heterodox fringe. But unlike heretics and witches, who were almost always pathologized from a 
third-person perspective, enthusiasts were frequently attacked from within—from the second-
person perspective, through rhetorical and satirical imitation. 
 To choose just one example, in 1642, the Royalist poet John Taylor—known as “the 
Water Poet” because his day job involved ferrying passengers across the Thames—produced a 
mock-sermon titled, A Tale in a Tub.39 This is, of course, a significant title given Swift’s A Tale of a 
Tub, and already suggestive of the degree to which Swift’s satirical masterpiece participates in a 
long counter-enthusiastic tradition populated in earlier decades by somewhat cruder productions. 
In his Tale, Taylor poses as Mi-heele Mendsoale, a once-lowly, now divinely illuminated cobbler 
up on his high heels, preaching to the masses. “Beloved Sisters, and my well infected Brethren,” 
Mendsoale begins, (deliberately privileging women in his salutation—very troubling indeed), 
“attend this text, as you shall find it written in the first Chapter of Bell and the Dragon.”40 
Mendsoale proceeds to offer a deliberately shoddy exegesis, starting with the first word of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Cf. Walter Stephens, Demon Lovers: Witchcraft, Sex, and the Crisis of Belief (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002). Stephens argues that participants in intellectual debates regarding the nature of witches used 
the figure of the demon-loving witch to work through fundamental problems of spiritual authority: above all, are 
demons and other spirits real or imaginary?  
39 For an interesting study of the “amphibious” Taylor and his complex poetic contexts, see Bernard Capp, The World 
of John Taylor the Water-Poet, 1578-1653 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1994). 
40 John Taylor, A tale in a tub, or, A tub lecture as it was delivered by Mi-Heele Mendsoale, an inspired Brownist and a most upright 
translator in a meeting house neere (Bedlam, London: Printed in the yeare when Brownists did domineare, 1642), i. EEBO. 
Taylor’s Tale was well received. It was written in 1641 and reprinted twice. He also wrote a sequel responding to his 
own persona—A full and compleat answer against the writer of a late volume set forth entituled A tale in a tub, or, A tub lecture: 
with a vindication of that ridiculous name called roundheads: together with some excellent verses on the defacing of Cheapside crosse: also 
proving that it is far better to preach in a boat than in a tub (1642)—which was also reprinted once. 
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first verse: “Now the Babilonians had an Idoll they called Bell […] First I will begin with the time, you 
must not conceive that it was 1,10. 100. 1000 yeares agoe, but Now, at this present, Now the 
Babylonians, &c. Beloved there is much evill and abomination to be picked out of these three 
letters Now.”41 	  
 A number of crucial features that typify the polemical imitation of enthusiasm can be 
identified from this one brief example. Enthusiasts were depicted as overly friendly to women—
as either actually feminine or feminized. The Quakers, as is well known, were especially notorious 
for allowing women equal spiritual status with men.42 They were depicted as lower-class—with 
their lowly professions (whether tailor, tinker, butcher, or cobbler) lending much ammunition to 
these caricatures. And they were depicted as dangerous fools retailoring and tinkering around 
with and butchering and cobbling back together extremely serious matters of religion—
represented here in the sloppy interpretation of a Biblical text. This interpretation is not just 
unskillful, as it clearly misreads the sense in which the word “now” is used in the first verse of Bel 
and the Dragon—it is politically dangerous. Taylor’s Mendsoale, a “Brownist,” insists that this 
text applies to the present moment. Babylon is not in the past. It is now. Idolatry is not a problem 
that plagued the past. It plagues the present. This is the nightmare of enthusiasm brought to life 
in print—a farcically incompetent upstart hermeneut leveraging the authority of scripture to 
immanentize the eschaton. Notice also that Taylor will not associate Mendsoale with actually 
sacred scripture, instead foisting the apocryphal Bel and the Dragon upon him—although, 
needless to say, most of those called enthusiasts consistently cited canon scripture, particularly 
the Gospels and (as we’ll see in the chapter on Locke) the Letters of Paul.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Taylor, A tale in a tub, 1. 
42 For the status of prophesying women among Quakers, which was more complex than counter-enthusiasts 
frequently supposed, see Phyllis Mack, Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1992), 381-96. 
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 One can further see in this example the degree to which the discourse of enthusiasm dealt 
with complex matters of mimesis. The so-called enthusiast claimed to reflect—to mirror—the 
mind of God as recorded in the scriptures. Travestying counter-enthusiasts like Taylor (and later 
Samuel Butler and Jonathan Swift) worked by imitating and undermining the enthusiast’s claim to 
mirror the divine, presenting a version of the enthusiast who clearly distorts rather than reflects 
this divine image. Meanwhile, a complementary branch of philosophical counter-enthusiasts 
(represented in this project by Henry More and John Locke) theorized this distorting effect of 
enthusiasm on the representation of meaning, proposing that the enthusiast is himself a vessel 
who muddies the pure waters of language either by polluting words with his unbalanced humors 
(More’s position) or by neglecting to respect the logical structure of signification (Locke’s 
position). I will propose that these matters of enthusiastic mimesis were pitched at three 
concurrent levels—reflection, imitation, and configuration—which it would be helpful to 
introduce here. 	  
 First, the enthusiast was used as a vehicle for working out the situation of the present 
moment within the larger terms of eternity. In Erich Auerbach’s terms, the enthusiast can be 
identified as a vehicle for thinking about figura—the way in which the sacred past prefigures the 
present, and likewise the way in which the present prefigures the future, the Second Coming—
during a moment when such figuration schema were sharply debated.43 The enthusiast took the 
Bible to be a living prophetic document, to reveal the deep truth about now. The counter-
enthusiast, by masquerading as a caricature of his opponent, reveals how ridiculous and 
overweening this interpretation actually is. He shows how wrong millenarian interpretations of 
scripture are by becoming, briefly and ironically, an inept millenarian. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” in Time, History, and Literature: Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach, translated by Jane O. 
Newman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 65-113. 
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 One might identify in the discourse of enthusiasm, then, a cosmic concern with reflective 
mimesis—a concern with the question of how present appearances reflect the greater arc 
revealed in sacred scriptures. The discourse of enthusiasm can thus be said to be concerned with 
the representation of reality, understood in Christian typological terms as the great story of the 
relationship of humanity and divinity. Of course, this phrase, “the representation of reality,” calls 
to mind Auerbach’s larger project in Mimesis, which identifies certain dominant literary modes of 
representation characteristic of different historical periods.44 The discourse of enthusiasm is 
concerned with just this task—the representation of reality in seventeenth-century England. But 
this discourse also reveals the degree to which this work was deeply contested during this era—
not just in the grand terms of an Auerbachian opposition between, say, the representational 
modes of Homer and the Bible, but in much more common (albeit just as momentous) local 
contestations. This was a time of struggle regarding the basic terms of representation—of whose 
account of things better reflects the divine will. Indeed, this is likely the case for any era 
dominated by religious war, which is, after all, finally motivated by fundamental disputations 
regarding the nature of reality considered in terms of the purported history of human-divine 
relations. The degree to which we cannot appreciate this purchase of religious dispute in the 
common understanding of reality—and feel, with Swift’s Master Houyhnhnm, that religious wars 
are silly battles over doctrinal iotas and ritual absurdities (“Whether it be better to kiss a Post, or 
throw it into the Fire,” etc.)—reflects the degree to which the discourse of enthusiasm has 
reframed the understanding of cosmic mimesis common to secular institutions.45	  
 But this is not the only way in which the discourse of enthusiasm was concerned with 
mimesis. As we can also see in Taylor’s imitation of Mendsoale, authors used the discourse of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, translated by Willard R. Trask (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013).  
45 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, edited by Claude Rawson and Ian Higgins, The Essential Writings of Jonathan Swift 
(New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010), 468. The passage concludes: “Neither are any Wars so 
furious and bloody, or of so long Continuance, as those occasioned by Difference in Opinion, especially if it be in 
things indifferent” (469). 
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enthusiasm to test the degree to which purported enthusiasts could be imitated and, as it were, 
replaced by virtual versions of themselves—and thus occupied by authors, and (to use a phrase 
that will come up regularly in this project) “virtually witnessed” by readers.46 Counter-enthusiasm 
constructed the enthusiast through the provisional occupation and imitation of its polemical 
target. Over time, such constructions came to overwhelm dissidents themselves—particularly, as 
we’ll see, in the version of the discourse perfected by Swift. Thus the discourse was concerned 
not only with the level of cosmic mimesis—the ability of a human vessel to reflect the divine 
plan—but also with the level of social mimesis—the ability of one writer to mimetically 
overshadow another. If the first, cosmic level was concerned with mimesis as reflection of the 
divine image, this second, social level was concerned with mimesis as polemical mimicry.	  
 There is also a third sense in which the discourse of enthusiasm was concerned with 
mimesis. It became deeply concerned, particularly in the version of the discourse influenced by 
the Cambridge Platonists (and subsequently by John Locke) with accounting for the way in which 
language reflects deeper structures of signification—whether the physical structures of the body 
(which are emphasized by Henry More), or the logical structures of meaning (as emphasized by 
John Locke). The enthusiast was thus used as a heuristic for thinking about the relation between 
language and embodiment in general—for the configuration of meaning—and for reframing this 
relation so as to challenge popular claims to divine illumination. The enthusiastic body, in this 
register, was treated as mimetic of nothing but its own humoral dysfunction. The enthusiast 
claimed to reflect the Logos of God. In fact, he reflected the material word, produced by chance, 
de-spiritualized, deprived of a larger background of meaning.47	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For the notion of “virtual witnessing,” see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s very influential study of the 
different experimental methods of Hobbes and Boyle, first published in 1985, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, 
Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 60 ff. 
47 Richard Kroll, The Material Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
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 In sum, then, there are three primary ways in which the discourse of enthusiasm mediated 
concerns regarding mimesis. 1) At the level of cosmic reflection, it offered a means of navigating 
and organizing different claims of participation in the divine reality conditioning Creation. 2) At 
the imitative level of social imitation, it offered a polemical means of caricaturing claims to 
spiritual authority. 3) At the level of physiological configuration, it offered a heuristic for thinking 
about the basic link between embodiment and signification—a way, if not to answer, then to ask 
the question, how are words related to speaking bodies? All three of these levels, as I’ve 
mentioned, were entangled in the discourse of enthusiasm. Social mimesis was developed largely 
to combat claims to cosmic mimesis. In other words, the ridiculous virtual enthusiast evident in a 
publication like Taylor’s absorbs the politically threatening perspective of millenarian cosmic 
mimesis, the claim to represent and reflect God’s will. Likewise, the ostensibly medical 
investigation of the power of enthusiastic language to fascinate and persuade groups of listeners 
was motivated by a desire to naturalize and despiritualize dissident claims to spiritual authority. 
As this strain of the discourse went, “They might say that they’re inspired, they might even sound 
like they’re inspired, but don’t believe them—they’re just bodies making empty noises.” 	  
 But at the same time that these levels of mimetic analysis were entangled, they were also 
becoming differentiated from one another. Indeed, studying this discourse reveals the emergence 
of distinct categories of representation—divine truth, social perception, medical fact—in the bud, 
as it were. The study of enthusiasm shows in part how the categories now associated with the 
“rationalized” world emerged from the particular pressures exerted on institutional legitimacy by 
unlicensed claims to spiritual authority. It offers a new genealogy of enlightenment.48	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This turn recalls J.G.A. Pocock’s argument that enthusiasm is the “antiself” of enlightenment. See Pocock, 
“Enthusiasm: The Antiself of Enlightenment,” Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650-1850, edited by Lawrence 
E. Klein and Antholy J. La Vopa (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1998), 7-28. This is probably the single most 
illuminating essay on enthusiasm that has been written. Pocock argues that concerns with enthusiasm bridge the early 
and later enlightenment, and suggests that as enthusiasm became associated with philosophical rather than religious 
questions “it ceases to be merely a phenomenon of that spirituality that Enlightenment set out to displace, and 
becomes instead a phenomenon of Enlightenment itself” (26). Nevertheless, as later discussion will show, I depart in 




 Hence I am suggesting that the approach to the discourse of enthusiasm in this project 
emphasizes the degree to which this discourse is important for the process known (after Max 
Weber) as “the rationalization of society.” It is worth clarifying what I mean by this, as the 
present sense is perhaps not the commonest applied to the phrase.  
 For many academics, rationalization theory is primarily associated with the thinking of the 
Frankfurt School, particularly Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who described 
enlightenment and modernity in terms of the tragic triumph of instrumental reason culminating 
in worldwide economic and ecological depredation.49 Weber captures this threat in one of his 
starkest and best-known sentences—“Not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar 
night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now.”50 While 
keeping this perspective in view, I see the rationalization of enthusiasm rather in terms of Jürgen 
Habermas’ Kantian interpretation of Weberian sociology, which separates experience into the 
distinct validity domains of factual-empirical discovery (science), intersubjective-normative 
jurisprudence (law), and therapeutic-subjective judgment (art).51 
 This trifurcation follows from a narrative of secularization. For centuries, as Habermas’ 
Weber would have it, what we call law reflected the Creator’s will as revealed in—or extrapolated 
from—the books of scripture; what we call science explored God’s creation as observable in the 
book of nature; and what we call private conscience involved the self in the cosmic struggle for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rationalization, and in the representation of provisional rather than true mental totalities. See the section on totality 
below and the discussion of Pocock in the Epilogue. 
49 Cf. “Enlightenment, understood in its widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating 
human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant 
calamity.” Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, translated by 
Edmund Jephcott (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1.  
50 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), 128. 
51 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. 
Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press: Boston, 1984), 143 ff. 
 21	  
souls. The Protestant Spirit isolated and detheologized these dimensions of society in the course 
of articulating a more private, personal faith unmoored from the hierarchies of the Catholic 
Church. It worked above all in three ways: 1) by rejecting the efficacy of sacraments and (as it 
was pejoratively called) “priestcraft” in general, 2) by particularized the individual believer in the 
doctrine of justification by faith alone (sola fide), 3) and by emphasizing the importance of a calling 
or vocation, increasingly interpreted in bourgeois professional terms, demonstrating a dutiful, 
obedient, and worldly-ascetic relationship to God.52 From this disenchantment of religion 
emerged both capitalist economics (characterized by a distinction between households and 
corporations, a formal freedom of labor power, an investment structure oriented toward markets, 
and the application of technical-scientific knowledge) and the modern bureaucratic state 
(characterized by a permanent and centralized system of taxation, a standing centralized military, 
a monopoly on legitimate violence, and the division of administrative roles into centrally 
organized offices).53 Rationalization is thus, in its principal articulation, conceived of as emerging 
from the creative-destructive energy in Protestantism.  
  For Habermas, this is on the whole a positive development. The disenchantment of 
religion leads to the enlightenment, culminating in Kant’s three critiques, which finally rationally 
separate the sort of thing a natural fact is from the sort of thing a social norm is from the sort of 
thing a private judgment is. This differentiation allows for the emergence of expert domains and 
institutions devoted respectively to science, law, and art: thus for attention to the peculiar 
vicissitudes of embodied subjectivity (in practices like clinical therapy and psychoanalysis); for 
more just and tolerant social norms (resulting in the ideals of legal equality regardless of gender, 
race, class, and, sexuality); and for the ever-more precise theorization and technologization of the 
natural world. Like Adorno, Habermas laments the degree to which one particular mode of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings, translated by Peter Baehr and 
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From Max Weber; Habermas, TCA, 164-65. 
53 Habermas, TCA, 158. 
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reason—instrumental, veridical reason—has tended to overshadow the equally important 
subjective and intersubjective domains of personal experience and social morality. Also like 
Adorno, he is wary of the allures of irrationality seemingly twisted into the process of 
modernization, and suspicious of the rejection of enlightenment values which can result (in his 
view) in disastrous political situations like the one into which he was born in 1929 Düsseldorf.54 
But he sees the continued pursuit and refinement of the enlightenment process of rationalization 
as the best available for a multicultural polity.  
 The degree to which this narrative of the trifurcation of experience is useful for the 
present project must be clear from the above pages, which have already begun to incorporate the 
nature-self-society paradigm. But, as must also be clear, I emphasize a crucial conceptual 
mechanism missing in Habermas’ account: the way that rationalization is driven by an internal 
Protestant critique of overweening unlicensed subjectivities, i.e. self-authorized prophets. In my 
view, the crisis of authority that the discourse of enthusiasm emerges to address necessitates the 
clarification and distinction of the validity domains central to Habermas’ account of 
enlightenment. Nature must be distinguished from society must be distinguished from 
subjectivity in order to put a stop to vernacular appropriations of religious authority. The 
totalizing flux of these elements represented in unlicensed prophetic speech, which mingles 
claims about natural events with claims about normative imperatives with claims about subjective 
feelings, must be calmed and categorized, ordered and organized.  
 Each of the three counter-enthusiasts considered here helps especially to clarify one of 
the validity domains distinguished by the rationalized perspective. More stylizes the material 
dimension of the enthusiast’s body. Locke stylizes the subjective dimension, exhibiting a 
profound concern with accounting for the relation between experience and signification. Swift 
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stylizes the intersubjective dimension, emphasizing the way that the enthusiast is a social and 
literary construction. But it is not necessary to overstress the degree to which each of these 
thinkers is especially committed to refining one particular validity domain. What is more 
important is that they use the enthusiast as a figurative means of distinguishing between 
epistemological categories and levels of signification in ways that ultimately contribute to the 
rationalization of experience.  
 Thus Habermas’ account of the centrality of the emergence of these particular validity 
domains for the rationalization of society offers a useful heuristic for this project. But it also 
offers more than a heuristic. It offers a way of framing the connection between the concept of 
enlightenment and the struggle for representation described here—and it offers a link to the 
present moment. Insofar as the rationalization of society is rooted in the crises of spiritual 
authority, Habermas’ theory is itself one result of the discourse of enthusiasm.  
* 
5. False totalities  
 As I have suggested, then, the discourse of enthusiasm framed the false prophet in terms 
of false totalities. The figuration of the enthusiast offered a way of conceiving of an apparently 
complete world-view, from the enthusiast’s own purported perspective, which was revealed to be 
one node or part of a larger world-view, from the counter-enthusiast’s perspective. This work, as 
I’ve suggested, was crucial to the process of rationalization—which eventually distinguished the 
validity domains of self, nature, and society. The enthusiast provided an early figurative resource 
for this process, allowing counter-enthusiasts to frame each validity domain in terms of a false 
enthusiastic totality which can in fact be reduced to a category of experience. “The enthusiast 
thinks he perceives the divine whole,” as More might say, “but in fact he perceives only the 
disorderly images produced by his own melancholic imagination.” Likewise, Locke might say, 
“The enthusiast speaks of divine wholes, but in fact he simply represents subjective associations 
 24	  
which he provides no compelling reasons to take as anything more than that.” Finally, Swift 
might say, “The enthusiast claims to know divine mysteries, but this is just his strategy for 
attracting readers; like me, he is just another peddler in the marketplace of ideas—but unlike me, 
he doesn’t admit it.” Counter-enthusiasms thus proposed to enclose enthusiastic totalities within 
a limited categorical horizon: nature, self, or society.  
 In this way, the discourse of enthusiasm participates in the longer task of distinguishing 
true from false prophets—that is, put differently, true from false representatives of totality—so 
central to early modernity and indeed to earlier eras as well. Prophets are, at least in theory, 
receptacles for the totalizing perspective of the divine. They are parts speaking for the Creator of 
the whole. And so the basic question in mediating between prophets was often simple: on behalf 
of which god is this prophet speaking? Is that god stronger or weaker than this other prophet’s 
god? Put differently, is the totality on behalf of which this prophet speaks bigger or smaller than 
the totality on behalf of which this other prophet speaks? Whose totality swallows the other’s? 
One might see this way of viewing things exemplified in the trope of miracle battles—for 
instance, the confrontation of Moses and the magicians in Exodus. Aaron casts down his rod and 
it becomes a serpent. Pharaoh’s magicians do the same: “For they cast down every man his rod, 
and they became serpents: but Aaron’s rod swallowed up their rods.”55 My god’s snake swallows 
your god’s snake; my totality is bigger than your totality. 
 In the seventeenth century discourse of heresy, which relies on a monotheistic 
conception of the divine, this standard shifts somewhat. It becomes: is this prophet speaking on 
behalf of the one true God, or not? The prophet is interrogated not according to the relative 
strength of his god, but according to whether or not he can be judged doctrinally to speak on 
behalf of the true God, the real God, the only God—the Creator of all that is. The signs for 
determining whether the prophet speaks for the true God are doctrinally agreed upon, and his 
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truth or falsity is determined above all on this basis. The question becomes not “whose totality is 
bigger?” but “is this created being really speaking for the Creator of all things—thus for the only 
totality that really is?” As we’ve seen, this standard too has Mosaic precedent:  
 If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or  
 a wonder, And the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee,  
 saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them;  
 Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams:  
 for the LORD your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the LORD your God  
 with all your heart and with all your soul.56 
In other words, Deuteronomy proposes that ultimately even the standard of miracle battles must 
be understood as subordinate to the doctrinal standard. If the wrong god’s prophet performs 
miracles—even if his snake swallows your snake—you still should not believe him. In that case, 
that prophet should be understood to be a temptation sent by the true God. As a corollary, if 
someone says that he comes from the true God—if he “speaketh in the name of the LORD”—
his claims to be a prophet must at least initially be taken seriously.57 This was not merely the 
standard according to Mosaic Law. It persisted in seventeenth century England. Oliver 
Cromwell’s government, for example, received and took seriously many retrospectively dubious 
figures claiming to interpret the will of the Christian God—as long as they had no disciples of 
their own.58 Hence the heresy paradigm, which I will discuss at length in the chapter that follows, 
was fundamentally concerned with the prophet’s beliefs—in other words, with whether his 
beliefs are true reflections of his creaturely relationship to God, or are, on the contrary, just his 
opinions. 
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 The discourse of enthusiasm again tweaked this question. It retained the emphasis on the 
creature-creator distinction, but it gave up the idea that the emphasis in determining a false 
prophet should be on the beliefs of the prophet. The false prophet—now cast as “the 
enthusiast”—might appear to have solid doctrinal positions. He might seem to be aligned with 
the one true totality. But he was not. And each counter-enthusiasm came up with a different way 
for determining how he was not. Henry More’s counter-enthusiasm, as we will see, emphasizes 
his medical and psychological pathologies: the enthusiast is not to be understood as a rational 
creature; he is in fact a malfunctioning body, with his humors out of balance. Enthusiasm is thus 
an expression of bad humors. John Locke’s counter-enthusiasm stresses the illegitimacy of the 
enthusiast’s subjective grounds for credibility. He might claim to represent the divine totality, but 
he cannot explain why we should believe him, and so he cannot be trusted. Enthusiasm is a sign 
of an irrational subject. Jonathan Swift’s counter-enthusiasm emphasizes the enthusiast’s 
rhetorical ineptitude. He frames the enthusiast as capable of hoodwinking the credulous (i.e., in 
Swift’s class-inflected view, mostly the poor), but also as susceptible to being hoodwinked by the 
clever (i.e. by Swift)—which would certainly not be the case if he were really God’s earthly 
representative. The enthusiast is an effect of an overly credulous public sphere at once hungry for 
information and uninformed.   
 Thus in the discourse of enthusiasm what the enthusiast believes becomes frankly 
unimportant (with some exceptions, to be discussed below). He is represented as a limited totality 
not because he believes in a false god, or because he professes opinions contrary to the doctrine 
of the true God, but because he expresses an incomplete (but seductive) total view on the world. 
The enthusiast represents a false totality reducible to some other category. For More, the 
enthusiast shows what matter can do on its own. He is stylized bad materiality. For Locke, he 
expresses a closed subjectivity that insists without reasons on its special relation to the whole. He 
is stylized bad subjectivity. For Swift, he exploits a market greedy for easy truths. He is stylized 
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bad intersubjectivity. All three counter-enthusiasms pitch themselves as able to account for and 
contain the false totality of the enthusiast—as able to see the enthusiast as a symptom of a greater 
whole. The enthusiast is a totality (in the sense of a unique, world-experiencing subjectivity); he 
claims to express the totality (that is, the perspective of God); when he symptomatically expresses 
another totality (whether the false totality of materialism, subjectivism, or information); which is in 
fact also a limited totality (which the counter-enthusiast shows by slotting that false totality within 
his own more capacious perspective).  
 This project is concerned with the formal and structural features of counter-enthusiasm 
itself—which are literary, in that they hinge on rhetorical, allegorical, and figurative techniques for 
representing other minds and bodies, but which are in a sense proto-literary, in that they are 
concerned first and foremost with the representation of shared reality and the relation of worldly 
creatures to the author of being. The discourse of enthusiasm is important for arranging and 
organizing totalities—not only in each counter-enthusiastic example, but in the discourse as a 
whole. In a future version of this project, I hope to connect the role the enthusiast plays in 
collective mimesis (by representing false totalities) to the emergence of the form of narrative 
known as the novel, which can be seen not only as a post-religious totality in itself (as Lukàcs has 
famously argued) but as a formal auditorium of limited totalities.59 This form seems ideally suited 
to the double task of the discourse of enthusiasm—to fold these enthusiastic characters, each of 
which is a totality onto itself, into another, wider, more capacious totality. Moreover, this 
ideological imperative to contain apparent totalities within oneself might be linked in the longer 
term to the liberal valorization of “manysidedness,” which can be seen as a form of counter-
enthusiastic being suspending many committed ideological perspectives—many points-of-view in 
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themselves total—within one’s universally sympathetic and personally ironic self-understanding.60 
For now, these connections must remain merely suggestive. 
* 
6. Enthusiasm and perspicuity  
 As suggested above, the discourse of enthusiasm finally opened on to a more basic 
question regarding the nature of language and its relation, on one hand, to God, and on the other 
hand, to human beings. In closing this introduction, I would like to develop my sense of the 
connection between enthusiasm and language, as this will be a central focus in all that follows.  
 Prior studies of enthusiasm have recognized the connection of enthusiasm and language. 
But they have not delved to the basis of this connection—to the role of the understanding of the 
Word itself for the political significance of prophecy. Instead, they have emphasized the degree to 
which enthusiasm was thought of as connected to a disorderly style of speaking and writing—
overly ornate and undisciplined. In this way, once again, they have largely reproduced the 
polemical perspective of counter-enthusiasts like (as we will see) Meric Casaubon, Henry More, 
John Smith, and John Locke. Nevertheless, it is worth reviewing prior work on the connection of 
enthusiasm and language in order to further clarify the distinctiveness of my approach here. 
 The relation between enthusiasm and linguistic style is first formulated in the twentieth 
century by George Williamson, who notes that the “neoclassical” style of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries is motivated by “the revolt against Enthusiasm.”61 He is the first—but hardly 
the last—to trace this revolt through a series of thinkers (Bacon, Hobbes, Thomas Sprat) who 
self-consciously combat “obscurity” in language, which they associate with the ecstatic 
enthusiasms of misled scholastic philosophers and theologians, and propose instead stylistic 
ideals of “plainness” and “perspicuity.” During the mid-twentieth century, many critics reinforce 
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his sense of the century as witnessing “the rise of the plain style,” in opposition to rhetoricity and 
metaphor as such.62 Perhaps most influentially, Richard Foster Jones’ investigations into 
seventeenth-century style purport to find Royal Society members like Joseph Glanvill revising 
their prose to eliminate enthusiastic flourishes, showing, in Jones’ words, that “distrust of 
language and hatred of words” is “a unique characteristic of early modern science,” cultivated, in 
part, as a reaction to the perceived scourge of enthusiasm.63 
 Having become something of a critical truism, the thesis that perspicuity is a late-century 
revolt against enthusiasm met with powerful and necessary backlash in the later decades of the 
twentieth century. As Brian Vickers notes, thinkers like Bacon, Hobbes, Sprat, and Glanvill do 
claim to write in a plain style. But this doesn’t mean we should believe they have a monopoly on 
stylistic plainness as such. This doesn’t even mean that they personally achieve a plain style in any 
objective sense.64 Their writings are as rhetorical as anyone else’s. Their language is, inevitably, 
soaked in style, plain or not. And their prolific writings demonstrate not an aversion to words, 
but a mastery of them. What is at issue in questions of style for Vickers and like-minded critics is 
the larger polemical context of the moment. As Vickers writes: 
 The crucial fact, which must never be lost sight of in discussing the seventeenth 
 century, is that contemporary accounts of style are seldom neutral or accurately 
 descriptive. They are the result of animus, or controversy, or party politics, or 
 religious dispute. What so many of these writers give us is not a program or manifesto for 
 how they themselves intend to write but an account of how their opponents write. And 
 diagnosing their opponents’ style is an action that does not exist on the same level as 
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 writing a prescriptive style manual. Nor, actually, is the dispute primarily one about style. 
 You attack your enemies for their style, but that is part of your whole campaign; or, 
 equally, the style is a symptom of something else that you disapprove of.65 
In short, there is no style shift away from rhetoric and toward plainness. There is a time-honored 
polemical practice of accusing those you disagree with of being mere sophists and rhetoricians, 
while you and yours are logical, reasonable, and truthful.66 
 Vickers is right to emphasize that a progressive history of style marching out of the 
murkily beautiful darkness of (say) Thomas Browne toward the plain clarity of (say) William 
Temple, which is openly relished in a critic like Basil Wiley and often implied in Jones, is too 
simple an account. But his treatment of style as “a symptom of something else you disapprove of,” 
as a surface effect which is overly emphasized in Jones’ account, to some extent misses the point. 
As Jones understands, language was not merely a vehicle and occasional target of late-century 
religious and political controversy. It was a theoretical object of the highest value lodged at the 
center of such controversy. Disputes over the basic nature of the relation of words to things, of 
language to nature, were centrally important to the later seventeenth century.67 They were not 
polemical flourishes. They drove to the religious heart of the matter. 
 The notion that the calm, orderly prose of the enlightened writer contrasts with the 
rhetorically disordered surface of the enthusiastic writer must be understood within the context 
of the political theology of language. The claim to possess plain language was itself a claim to 
theological priority over other, competing groups. Insofar as one’s language was clear, plain, and 
perspicuous, it reflected the perspicuity universally acknowledged as intrinsic to God’s creation 
and to the Bible. The value of plainness for questions of spiritual authority is clearly evident, for 
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instance, in the paradox noted by Roger Pooley, N.H. Keeble, and others, who show that all sides 
of the intra-Protestant controversies in early modern England claimed to speak and write plainly, 
while accusing their opponents of extravagance and excess.68 This maps the struggle for scriptural 
and hermeneutic authority in the seventeenth century. From Keeble’s perspective, there is a shift 
in the discourse of plainness over the course of the century that reflects the broader religious 
atmosphere of early modern England. Early on, the growing movement of Protestants known as 
Puritans claim to read and preach plainness, largely emphasizing the avoidance of Latin and 
Greek obfuscations in favor of straightforward and easily understood English preaching, as 
exemplified in William Perkins’ Arte of Prophecying (1592 and 1607): “[Preaching should be] both 
simple and perspicuous, fit both for the peoples understanding, and to expresse the Majestie of 
the Spirit … Wherefore neither the words of arts, nor Greeke and Latine phrases and quirkes 
must be intermingled in the sermon.”69 This stylistic standard is, Keeble joins Pooley in observing, 
set in contrast to the ornate, learned, allusive style of the High Church of the 1630s—exemplified 
best, perhaps, in the prose style of Andrewes or Donne. Later in the century, the shoe appears to 
be on the other foot, as Anglican clergy “present themselves as the guardians of lucidity and 
perspicuity against the extravagant excesses of the nonconformists’ metaphorical and figurative 
indulgence, imprecise and obscurely evocative phraseology, and wild flights of fancy.”70 Keeble 
proposes a standard for sorting out this debate: nonconformists tend to emphasize the 
ineffability of the experience of God, which is finally beyond all language, while conformists want 
God and his doctrines to make rational sense.71 And this observation, as we will see, is certainly 
valuable in helping to trace the emergence of “reason” as the standard for divine-human contact, 
as especially emphasized by the Cambridge Platonists. But one needn’t go this far with the 
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analysis. Certainly orthodox Christians, even those committed to rationality, are capable of 
placing the ineffable at the center of their belief—with Aquinas being only a particularly obvious 
example. And likewise unorthodox Christians champion the rationality of religious concepts—
and here one might think especially of Milton. What is at conflict is not so much a question of 
differing subjective attitudes toward the divine, as differing attitudes toward the role of language 
in mediating divine authority.  
 The crux of the matter is simple. All Christian sects of the seventeenth century, 
nonconformist and conformist alike, affirm the perspicuity of scripture. This is, indeed, a 
Protestant truism from Luther to Calvin to Arminius to Tyndale to Cranmer to Foxe to 
Cromwell. All Protestant theologies insist that they are simply reading scripture in the simplest 
and most consistent terms. They are reading the plain, literal meaning.72 Others extravagantly 
impose their own interpretations upon the obvious. Perspicuity reflects divine light; the 
perspicuous preacher is a medium through which the spirit shines. Extravagance reflects pride 
and sin; the extravagant preacher produces an image of divine truth as stamped by his own 
muddied, polluted, and deformed mind.  
 This is not to say that there aren’t clear hermeneutical differences detectable in the 
various approaches to figuring perspicuity. For established clergy and their secular apologists, 
some degree of respect for and training in the ancient languages through which scripture and its 
hermeneutic history was historically received remained essential to bringing out the intrinsic 
perspicuity of the scriptures. This dovetails with the cessessionist approach to the problem of 
false prophecy which we will touch on in the chapter that follows. Launcelot Andrewes, for 
instance, notes that “at first, to shew the glorie of His greatnesse,” Christ “took and imployed 
Fishermen, such as had no bringing up in Schooles. But, it was not long after, but Learned men came 
in apace: Learned men of all sorts; Zenas, in Law; Luke, in Physique; Apollo, with his Eloquence; 
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Dionyse, with his Philosophie; S. Paul, with his much learning … Which learning … turned not his braines, 
nor did them any hurt at all.”73 Where immediate revelation is possible, as in the time of Christ, it 
is available to all; subsequently, learning is important in disseminating and clarifying the message. 
Learning is a historical prism, as it were, that makes the divine light visible to human eyes. To this 
extent, Church of England theology reflected Catholic theological tradition, which has always 
maintained the necessity of hierarchized and inspired interpretation to make sense of the 
apparent (but only apparent) obscurities of the Bible. (As Augustine puts it, in the strongest terms, 
“[One] should not believe the Gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic 
Church.”)74 But they also mitigated this commitment to hermeneutic authority with a sense that 
the meaning of scripture, in its origins and still for the most part, is clear to the ordinary 
understanding. For some of their radical opponents—for Thomas Müntzer, Prophet Hunt, or 
George Fox—such interjections of tradition were transparently interpretable as attempts to stifle 
the vitality of the gospel and starve the lay people who harbored true Christianity.  
* 
7. Language and embodiment 
 This study builds on this critical tradition of understanding enthusiasm’s role in the 
figuration of perspicuity. It sees a common element linking 1) Williamson’s observation (later 
refined by Jones) that neoclassical stylistic perspicuity is defined in opposition to enthusiasm, 2) 
Vickers’ observation that charges of linguistic obscurity and “mere rhetoric” were common to 
early modern polemics, and 3) Keeble’s observation that English Protestants of every confession 
claimed to understand, interpret, and profess the plain and clear meaning of scripture. I see all of 
these positions as reflecting dimensions of the central fact that language had special political and 
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theological significance in early modern England, specifically because it was understood to be the 
medium of revelation. As revelation was contested in Luther’s long wake, language was 
retheorized. The enthusiast offered a vehicle for this retheorization of language vis-à-vis human 
experience, on one hand, and divinity, on the other. The enthusiast’s virtual body, in short, 
provided a conceptual crucible for thinking about what language is, how it is related to God, and 
how it can be distorted by the limitations of human embodiment. 
 I hope it is intuitively clear why the question of how humanity and divinity are linked 
through language is important for any consideration of prophecy. The prophet works through 
hearing and speech—and, especially when canonized, through the analogous literary actions of 
reading and writing. Moreover, the prophet himself is represented as God’s conduit or 
amanuensis. He hears “the word of the LORD,” as the Bible so often puts it.75 And he so often 
prefaces his exhortations: “thus saith the LORD.”76 And congregants of whatever denomination 
then hear the word of the LORD through the record of scripture. We will have occasion for 
further exploration of the importance of the theorization of language for prophecy in the 
chapters that follow—particularly in the chapter on John Locke. For now, it is important simply 
to establish that prophecy—a word which literally means “to speak before”—is primarily an aural 
form. 
 Thus the crisis of authority represented by the discourse of enthusiasm raises many 
questions regarding the capacity of language to serve as a conduit for divine messages. While the 
basic semiotic connection between humanity and divinity is upheld by this discourse, it reframes 
the nature of this connection. Many important studies have charted the rising emphasis on “the 
Book of Nature” rather than “the Book of Scripture” in decoding the language of God.77 My 
project finds in the discourse of enthusiasm a different—if perhaps complementary—discursive 
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movement which seeks to evacuate the prophetic claims of later saints by clarifying the structure 
of the speaking body in general. The unlicensed prophet claims to speak for God. The counter-
enthusiast purports to explain why this cannot actually be happening—why the enthusiastic body 
should be understood as closed off from linguistic contact with the divine.  
 In the works of Henry More, the enthusiast is imagined as a mimetically closed vessel, 
interacting only with the sensual realm of nature and never allowed to reflect the rational mind of 
God. The enthusiast is thus mimetically limited to representing only himself. He is configured, to 
recall the terms used above, as a closed mimetic body. Moreover, he purports to reveal the 
enthusiast’s basic doctrinal tendency to read the whole created universe as a solipsistic allegory of 
his own existence—thus to privilege his own private incarnation over the Incarnation of the 
Word in the flesh of Jesus Christ. The enthusiast, in his reading, becomes a mad allegorist 
recentering Christian typology on his own brief candle.  
 John Locke approaches the relation between language and embodiment differently. In 
Book Three of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he generalizes the Adamic theory of 
language (which traditionally sees things as having an essential correspondence to words, a 
correspondence discerned by Adam in the prelapsarian state), showing its connection to all 
human utterance, while at the same time rejecting the essentialist theory of language in favor of 
the view that most forms of linguistic reference are in fact arbitrary. He thus cuts the magic cord, 
as it were, linking humanity to Eden through language—and so severs the theoretical basis of 
enthusiastic authority.  
 Jonathan Swift treats the relation of embodiment, language, and enthusiasm somewhat 
differently. He sees the enthusiast as a role one might play on the historical-literary stage, and 
imagines a war of information between those who appear—whether because they are fools or 
knaves—to believe in innovative theological and philosophical certainties, and those who are able 
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to indicate that they only provisionally enthusiastic.78 In Swift’s view, some display and exploit a 
meaningful gap between themselves—their persons—and the enthusiasts they wear in their 
writings—their personae. Others show no such awareness; they cannot understand, or at least 
cannot communicate, the distinction. Thus the true enthusiast—that is to say, the false 
prophet—is a fusion of person and persona. The false enthusiast—that is, in a sense, the true 
prophet—communicates the gap between who one is and who one appears at various times to be. 
 These counter-enthusiasms are very different. But they have in common a central 
concern with refining the inherited understanding of the role of language as a divine medium and 
its relation to embodied experience. It should also be emphasized that each defines enthusiasm in 
terms of an insufficient appreciation of the extent to which language is a collective rather than a 
personal inheritance. For More, the enthusiast narcissistically reads the whole arc of figuration as 
referring to the self he happens to occupy. For Locke, the enthusiast belatedly and illegitimately 
reactivates the Adamic charism of world-naming—forgetting that he already exists within a 
perfectly functional (and indeed indispensable) horizon of conventional meaning. For Swift, the 
enthusiast fails to notice the degree to which he cannot advocate a position without also stepping 
into a role—and thus becoming legible as a type. For all three thinkers, to put it plainly, language 




 Before turning to the historical introduction of the concept of enthusiasm, it would 
perhaps be helpful to discuss briefly the general methodological approach of this project.  
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 This is a literary history of a particular concept—enthusiasm—and a set of concepts 
informing that concept—above all, language, authority, and prophecy. It is a literary history not 
only because it includes literary figures (above all, Swift) but also because it emphasizes the 
mimetic, allegorical, and figurative dimensions of this history—dimensions which are generally 
overlooked or underemphasized in more straightforward intellectual histories of early modern 
religion. This study is rooted in a period frequently associated not with literature but its 
absence—the 1640s and 50s in England. I show, as others have done but in a different way, that 
literary work is far from absent during this period.79 Indeed, it is absolutely crucial. But it might 
appear more or less invisible to the literary canon. And this is because, as I mentioned in the 
above discussion of Auerbach, the mid-century work of literature is involved in the more basic 
task of representing reality itself, and sorting its dimensions during a time of unprecedented 
theological, political, and epistemological uncertainty. Literature in this period is thus especially 
difficult to distinguish from history, philosophy, and theology, and that is paradoxically what 
makes it such an important moment to study from a literary historical perspective. One sees here 
literature where the rubber meets the road, as it were. 
 That said, as I’ve mentioned, I am certainly indebted to the intellectual histories of 
enthusiasm that have preceded me—particularly those of Michael Heyd, Ann Taves, Jon Mee, 
and J.G.A. Pocock. My debts to their lines of thinking—and to those of many others who have 
covered areas important to this investigation—will be apparent throughout the study that follows. 
(I introduce these contexts as needed rather than crowd them in at the beginning.) 
 As this introduction likely makes clear already, this study explicates the creation of a 
literary discourse—the discourse of enthusiasm—with profound political-theological implications. 
It draws upon history, but also connects historical evidence to larger conceptual claims regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric, and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Smith; Achinstein.  
 
 38	  
the representation of reality. At times I discuss the discourse of enthusiasm in a historical register, 
as related to particular controversies and events. At other times, I discuss this discourse as a 
conceptual formation with, as it were, a life of its own that outruns particular historical moments 
even as it comes to life within them. At times, the discussion here emphasizes the way the 
discourse is shaped by particular agents—in this study, three profoundly influential writers. At 
other times, it treats the discourse as a mimetic field bigger than any given writer—as a genre, or 
a gathering of tropes. (This latter approach, which sees enthusiasm as a discourse that uses 
writers as much as writers use it, is particularly evident in the following chapter.) This 
compromise between thinking of the discourse of enthusiasm and the problem of false prophecy 
which it inflects as either purely historical or purely conceptual is bound to leave many readers 
unsatisfied. But it aspires to reflect the way that ideas themselves—and this idea, enthusiasm, in 
particular—have this double quality. They occur in particular moments, but they also bear a 
general significance to which any given moment and any given conduit must remain blind. The 
availability of massive searchable databases such as Early English Books Online and Eighteenth-
Century Collections Online—and this project, as my footnotes will make clear, took root in these 
databases—helps make this clear in a new way. As Peter de Bolla has recently observed, such 
resources have the potential not only to continue scholarly trends toward the deconstruction, 
complication, and specification of the history of ideas—but also to recover and refresh a larger, 
more general view of past concepts: to locate and trace those ideas (to fall into an older critical 
idiom) “which attain a wide diffusion, which become a part of the stock of many minds.”80 I have 
found this to be true, especially when these massive databases are paired with careful close 
readings of those writers who clearly do shape the discourse consciously and effectively, such that 
their innovations and refinements become absorbed into subsequent iterations of the idea under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), 19. Quoted in Peter 
de Bolla, The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human Rights (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2013), 12. 
 39	  
examination. The three writers I focus on here are, in my view, among the most important such 
discourse-changing figures. 
 Not long ago, Lorraine Daston formulated a view that has subsequently guided my sense 
of literary historical methodology—or, more specifically, my sense of how to balance historical 
specificity and conceptual generality in pursuing a historically- and philosophically-informed 
literary criticism. She noticed the indebtedness of “concepts” not to distinct logical ideas, but to 
paradoxically coherent entanglements of logically distinct threads.81 She noticed further that the 
humanities have grown remarkably adept at detangling the logically distinct threads within 
concepts—particularly after Foucault—but increasingly less adept at accounting for this 
paradoxical coherence. Instead, she remarks, people are inclined to treat history as somewhat 
arbitrary—as “an enormous smorgasbord,” in her words, from which one might pick and choose 
“the epistemic attitudes” one prefers—and to stake their projects on a desire to detach some 
aspect from a past conceptual whole and transpose it to the present.82  
 One might certainly take issue with this view, but to me it seems to identify correctly an 
approach to the past widespread in the humanities—particularly in literary studies, which so often 
stake their importance on the translatability and portability of past representations.83 Looking 
back from the present is inevitable. But shifting too quickly between the contexts of the early 
modern and fully modern centuries without accounting carefully for larger continuities and 
discontinuities does particular injustice to the former, rendering it at times too simple and at 
times too complicated. Simplification occurs, for example, when politics and theology or religion 
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and secularity are treated as though they must have been “ostensibly discrete” domains or modes 
in the early modern era, when this was very far from the case.84 And over-complication occurs, 
for instance, when the emphasis on the varieties of religious experience in the past effaces the 
common ground upon which faiths clashed—specifically, as I will argue, on the status of 
revelation. We can better understand where we are now with regard to political theology when we 
recognize the broader horizon against which the various apparently discrete views of More, 
Locke, and Swift—and, although I cannot develop these connections at length in the present 
project, Hobbes, Spinoza, Milton, and many well-known and lesser-known thinkers—respond to 
this one coherent problem, indeed, this problem about the coherence of the world and the status 
of totality: the problem of prophecy. This might not help us to assemble a preferred secular 
ethics, but it should help to elucidate some the missed conversations we see every day in the 
contemporary world. In other words, it might help us to account not for the present that we 
would prefer to experience, but the present that we are experiencing.  
* 
9. Overview 
 In this project, I establish that the discourse of enthusiasm consistently did two things. 
First, it pathologized its polemical target, the self-authorized prophet, who became known as “the 
enthusiast.” Second, it imitated this target, recovering in an ironized form the spiritual authority it 
appeared on the first level to discredit. The enthusiast was thus a puppet effigy of a false prophet 
which was, in the same polemical motion, rhetorically rehabilitated in complex ways by many 
writers identified now with the literary culture of the English enlightenment. Although the three 
counter-enthusiasms I look at in this study are remarkably varied, they share this double-structure. 
They not only polemicize, but also provisionally reinhabit the enthusiast. 
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 In the chapter that follows, I offer an historical account of the discourse of enthusiasm as 
it emerges from and transforms the discourse of heresy from the early English Reformation 
(specifically, from the 1539 publication of the first legal English Bible) to the mid-seventeenth 
century. The next three chapters examine particular—and particularly influential—counter-
enthusiasts. As mentioned, each counter-enthusiasm works on two basic levels. First, the 
enthusiast is defined and delimited. Second, some version of the enthusiast is rehabilitated. In 
describing the counter-enthusiasm of Henry More, I emphasize, first, his way of provisionally 
appropriating materialist perspectives in order to despiritualize unlicensed prophets; second, I 
examine his positive enthusiasm of Incarnation—where the spiritual capacity of language is 
connected not to one’s own flesh, but to the Word made flesh. I then turn to John Locke, whose 
theory of language is designed to address the problem of popular spiritual authority at the root—
by de-essentializing language and trivializing the Adamic word. But again Locke has a positive 
enthusiasm as well—which comes out in his paraphrase of Paul’s Epistles, which I read as an 
extension and qualification of his work on language in the Essay. Finally, I consider Jonathan 
Swift. I identify in Swift’s work two satirical approaches the enthusiasm—the first (and best 
known) of which travesties the enthusiast, the second of which finds in ironic imitations of 
enthusiasm a capacity to communicate prophetically, to reach his readers, to connect. An 
epilogue considers the longer legacy of the discourse of enthusiasm and its importance in 
particular for the ensuing ambivalence regarding the capacity of language to act as a vehicle for 







2. WHAT WAS ENTHUSIASM? 
 
        The audacity of your mad 
        belief resembles that of the 
        child who devises a monster 
        and then afterward fears it. 
          -Sor Juana85 
 
1. The Heretical Paradigm 
 In 1539, plagued with uprisings both real and threatened in the wake of his rupture from 
the Roman Catholic Church, Henry VIII finally legalized the English Bible and required that it be 
chained to a rostrum in every church in his kingdom. The text of this Bible was largely the work 
of William Tyndale, who in 1524 had fled Henry’s anti-Protestant England for the Low Countries, 
where by 1526 he had illegally translated the New Testament from Erasmus’ Greek into English. 
In 1530 he published an English Pentateuch from the Hebrew.86 Between 1526 and 1566, over 
forty editions of Tyndale’s scriptures, three authoritative and the rest pirated, were printed at 
Worms and Antwerp and then smuggled into the English market between 1526 and 1566.87 
Tyndale died, as is well known, in 1536, having been apprehended by Henry’s spies, tried, 
strangled with a chain (a sign of respect afforded a scholar), and then burned at the stake.88 The 
works bearing Tyndale’s name remained illegal long after his words were licensed to be uttered in 
English churches; indeed, owning any of them, including the scripture translations, was a capital 
crime.89 At the same time, refusing to accept the legitimacy of the English Testaments he helped 
produce, by 1539 incorporated into a massive folio called the Great Bible, was, if not punishable 
by death, still punishable.90 
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 It is very unlikely Henry would have seen any irony in these events. He had finally broken 
from the Church of Rome with the 1534 Act of Supremacy. Thereafter he imagined himself to be 
the sole legitimate conduit for scripture in England. In 1536 he opposed the translation of the 
Bible. In 1539 he endorsed it. His will was the spigot controlling the flow of the Holy Spirit into 
English ears and minds. He had graciously turned the spigot on—but he reserved the right to 
turn it off again whenever he wished. 
 This attitude is expressly represented in the well-known frontispiece of the Great Bible, 
which imagines King Henry as the divinely-appointed distributer of the Verbum Dei—the Word 
of God. (See figure 2.1 in appendix.) On Henry’s right, ecclesiastical viceroys of the newly 
established Church of England receive the Word from Henry and preach it to a thankful mass of 
people—most of whom are declaring, rather oddly in Latin, “Vivat Rex!” (Latin appears still to 
have been understood to be the more efficacious language of spirit.) Two of the subjects English 
this: “God Save the Kynge!” The sermon text unspooling from the mouth of the preacher is 
from 1 Timothy 2, which exhorts the people to pray for and thank “kynges, and for all that are in 
auctorite, that we maye lyve a quyet peaceable lyfe, wyth all Godlynes and honestye.”91 On 
Henry’s left, secular politicians likewise receive the Word. As one follows the story of their power 
down the page, one finds that it instills less jubilation in the unhappy subjects stowed in the 
prison at the bottom of the secular side. The symbolism is clear. Henry is God’s intermediary on 
earth. Indeed, one can see him in the upper right hand corner actually talking to God, receiving a 
prophetic charge. Henry derives from his special status as God’s viceroy authority over both 
spiritual and worldly matters. He has been divinely appointed England’s monopolist of both 
legitimate violence, symbolized in the prison, and legitimate prophetic representation of God’s 
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Will, symbolized in the pulpit. He is the source of righteous fear within this world, and 
deferential hope for another.  
 Indeed, the symbolism of the Great Bible—among many other possible examples—
illustrates clearly the interdependent nature of the late feudal monopolies of legitimation in 
England. The monopolies on doctrine, revelation, and violence support one another. These three 
monopolies hold up the polity like the three legs of a stool—on top of which Henry is 
comfortably perched. 
 That, at least, was how it was supposed to work in theory. In practice, as is well known, 
the English Reformation—like most European Reformations—was vexed, bloody, protracted, 
and profoundly destabilizing for the existing medieval culture.92 Signs of troubles to come are not 
hard to find even in this very early document of the Church of England. In his Preface to the 
Great Bible, Thomas Cranmer identifies two signs of danger: on the one hand, traditionalist 
grumblers who obstruct the reading the Bible out of respect for (in his terms) “custom,” whom 
he exhorts to obey their king and read their Bible for the good of their souls; on the other, those 
who take the privilege of reading scripture too far, who exhibit hermeneutical “licentiousness.”93 
Eamon Duffy and others have studied the unsettling effect of the English Reformation on the 
first sort—the Catholic English who find their allegiances torn between king and pope.94 This 
chapter will concentrate on the second sort—the licentious readers who will be recast, by the 
mid-seventeenth century, as “enthusiasts.” 
 Cranmer’s warning in the Great Bible already displays a number of the tropes, motifs, and 
themes that will build the discourse of enthusiasm for decades to come. For example, the 
warning is cast in quasi-medical terms of purity and danger, albeit rather in a Levitical than (as 
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will be common later) a Galenic register.95 For Cranmer, “inordinate reading, undiscrete speaking, 
conscientious disputing” and “licentious living” are all of a piece. In the right dosage and taken in 
the right devotional attitude, Scripture is “the most healthful medicine.” But just as medicines 
become poisons when wrongly administered, so too the scripture can cause damage when placed 
in impure hands and mouths. “[F]or it is dangerous,” Cranmer writes, “for the unclean to touch 
that thing that is most clean: like as the sore eye taketh harm by looking upon the sun.” Only 
those “of exact and exquisite judgments,” who have “spent their time before in study and 
contemplation”—i.e. those trained in theology at Oxford or Cambridge—are fit to interpret the 
Word. The layperson ought rather to receive it, “showing himself to be a sober and fruitful 
hearer and learner, which if he do, he shall prove at the length well able to teach, though not with 
his mouth, yet with his living and good example, which is sure the most lively and most 
effectuous form and manner of teaching.” Cranmer sums up his anti-licentious hermeneutics 
succinctly: “I forbid not to read, but I forbid to reason. Neither forbid I to reason so far as is 
good and godly. But I allow not that is done out of season, and out of measure and good 
order.”96  
 As I will suggest in this chapter, one can see here the pulling apart of two paradigms. On 
the one hand, it is forbidden to reason. Any private thoughts—opinions, i.e. heresies—that 
interfere with the transmission and understanding of the Word of God are to be resisted, 
confessed, purged. On the other, it is forbidden to reason “out of season.” Reasoning is 
allowed—but only in certain circumstances. It must be a controlled reasoning. This is, in brief, 
the difference between the heretical and enthusiastic paradigms for identifying false prophetic 
strains within the body politic. On the one hand, opinions are not admissible. Any opinion is a 
mark of prideful distance from the divine truth. (One might think of Dante’s sinful opinionizing 
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in hell, where he feels pity for the suffering damned. Virgil admonishes him: “Qui vive la pietà 
quand’ è ben morta”—as translated by Dorothy Sayers, “Here pity, or here piety, must die.”97 
One must give up one’s own thoughts and conform to the divine will.) On the other, opinions 
are admissible. But they must be adjudged “good,” “godly,” “seasonable,” “measured,” “orderly.” 
They must reflect a balanced and proper piety. One might say—they must be properly 
formulated, delimited, state-accredited. Where the heretical paradigm imagines the subjectivity of 
the believer as participating in a divine totality to which it either conforms or doesn’t conform, 
the enthusiastic paradigm imagines the utterance as an occasion to decide whether or not the 
subjectivity that gives it egress has properly situated this given thought within the divine balance 
of wholes. In the one, the believer’s mind is microcosmic. The mind must be controlled. In the 
other, the utterance is microcosmic. The word must be controlled. These are, traditionally, from 
Aristotle forward, the two sides of logos—thoughts within, and thoughts (i.e. words) without the 
mind.98 The heresy paradigm emphasizes the former, enthusiasm the latter. 
 Cranmer frames his concerns about licentious reading as a matter of pastoral care. He 
simply doesn’t want any of his parishioners harmed —and their salvation jeopardized—by 
improper hermeneutical conduct. Their sore eyes must be shielded from too much sun. But quite 
soon after the licensed publishing of the English Bible it became clear that the potential 
ramifications for established power of the widespread availability of popular scripture involved 
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much more than a few lost sheep. It involved the possibility of whole lost flocks—of new basic 
understandings of political legitimacy, and of the explosion of the state monopoly on revelation. 
 As a case in point, consider Thomas Bonner, the Bishop of London at the time of the 
publication of the Great Bible.99 Bonner’s initial support for the Great Bible was such that he far 
exceeded Henry’s order that at least one copy be made publically available to each congregation. 
He privately purchased six Great Bibles for St. Paul’s Cathedral and had them chained to reading 
pulpits situated throughout the church. Faced with a laity eager to exploit his generosity, Bonner 
soon found it necessary to clarify the terms under which these Bibles could be used. Above each 
chained copy of the Great Bible he posted “An admonition and advertisement.” Echoing 
Cranmer, Bonner insisted that only the pure and meek should approach the Word: 
 [R]ight expedient, yeah, necessary it shall be also that leaving behind him vainglory, 
 hypocrisy, and all other carnal and corrupt affections, he bring with him discretion, 
 honest intent, charity, reverence, and quiet behavior […] Evermore foreseeing that no 
 number of people be specially congregate therefore, to make a multitude. And that no 
 exposition be made thereupon, otherwise than it is declared in the book it self.100 
Bonner, in line with Cranmer but showing more urgency, subscribes to something like a 
Donatism of the laity: only the pure may read, and only in such a way as to avoid gathering to 
themselves congregations, whether through oratorical or hermeneutical brilliance.  
 The admonition does not appear to have worked. At least one member of Bonner’s 
congregation, John Porter, died after being arrested for preaching in too distressing a manner. As 
John Foxe writes: “[G]reat multitudes would resort thither to hear this Porter, because he could 
read well and had an audible voice. […] Bonner then laid unto his charge, that he had made 
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exposition upon the text, and gathered great multitudes about him to make tumults.”101 Bonner 
sent Porter to Newgate, where he was further roughly handled for preaching the gospel to the 
other prisoners. Within a week of his imprisonment, he was dead. Margaret Aston, among other 
historians, has recommended that Foxe’s narrative be taken with a grain of salt. She notes that 
Bonner’s grievance against Porter was more likely that he read the gospel during church services 
than that he read it at all; indeed, it seems that more than a few “Gospellers” of the 1540s took 
pride in reading the word of God “while ye read in the quire the pope’s service and the devil’s 
service” (in the words of William Turner).102 But this only clarifies the conflict that emerged 
quickly upon the introduction of the vernacular Bible to churches. The available word of God 
became widely understood not as a supplement to established hermeneutics but a replacement or 
challenge to a theology at once brand new and still rooted in the Latin mass. The Bible 
threatened to render the church superfluous.  
 Certain orthodox theologians—whom we might now call “conservative,” though neither 
that term nor its usual antonyms (“progressive,” “liberal,” and “radical”) fit comfortably into the 
post-Reformation theological-political milieu—had long seen this coming. Following the 
licensing of the English Bible, for instance, Stephen Gardiner, who would become Mary I’s Lord 
Chancellor, observed in horror that every English reader of the Bible is potentially “a church 
alone.” Cuthbert Tunstall, the Bishop of Durham, reportedly muttered around the same time, 
“They will see what we do.”103 The ambiguity in this phrase is irresistible. Put the emphasis on do, 
and Tunstall appears anxious that “they,” the laity, will have unmediated access to the practices 
that confer authority. Put the emphasis on we, and he appears worried that they will discern the 
secret of politics—that political legitimacy is less a divine creation than a human invention.  
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 Within a few years of furnishing his churches with Great Bibles, Henry VIII had seen 
enough. In the Act for the Advancement of True Religion (May 1543), he declared:  
 [M]any seditious people, arrogant and ignorant persons whereof some  
 pretending to be learned, and to have the perfect and true knowledge,  
 understanding and judgment of the sacred and holy scriptures, and some  
 other of their perverse, froward and malicious minds, wills and intents,  
 intending to subvert the very true and perfect expositions, doctrine, and  
 declaration of the said scripture, after their perverse fantasies: have taken  
 upon them, not only to preach, teach, declare, and set forth the same by  
 words, sermons, disputations, and arguments, but also by printed books, printed  
 ballads, plays, rhymes, songs, and other fantasies, subtily and craftily instructing  
 his highness’ people, and especially the youth of this his realm, untruly and  
 otherwise than the scripture ought or should be taught, declared or expounded and 
 contrary to the very sincere, and godly meaning of the same.104  
Not only, then, were English people reading the Bible with loud and high voices; they were using 
that amplifier of amplifiers, the printing press, to promulgate their interpretations and to mingle 
the holy words of scripture with baser human inventions in “ballads, plays, rhymes, songs, and 
other fantasies.” Here was the nightmare complete: the pure language of scripture rendered 
impure by mixture with popular forms. In fact, the scripture had been used in popular literatures 
and plays for centuries without incident, as attested by the tradition of Corpus Christi plays. But 
clearly such interpolations were taking on a new meaning. They were increasingly understood not 
to reflect sovereign authority but to foment an alternative form of religious legitimacy—what I 
will call popular prophetic authority. Faced with this harrowing development, Henry promptly 
banned the Great Bible. He further banned all private Bibles—with the often-noticed proviso 
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that nobles and householders, i.e. those who owned property, could continue to read their Bibles 
quietly at home. 
 And so, just as he reserved the right to do, Henry revoked the access he had previously 
allowed. And his son Edward reinstated it. And his daughter Mary revoked it. And his daughter 
Elizabeth reinstated it. But whatever the state position of the moment vis-à-vis the laity and 
scripture, the major theological-political problem of the next century and a half had been clearly 
established. Through widespread access to the vernacular scriptures, England was poised to 
become Milton’s “Nation of Prophets.”105 The divine legitimacy once enjoyed by great arteries of 
church and state would now be divided among countless capillaries—lay preachers, local 
prophets, religious ballad-makers, unlicensed sermon-makers. 
 This is not by any means to claim that all English readers of the Bible were so 
hermeneutically licentious. Many were good readers in Cranmer’s sense: quiet cultivators of better, 
healthier interiorities. Many preferred praying at home to prophesying in the aisles. But those 
who did claim license to preach and interpret the Word found thereby an instantaneous 
legitimacy—a means to draw upon the wellsprings of a power the established church and state 
were absolutely bound to recognize, at some level, to which they were committed by a thousand 
years of tradition. The Word of God could not but be true. It had to be defended at the same 
time that it opened the state to civil attack from within. This was the vulnerable point in the 
legitimation schema that had seemed to work so well for so long—and was now turned against 
those whose institutional order was predicated upon it. 
 One event that must be understood in this context is the English Civil War—often 
characterized by historians as the last “war of religion.”106 This is not to say that there are not 
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many economic and social reasons for the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, of which England’s civil 
wars of the 1640s were a part. But these motivations found in the question of who owns the 
Word of God—and of the relative role of pastors and flock in the spiritual distribution of God’s 
Word—more than a spark. It also found continual fuel. Consider the story—told almost 
inevitably in any account of Presbyterian history—of Jenny Geddes. True or not, its literary 
features help capture the centrality of the question of the Word for the unstable political order of 
the 1630s. As the tale goes, Geddes objected to the first reading of the 1637 Book of Common 
Prayer at St. Giles’ Cathedral in Edinburgh. When the priest began to read from this book, she 
hurled a stool at him and said, “De’il gie you colic, the wame o’ ye, fause thief! Daur ye say Mass 
in my lug?”107 Other versions have Geddes object not to the preacher, but to a fellow congregant 
who was obediently repeating the liturgy when she struck him with a Bible before uttering her 
famous sentence. At any rate, this sparked a riot among the congregants and led to the re-
establishment of the Church of Scotland on the basis of Presbyterianism—the first major event, 
as is well known, in the series of civil conflicts that would occupy the British Isles for the next 
decade and more.  
 Not in my lug. This encapsulates the central issue—who gets to pour, through my ear, 
the conditioning logos of my mind? Who regulates logos without, and hence logos within? That 
Geddes’ ear is inevitably represented in the Scot original—lug—illustrates the importance of the 
vernacular in this moment of defiance. For many Presbyterians, English was to Scots as for 
radical English Protestants Latin was to English. And Geddes, like Prophet Hunt in the last 
chapter, thus refuses to hear the word in the dead letter of a dead language, preferring its living 
sense of her own tongue. She imagines prophecy, the transmission of spirit, not as a special 
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2003), 42-64. 
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activity of the past, but as a continuous experience in the present. Her ear—her lug—is thus not 
unlike Mary’s ear when it catches the conceiving voice of the angel. Her protests express a wish 
that her ear, too, and hence her conceptions, might be made holy.    
 The notion of the living word of prophetic protest, then, is highly productive for 
Presbyterians and other radical Protestants. For the established institutions of power, though, it is 
foundationally destabilizing. The prior paradigm that could rely on a hierarchical transmission of 
doctrine, in a holy and elite tongue, from God into the layperson’s head—that is, the heretical 
paradigm, which interpreted any resistant twitching of opinion within the lay worshipper in terms 
of a Satanic irritant to be purged—clearly needed to be reconceived from the bottom up.   
 In the rest of this chapter, I outline some of the forms this construction took. I 
emphasize forms that are particularly relevant to the discussion of the three counter-enthusiasts 
that follows: the enthusiast as original sinner, the enthusiast as irrational prophet, the enthusiast 
as infectious rhetor, the enthusiast as pagan, the enthusiast as inspired poet, and the enthusiast as 
chamber of wonders. These are not the only possible emphases. One might, for instance, more 
centrally feature the enthusiast as witch, or the enthusiast as natural philosopher. Part of the point 
of this rehearsal is not to exhaust the figure, but to show how many varieties of this figuration 
there are, and how many ways it has been emphasized. The emphases I’ve chosen will hopefully 
prove helpful for contextualizing the more in-depth readings that follow.  
 Moreover, this approach supports the general thesis of this chapter—which I focus on in 
the last section but which is evident throughout: the enthusiast should be understood in this early 
form of the discourse as a limited totality. The figure works to represent forms of belief that 
seem total, but which are revealed by the discourse to be partial. Another way of putting this, the 
enthusiast is represented as wanting to be seen as a special portal to God, a vehicle of revelation; 
he is revealed by the discourse to be, on the contrary, just one bee in a swarm of similar 
“singularities.” In a sense, the discourse cannot decide which dimension to emphasize, or which 
 53	  
is more horrible—the enthusiast’s monstrous uniqueness, or his total anonymity. I will suggest 
that the figure thus offers a means of representing the difference between, in the terms of 
rationalization, subjectivity and intersubjectivity.  
 As a final introductory thought, it is worth emphasizing that one of these nodes of the 
discourse of enthusiasm is unlike the others, and so warrants special attention at the outset. 
Whereas most of the tropes of enthusiasm are polemical in nature, there does persist throughout 
the seventeenth century a strain of the discourse associated with poetic inspiration which is not 
polemical—which is, indeed, valorized. I situate this as one part of the “pagan” discourse of 
enthusiasm toward the close of this chapter, as the “inspired poet” strain. It is significant for the 
project as a whole not just insofar as it complicates an otherwise negative discourse, but also in 
that it suggests the degree to which enthusiasm was from its inception available for the 
conceptualization of a form of meaningful expression and communication—not necessarily 
divine, but still prophetic. This positive form of enthusiasm was also, from its inception, marked 
by classism and elitism. It was associated with classical prestige derived from Plato, Aristotle, 
Longinus, and other authorities.  
* 
3. The enthusiast as original sinner 
 Consider the Anabaptist Thomas Müntzer. In his 1521 Prague Protest, Müntzer writes: 
“Like a stork that gobbles up frogs in the fields and ponds and then afterwards spits them out, 
just as raw, to its young in the nest…so, too, are the profit-seeking and interest-boosting parsons 
who gobble whole the dead words of Scripture and then spit out the letter and their 
inexperienced faith (which is not worth a louse) to the righteous, poor, poor people.”108 
According to Müntzer’s radical vision, “pitch-smeared parsons” and “donkey-fart doctors of 
theology” might hoard up the Word of God in their stork-like beaks. But they do not digest it. 
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They do not experience “the living speech of God,” here imagined as still-living frogs ready to be 
devoured by the stork’s poor nestlings.109 Similar images of scriptural vitality nurtured within a 
desiccated vessel emerge later in the treatise, most strikingly in Müntzer’s comparison of 
theologians to “scrotums” who carry the “marrow, juice, force, and power” of the “living word 
out of the mouth of God” without letting it penetrate them and return, refreshed, to the world.110 
Müntzer’s excoriation of the priesthood frequently picks up images of idolatry. Licensed parsons 
are “wooden,” “stone,” “dust,” and “rubble.”111 They are “diarrhea-makers” who “have taught 
the people to pray to Baal.”112 Likewise, he draws for poor, uneducated Christians associations 
resonant with unfulfilled communion. Citing Jeremiah 4.4, he writes, “The children have prayed 
for bread and there was no one there to break it for them.”113 Later he asks, “Do we lack blood in 
our body and life that affairs proceed in such a mad and stupid way?”114 
 Müntzer’s point is simple. He understands Bible interpretation as an encounter between 
text and reader—without an intervening hierarchy of priests to get in the way. To be properly 
understood, the Word of God must come alive within the believer. It must be felt. As he writes, 
“Does one not feel at least a small spark that virtually seeks to expand into tinder? Indeed, one 
feels it and I feel it too.”115 It must wriggle—like a living frog. And, most significantly, one must 
respond to this wriggling actively—by digesting the word into one’s own language. One must 
produce from one’s experience of the holy word revelations—inspired redigestions, 
rearrangements, typological repurposings. “The office of the true shepherd,” Müntzer writes, “is 
simply that the sheep should all be led to revelations and revived by the living voice of God.”116 
The Word of God itself has not suffered for its Babylonian confinement in the beaks of storks. It 
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remains as raw and vital as ever. And it is time, finally, to let its vitality mingle with and 
contribute to one’s own. For Müntzer, this form of personal hermeneutic practice does not 
distort the text. It reveals its meaning. Indeed, how can one exclude oneself from the interpretive 
process? How can one pretend not to be present, as it were, when the Word of God is uttered? 
How can one hear and say these holy words and feel nothing? 
 But for Martin Luther, who violently opposes Müntzer, the problem is not that one feels 
or hears the spirit. That is perfectly laudable. The problem is that they then speak their sense of 
the spirit, taking the external word of God, mixing it up in the self, and returning it to the world 
as a new external word—now corrupted by the enthusiast’s own interiority. As he writes in the 
Smalcald Articles: “We must firmly hold that God grants His Spirit or grace to no one, except 
through or with the preceding outward Word, in order that we may [thus] be protected against 
the enthusiasts, i.e., spirits who boast that they have the Spirit without and before the Word, and 
accordingly judge Scripture or the spoken Word, and explain and stretch it at their pleasure, as 
Müntzer did, and many still do at the present day, who wish to be acute judges between the Spirit 
and the letter, and yet know not what they say or declare.”117 It is important to note that for 
Luther the “spoken Word” is not the human word. It is the Word of God—not only as written 
in Scripture, but also as written into the world, into the heart of the faithful. It is the Word that 
was with God in the beginning, according to the opening of the Gospel of John. It is an external 
Word—a force from without the self, which reveals to the self at once one’s infinite helplessness 
to transact one’s own salvation, and one’s dependence upon a loving and forgiving creator. 
Enthusiasts like Müntzer, according to Luther, shut their ears to this Word and replace it with 
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their own human words—their own selfish interpretations of divine mysteries. They center the 
Bible—and thus the church—on their own fleshly selves.118   
 And in this, Luther continues, they are no better than the Pope. He writes, “The Pope 
boasts that all rights exist in the shrine of his heart, and whatever he decides and commands 
within his church is spirit and right, even though it is above and contrary to Scripture and the 
spoken Word.” Just as the Pope is just a human being who has set up his peculiar interpretation 
of scripture for the truth, so too each enthusiast is a miniature Pope seeking the same unholy 
privilege. Still more foundationally, he interprets enthusiasm as coextensive with original sin: “All 
this is the old devil and old serpent, who also converted Adam and Eve into enthusiasts, and led 
them from the outward Word of God to spiritualizing and self-conceit.” The false substitution of 
the outward for the inward word, of private interpretation of God’s speech, encouraged by the 
serpent commences the fall from God’s presence—“For God doth know that in the day ye eat 
thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil” (Gen 
3.5). Enthusiasm, in short, is worship of one’s own words in a state of ignorance of God’s Word.  
 As is clear, then, for Luther, enthusiasm is not simply a symptom of a deeper social or 
political problem. It is a symptom of the human condition—a sign of our fallenness, our distance 
from the divine, our tendency to see the world through the dark window of our own desires and 
emotions. Although all heresies lead, eventually, via their peculiar byways, to “the old devil and 
the old serpent,” this is especially true of enthusiasm. It is the first heresy. In some ways, it is the 
heresy intrinsic to human existence—the reliance upon the self, and the setting up of the self for 
a substitute god. (We will see in the chapter that follows how important this line of argument is 
to Henry More.) 
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 In denouncing enthusiasm, Luther notes a paradox that many others will pick up on—
though not always in the spirit he intended. He writes that enthusiasts claim to receive revelations 
themselves, but that these are only “accomplished this through other outward words.” In short, 
there is no true inward word. All words are echoes of words taken in from outside. The external 
word is the only word—and all words one uses oneself are derived from some original language 
one obviously did not create. Enthusiasts merely fool themselves into treating such words as their 
own—falsely laying hold on what can never be one’s own. For Luther, this is an open-and-shut 
difference between the Christianity he is preaching, which begins and ends in utter submission to 
God, and that preached by self-proclaimed prophets of Anabaptist sects or self-proclaimed 
priests of the papacy. To others, as will be immediately obvious from the vantage of the passage 
of centuries, the distinction is not so clear. All Christian denominations then and now preach 
submission to God. So do almost all monotheistic religious groups. All believers, then, claim to 
be evaporated in the searing power of the divine spirit—to be nothing but vessels for the truth. 
This is no less true of Luther than it is of Müntzer, and (in one of the many recapitulations of this 
contrast a century later) no less true of John Donne than it is of George Fox. Thus Luther’s 
objection might be leveraged against Luther himself. Why is his “external Word” not also an 
internal word—not also, that is, a private interpretation? On what external grounds are such 
internal determinations possible? 
* 
4. The enthusiast as belated 
 One solution that emerged among reformers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is 
the view evoked by the phrase, “the age of miracles,” understood as distinct from “the present 
age.”119 According to this perspective, prophecy was a real presence from the creation of the 
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world to the time of Christ—through the period when the scriptures were written down. Since 
the time of Christ’s apostles, it has not been necessary, and so has ceased. As Hobbes puts it: 
 Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left whereby to acknowledge the 
 pretended revelations or inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any 
 doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of 
 our Saviour supply the place and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy; 
 and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination, all rules and 
 precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without 
 enthusiasm, or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced.120 
Hobbes’ deductions from scripture—namely, that only the sovereign can justly interpret its 
meaning—might have been controversial. His sense that spiritual things then were not as they are 
now, however, was not. Indeed, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed many popular 
variations on this notion—from Milton’s virtuosic updating of Plutarch’s account of the 
cessation of oracles in “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” to Defoe’s sardonic suggestion, in 
The Political History of the Devil, that Satan doesn’t need to appear in the flesh anymore, because 
people have grown so evil that they will do his dirty work for nothing. 
 But the idea that there is a historical difference between the age of miracles and the 
present age did not do much to curtail the problem of popular spiritual authority. For one thing, 
heterodox believers fully agreed that spiritual life was different in the times of the first churches; 
they merely saw themselves as participants in the reawakening of this former, primitive spirit, 
which they took to have been long dormant and now moving once more. (This was true in 
particular of the Diggers and the Quakers, and in general of many radical dissenting groups.)121 
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For another, orthodox believers were still confronted with the problem of the Holy Spirit as a 
continuously present tether to the divine. Jesus promises his followers “another Comforter, that 
he may abide with you for ever,” whom he identifies as “the Spirit of truth; whom the world 
cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him; for he dwelleth 
with you, and shall be in you” (Jn 14.16-17). The age of direct miracles might have ceased; but 
what, then, is this promised spirit of truth, which one can only discern within oneself? How does 
it pass from God to the human soul? And how is this passing not prophetic—not, thus, a 
continuation of the prophetic dispensation? 
 Many Church of England theologians answered these questions by way of an emphasis 
on proper hermeneutic comportment. As Jeremy Taylor puts it:  
 Gods Spirit did assist the Apostles by wayes extraordinary, and fit for the first 
 institution of Christianity: but doth assist us now by the expresses of those first 
 assistances which he gave to them immediately. So that the holy Ghost is the  author  of 
 our faith, and we beleeve with the spirit (it is Saint Pauls expression) and yet our 
 beliefe comes by hearing and reading the holy Scriptures and their interpretations. 
 Now reconcile these two together, Faith comes by hearing, and yet is the gift of the 
 Spirit, and it sayes, that the gifts of the Spirit are not extasies, and immediate infusions of 
 habits, but helps from God to enable us upon the use of the meanes of his owne 
 appointment to beleeve, to speak, to understand, toprophecy [i.e. preach], and to pray.122 
For Taylor, inspiration is no longer immediate, as it needed to have been for the “first institution 
of Christianity.” All spirit now, for Taylor, is mediated by the scriptures. It must be cultivated by 
reflection (and thus the discourse in which this passage appears is a defense of liturgical forms of 
prayer over ex tempore preaching). It must be actively believed, understood, and accepted. The 
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spirit will help—but the believer must perceive and accept this help. This is a patient, disciplined 
hermeneutics of cultivated and refined reading habits.123  
* 
4. The enthusiast as irrational 
 Alongside this emphasis on disciplined hermeneutic comportment—which was 
reinforced in all the major established theologians, from Cranmer to Hooker to Donne—there 
emerged a polemical caricaturing and rejection of the opposite. Ecstasies, “immediate infusions,” 
frenzies, extemporaneous exhortations—all of these spiritual activities were associated with 
madness and fraud. And this was true not only of contemporary theological behavior. It was 
back-projected into the long history of revelation. Moses, Elijah, and even prophets like Jeremiah 
and Ezekiel who were apparently prone to ecstatic experience, at least if one reads their prophetic 
books literally, were recast as serene, self-aware conduits of divine messages. This discourse was 
inherited, on one hand, from the rational theological traditions of Maimonides and Aquinas, and 
on the other, from the political theology of witchcraft, which similarly distinguished between 
rational, masculine prophets of God, and irrational, feminine witches and sorcerers.124 As Jean 
Bodin puts it in De la démonomanie des sorciers (1580), “[C]eux, qui sont inspirez des Daemos, sont 
alors les plus furieux et insensez, et ceux qui sont inspirez de Dieu, sont alors plus sages que 
iamais” (24).125 The man of God—and with emphasis here on man—is in his right senses, and 
speaks wisdom calmly. This is why, Bodin continues, the ancient Hebrews did not distinguish 
between sages and prophets: because prophecy, when justly divine, instills sagacity. On the 
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contrary, the sibyls—and, by analogy, the witches, and (later) the enthusiasts—prophesy only in 
possession and fury. We will explore some of the ramifications of this contrast of feminine sibyls 
and masculine “true prophets” below. The distinction centrally informs Cambridge Platonism, 
Lockean epistemological linguistics, and Swiftian satire alike. 
 To put it plainly, the pressing needs of early modern politics reverse-engineered a long 
tradition of “reasonable” prophets who displayed none of the fears and tremblings polemically 
associated with radicals—and indeed imprinted upon sects called “Quakers,” “Ranters,” 
“Shakers,” etc. We will look at a crucial articulation of this perspective, John Smith’s Of Prophesie, 
in the next chapter. For now, it is worth noticing that the question of empirical accuracy fades to 
the background in this discourse. It is plainly obvious that scriptural prophets were far from 
universally serene and reflexive. Maimonides and Aquinas, in their more sophisticated (and, not 
coincidentally, more politically secure) articulations of the “rational prophet” trope, emphasize 
the extent to which strange voices, visions, and sounds accompany prophetic experiences in the 
Bible.126 Spinoza, in the Theological-Political Treatise, goes so far as to deny that prophets are 
anything but overly imaginative moral polemicists—who perceive things that aren’t really present 
with the same vividness that ordinary people perceive things that are. He denies the 
Maimonidean notion that prophets enjoy special intellectual congress with the divine and insists, 
in fact, that prophets and philosophers are very different sorts of people—the one prone to 
imaginative visions, the other to careful ratiocinations.127 And he comes to this conclusion simply 
by reading the Bible and noticing the consistency with which prophetic experiences are there 
described in ecstatic, visionary terms. (And Voltaire, a century later, takes evident delight in 
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pointing out the frequency with which Biblical prophets do quite unsociable things like eat feces 
and marry prostitutes.)128 
 It is worth reiterating that this emphasis on irrationality and frenzy by no means 
accurately reflects the religious beliefs and practices of those eventually called enthusiasts. 
Certainly there are clear instances of ecstatic experience in the writings of theological figures like 
George Fox and John Bunyan. But there are also moments of intense reflection, discernment, 
patience, and quiet that resonate with Taylor’s above recommendations. (Indeed, nowadays the 
Quakers are proverbially aligned with patience and the practice of consensus-oriented 
discernment of spirits, and with far better reasons than they were formally aligned with babbling 
and quaking.) Indeed, there is a large body of Quaker writings of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries that attempt to countervail the polemics against them—that insist that this group be 
called not Quakers but their preferred name, “the Society of Friends,” that emphasize the many 
commonalities linking their beliefs and practices with those of the mainstream, and that offer 
carefully considered reasons for those beliefs and practices that do not align.129 Likewise, there 
are many instances of passion, depression, and sudden conversion among members of groups 
more readily identifiable as orthodox—even among Anglicans. One need only think of the 
passions, obsessions, fears, and sentimental pilgrimages of Samuel Johnson.130  
* 
5. The enthusiast as rhetorical 
 But of course, we cannot expect any polemic to accurately represent its target. But the 
misalignment in this case is particularly marked. So-called enthusiasts, as we will continue to see, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Ezekiel 4.12; Hosea 1.2. Voltaire on Ezekiel’s eating habits: ““Yet it must be admitted that cow-dung and all the 
diamonds of the great Mogul are perfectly equal, not only in the eyes of a Divine Being, but in those of a true 
philosopher.” See The Works of Voltaire Volume IV, translated by William F. Fleming (New York: E.R. DuMont, 
1901), 306-07.  
129 See Keith.  
130 I am thinking especially of Johnson’s pilgrimage to Lichfield, where he stands for hours in the rain in penance for 
mistreating his father. This episode could have been part of Bunyan’s Grace Abounding—or Fox’s Journal. See James 
Boswell, Life of Johnson, edited by George Birkbeck Hill, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 373.  
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were defined philosophically, theologically, and medically as frenzied, melancholic bodies—without 
reason, without patience, without discernment, without discipline. Consider, in this light, the 
frontispiece from Daniel Featley’s The Dippers Dipt, or, the Anabaptists duck’d and plung’d over their 
ears. This work was first printed in 1645, in the midst of the English Reformation’s climactic 
decade of open religious war, and was often reprinted in the two decades that followed. Featley 
was a Calvinist theologian—and thus would have been considered an Anabaptist (or close 
enough) by many Established Church Christians of his time. Indeed, those we might call 
“conservative Calvinists” were generally among the most active architects of the early concept of 
enthusiasm. Thomas Edwards, author of Gangraena (1646), the best-known work of seventeenth-
century English heresiography, is another case in point. Eager to defend themselves from 
accusations of heresy, they turn this charge on others. 
 David Loewenstein and Anne Hughes have recently studied the work of such mid-
century Calvinist heresiographers as Featley and Edwards as their works reflect a climate of deep 
religious paranoia and anxiety regarding the spread of “blasphemy” and “heresy.”131 What I 
would notice, beyond these accounts, is that such heresiographers in fact register, albeit 
unconsciously, the inadequacy of their own preferred concepts—in particular, the inadequacy of 
heresy—for dealing with the proliferation of self-authorized religious sects. When heresy is so 
abundant—and not any particular heresy, but countless varieties—how does one even oppose it? 
How does one define an orthodoxy against which to array so many doctrinal abominations? At 
the same time, these heresiographers find, or at least foreshadow, the means of accomplishing 
this redefinition of orthodoxy. They facilitate the recognition of the common denominator of 
seventeenth-century English heresy: self-authorized claims to divine inspiration. Edwards, for 
instance, uses the Gospel warning against “false Prophets which come to you in Sheeps clothing, 
but inwardly the yare ravening Wolves” as one of his epigraphs, and regularly returns to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Loewenstein, 194. Anne Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University 
Pres, 2004). 
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image in his catalog of heresies.132 These writers begin to bring the importance of such claims to 
the forefront of the discourse. 
 Another hint of this shift is evident in the frontispiece to The Dippers Dipt, in which 
Featley documents and particularizes the so-called heresies that proliferated following the 
publication and wide distribution of the vernacular English Bible—following, that is, the spread 
of hermeneutic power beyond the licensed church. On this frontispiece, one finds, for instance, 
the Menonist—ancestor of the Mennonite—audaciously assuming the power to write new 
scripture. (See figure 2.2 in appendix.) One finds the Hemerobaptist or “daily baptizer” usurping 
the initiation rite traditionally reserved for the church. One finds the Bucheldian (a follower of 
John of Leiden) sinfully cavorting with women—and prominently baptizing them, in the nude, in 
the center woodcut. And there’s the Georgian (a follower of David Joris, whom we will meet 
again in our discussion of Henry More) with a little devil flying into his gaping, unlicensed mouth. 
And all of them are arranged under the pseudo-baptismal fiery breath of Satan—the great 
pretender, the chief spirit of lies and deception, the universal and persistent inspirer of the false 
prophetic imagination. Indeed, Satan’s breath disconcertingly resembles droppings—particularly 
as it emerges from the bottom edge of the banner—which makes for a grotesque 
transubstantiation of his unholy spirit. 
 Numbered among these many varieties of heresy is the figure in the lower left-hand 
corner of Featley’s illustration—the “enthusiast.” He clenches his fist, clearly enraged and railing 
against some perceived evil. His body is wavering, askew. He might be drunk—if not literally, 
then with his own spiritual juices. His eyes seem sunken and glassy, as though clouded by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 This is an epigraph for the Second Part of Gangraena. See Edwards, The first and second part of Gangraena, or, A catalogue 
and discovery of many of the errors, heresies, blasphemies and pernicious practices of the sectaries of this time, vented and acted in England 
in these four last years (London, 1646), 45. EEBO. The image also appears on pp. 9, 11, and 48 of Gangraena, and on pp. 
10, 37, 113, 164, and 166 of a sequel document included in the 1646 edition of Gangraena: A Fresh and further 
DISCOVERY OF THE ERROURS and Pernicious Practises of the SECTARIES in ENGLAND. 
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cataracts. His face is heavily lined and distorted by passion. He appears to be trapped within his 
own mind, shaking his fist at images painted on the insides of his eyeballs.  
 The enthusiast is here one figure among his unholy brethren. Within a decade of Featley’s 
book, he has stepped forward and threatened the Anabaptist for the crown of preferred 
metonym for heresy in general. Beginning with Henry More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus and Meric 
Casaubon’s Treatise Concerning Enthusiasm (both 1656), many treatises on enthusiasm were 
published in the mid- to late-seventeenth century. These were widely reprinted and debated well 
into the nineteenth century.133 (See appendix figure 2.3 for an estimated frequency of word use 
through the English seventeenth century.) These works also elicited many replies from purported 
enthusiasts or false prophets—very often Quakers and Catholics—who disputed the term and 
argued for the legitimacy of their form of Christian inspiration. The disputatious works on both 
sides, for the most part, continue to pursue the methods of the earlier, heretical paradigm. They 
often attack the specter of enthusiasm—and defend favored sects from the charge of 
enthusiasm—using similar exegetical methods to those seen in intra-Christian debates from the 
Church Fathers forward, proposing better readings of the Bible, which are countered with 
different readings of the same Biblical evidence, and so on. But they also herald a profound shift 
in theological discourse—away from exegetical engagements on undesirably equal ground and 
toward the objectification, medicalization, and psychologization of such theological outliers. The 
discourse thus turns away from the question of whether those charged with enthusiasm are truly 
inspired or not. It brackets inspiration altogether and treats immanent claims to prophecy as signs 
of madness—or, in the preferred terminology of the seventeenth-century, melancholy. It tucks 
true prophecy out of reach—not because it isn’t important to the discourse, but because it very 
much is—and treats the entire question of present inspiration under the sign, so expanded as to 
be now invisible, of false prophecy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See Taves, 17 ff. 
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 Another way of putting this, the emphasis in the discourse ceases to be on the “errors” of 
the various sectaries plaguing England (a concern which is still centrally evident in a transitional 
work like Gangraena, which bridges the discourses of heresy and enthusiasm as I am distinguishing 
them here). What matters is not the monstrous beliefs such figures exhibit, so much as their 
erroneous ways of being spiritual. They preach erroneously. They influence others erroneously. 
They reason erroneously. The doctrines produced by these erroneous methods are not the 
polemical focus of the discourse of enthusiasm. The methods themselves are the focus. If heresy 
is about error, enthusiasm is about erroneousness. 
 Specifically, it is about the erroneous use of rhetoric. This shift is clear, for example, in 
Meric Casaubon’s A treatise concerning enthusiasme, as it is an effect of nature, but is mistaken by many for 
either Divine inspiration or diabolical possession, which sold out three editions between 1654 and 56 and 
remains his best-known work.134 Casaubon found the connection between enthusiasm and 
rhetoric somewhat naturally. He was an Aristotelian scholar, the son of the renowned humanist 
Isaac Casaubon (to whom Meric remained devoted throughout his own scholarly career), who 
was born in Geneva and then moved to London in 1611 when he was twelve years old. While in 
England, he converted to the Church of England; he remained staunchly loyal to this church 
through the Interregnum and until his death.135 He inherited an interest in ancient languages—
and, significantly, with the holiness of such languages—from his father, who, as Anthony 
Grafton and Joanna Weinberg have shown, was particularly interested in Hebrew.136 Meric 
Casaubon’s publications in a similar vein included De verborum usu (1647), a treatise on the proper 
use of words, and De quatuor linguis commentationis (1650), which argues for the relation of English 
to Greek.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 R. W. Serjeantson, ‘Casaubon, (Florence Estienne) Meric (1599–1671)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4852, accessed 11 June 2014] 
135 Serjeantson, DNB. For Meric Casaubon’s Aristotelianism, see Michael R. G. Spiller, “Concerning Natural 
Experimental Philosophie”: Meric Casaubon and the Royal Society (The Hague, Boston, and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1980), 18 ff. 
136 Anthony Grafton and Joanna Weinberg, “I have always loved the Holy Tongue”: Isaac Casaubon, the Jews, and a Forgotten 
Chapter in Renaissance Scholarship (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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 The Treatise concerning enthusiasme makes clear that this grounding in philology and the 
history of languages gave Casaubon a unique and influential perspective on the question of lay 
inspiration. He argues in this treatise that enthusiasm is “a very ardor, and nothing else, whereof 
all men are naturally capable.”137 He considers it a form of rhetorical performance. His analysis of 
enthusiasm emphasizes the degree to which the appearance of inspired speech can be 
counterfeited, either by carefully rehearsing one’s “extempore” delivery (or not so carefully, given 
the decline of rhetorical standards in contemporary England, according to Casaubon), or by self-
induced trance.138 The enthusiast, in other words, is not possessed by the devil. He is possessed 
by his own desire to be possessed. He is not a conduit of Satanic errors. He is an abuser of the 
universal human capacity for rhetorical self-presentation.  
 In making this point, Casaubon is concerned to let his reader know that he is not de-
spiritualizing the world—only the enthusiast. The devil is still present in the enthusiast, insofar as 
the enthusiast shares the devil’s evil nature. But the devil does not immediately create the 
enthusiast’s inspirations. Thus Casaubon makes a distinction between “personal immediate 
possession” and “general concurrence” with a larger category.139 He helps, in other words, to 
delimit enthusiastic subjectivity—to buffer the enthusiast, in Charles Taylor’s terms.140 Indeed, it 
is important to notice, as will be emphasized in the following chapter, how the categories of 
secularity including the buffered self identified by Taylor are first constructed polemically and 
projected onto religious dissidents by counter-enthusiasts like Casaubon. The enthusiast becomes, 
for Casaubon, a merely rhetorical totality—a subjectivity claiming to be a special point of contact 
between transcendence and immanence, who is in fact absolutely natural, absolutely ordinary. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Meric Casubon, A treatise concerning enthusiasme (London, 1655), 17. EEBO.  
138 For extempore speaking, see 158 ff. For self-induced trances: “And if that were granted, there would be no great 
question of the possibility of voluntary Trances: it being a thing (in ordinary judgement) of equall facility in point of 
nature, to fill the Ventricles of the Brain with pituitous (or whatever Physicians will make them,) humours, and to 
empty them at pleasure; and to command certain humours into the chine of the back, and nerves, to be recalled 
again at will” (91). 
139 Casaubon, 61. 
140 Charles Taylor, 25. 
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is thus for Casaubon a limited totality—able to be slotted into a larger spiritual purview without 
being himself spiritualized except by distant analogy with moral categories of good and evil.141 
 Casaubon’s Treatise considers enthusiasm as something anyone can do, as it were. One 
only needs to practice the rhetorical foundations of appearing inspired. But at the same time, he 
argues that certain sorts of people are particularly susceptible to being fooled by such enthusiasts. 
Even as the enthusiasts themselves are generally voluntary charlatans, their victims are frequently 
people who are constitutionally susceptible to enthusiastic raptures and fits, and thus (to again 
use Taylor’s terms) porous, open to influence from without, prone to fascination and insinuation. 
Predictably, this susceptibility breaks down according to class status. At several points in the 
Treatise Casaubon registers particular awe and concern at the vulnerability of the uneducated to 
fits brought on by exposure to enthusiastic rhetoric. Citing Aristotle’s short work on divination 
by dreams, Casaubon expresses his agreement that there are natural, invisible “emanations” of 
future in the atmosphere which melancholic tempers can pick up on and read.142 The ability to 
read these emanations seems stronger “when and where there was a disposition in the subject for 
reception or impression: which was, when and where reason had least force, as in Sleep, and 
Trances; and in such persons where reason naturally was weakest, and the phasie strongest, as in 
Women, weak men, Idiots, and the like.”143  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Later in his career, beginning with his well-known edition of John Dee’s Conversations with Spirits (1659), Casaubon 
exhibits a central interest in proving the existence of spiritual beings and the reality of witches. One might take this 
to be an attempt to compensate for his work on enthusiasm, which helped popularize the notion that those who 
claim to be inspired often are not. Henry More takes a similar turn late in his career when he contributes to Joseph 
Glanvill’s account of the reality of witchcraft, Saducismus Triumphatus (1681). Early counter-enthusiasts, it seems, were 
haunted by the disenchanting ramifications of their groundbreaking attempts to defend the Established Church from 
spiritual insurgents.  
142 See Aristotle, On Divination in Sleep. This very interesting work of Aristotle is worth more attention. While it is 
mostly incredulous about the possibility of divination by dreams, at a couple of points Aristotle suggests that he 
agrees with a physicalist interpretation of time and space that would figure foreshadowings of the future as skins, 
waves, images, or emanations of actuality travelling in some sense through space and able to be picked up by the 
dreamer. These waves are not Lucretian “skins” peeling off from the surfaces of things; rather they are like ripples of 
water caused by oarstrokes, which bear a vague impression of the object that set them in motion, not as 
representations but as repurcussions from which one might read backward a causal event just as one might guess, 
from looking at different ripples, that this pattern comes from an oar, that from a boat’s motor, that from a duck 
scrambling into flight. Does this mean that Aristotle imagines time to be a physical substance? Aristotle doesn’t say, 
and is, at any rate, careful to mark this discussion as purely speculative. 
143 Casaubon, 43. 
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 Casaubon thus displays special concern for the degree to which such weak vessels are 
overly open to rhetorical persuasion. Simple people don’t realize, Casaubon reasons, that certain 
rhetorical effects—such as the appearance that one is speaking ex tempore when one has in fact 
practiced one’s speech carefully and repeatedly—might be faked. So might the appearance of 
ardor or passion. As he writes: “The ignorance of this advantage of nature, being unhappily 
mistaken for Christian Zeal, hath been the occasion of much mischief in the world, and a great 
stumbling block to simple people, to draw them into the contagion of pernicious Heresies.”144 
Casaubon thus identifies as one of the central tasks of anti-enthusiasm the importance of 
naturalizing the ecstatic effects of extemporaneous preaching, and of rhetoric more broadly. And 
the image of the rhetorical enthusiast that he produces in his Treatise—dangerously charismatic, 
liable to infect all who listen—has, as we’ll see, a long afterlife as the concept develops. 
 Hence even as the enthusiast himself is treated as buffered, his audience is treated as 
porous. Even as the enthusiast offers a way of thinking about the category of subjectivity—of the 
secret will of the enthusiast to deceive, to self-induce frenzy—his audience provides an occasion 
for thinking about intersubjectivity—the openness of the imagination to external effects and 
influences. He becomes, clearly, and perhaps for the first time—though, as we’ll see, Henry More 
soon follows suit—a means of differentiating the categories of experience that characterize the 
process of rationalization. 
 Thus, as Casaubon helps to show, there was a rhetorical arms race to the bottom of 
language in the early modern centuries—to the point at which word and thing are conjoined in 
the creative action of the divine. By the mid-seventeenth century, as Casaubon exemplifies, the 
discourse of enthusiasm found a new path in this race. It ceased concentrating on the theoretical 
perspicuity of the Word and the satanic nature of doctrinal error. Instead, it turned to the 
polemical figuration of the muddied minds of those who appeared unable to receive the Bible’s 
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clear messages. The discourse turned, in other words, from reading the text, to figuring bad 
readers of the text. 
* 
8. The enthusiast as wonder 
 Casaubon’s Treatise marks a shift in the management of claims to prophetic authority. It 
simultaneously naturalizes the false prophet, insisting that he is just like anyone else, and marks 
the false prophet as unusual, insisting that he is a defective or extraordinary version of other 
people. The claims to authority supporting those called enthusiasts are not what matters in this 
discourse. Communication or persuasion—traditional means of reaching lost believers—are 
hopeless and ought to be abandoned. The enthusiast, in other words, is figured as beyond the 
reach of rational language—indeed, beyond the reach of his own language.  
 Thus the false prophet is reframed as what we might call a natural wonder—a being 
subject to the laws of nature, but revealing, through its unusual properties, hidden and 
unexpected dimensions of those laws. The enthusiast is “just like us”—only terribly different. 
And this turn captures the reversibility of this figure. Fears and anxieties—political, religious, 
philosophical—are projected onto the figure of the enthusiast, where they can be studied, 
categorized, and (to use a vocabulary familiar from New Historicism) contained. In this way, the 
enthusiast is (as I’ve suggested) a heuristic for working out the shape of the epistemologically 
limited self as it interacts with intersecting totalities of creation—nature, incarnation, and 
language. 
 The discourse of enthusiasm thus both rebukes and participates in the fear and wonder it 
perceives as both an irrational feature of the enthusiast’s own mind and a rational response to the 
enthusiast’s unfortunate existence. Generally, only one side of this process has been emphasized. 
Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, in Wonders and the Order of Nature, write: “What was new 
among the late-seventeenth-century critics of enthusiasm and [natural] prodigies was their vivid 
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sense, based on personal experience of religious conflict and civil war, of the urgent political 
dangers lurking in the emotions of wonder and fear when paired.”145 But the wonder and fear in 
the discourse was not simply the enthusiast’s. It was equally and concurrently the counter-
enthusiast’s. In other words, enthusiasm is not just a political problem stemming from the 
experience of wonder and fear (of prodigies, comets, and other traditionally prophetic signs). The 
enthusiast becomes figured as itself a Wunderkammer of strange and curious thoughts. The 
enthusiastic brain becomes a natural philosophical—and theological, and ontological, and 
political—hothouse.  
 John Evelyn, the diarist and founding member of the Royal Society who spent the 1640s 
traveling on the European continent, avoiding the war in England, writes of “a Burgundian-Jew 
who had married an Apostate Kentish-Woman” in precisely this mode, thus complementing his 
admiration of the arts, sciences, technologies, and prodigies of strange nations with an admiration 
of the outgrowths of (in his view) strange minds: “I asked him divers questions, and, amongst the 
rest, remember he told me that the World should never end: That our Soules transmigrated; & 
even those of the most holy persons did Pennance in the bodys of bruits after death; & so he 
interpreted the banishment & salvage life of Nebuchadnezar,” etc. He concludes, “[A]nd so I 
tooke my leave of the lying-Jew, whom I found to be a merry dronken fellow.146 The enthusiast—
in this case Jewish, and thus among the oldest-established heretics extant—is figured as a mind 
housing a swarm of opinions.  
 And this swarm-like dimension of the enthusiast is a transitive rhetorical property of the 
discourse which it defined. The interior of the enthusiast’s head is figured as a swarm of 
heresies—of opinions. Zoom out, and the individual enthusiast is revealed as one amongst a 
swarm of other enthusiasts—one strange mind among a hive of like minds. The discourse of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 
336. 
146 John Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn, ed. E.S. De Beer (London: Everyman’s Library, 2006), 33. 
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enthusiasm as wonder is encouraged by lurid accounts of singular yet interchangeable sects—
particularly Ranters and Quakers but also Adamites, Seekers, etc.—who are depicted in less 
sophisticated literary forms as simple moral monsters practicing free love, committing 
unspeakable blasphemies, and spreading other perceived atrocities.147 One interesting way of 
tracking the perceived interchangeability of sects during the 40s and into the 50s is the recycling 
of woodcuts among printers of anti-nonconformist tracts.148 (See figure 2.4 for woodcuts.) For 
example, a woodcut somewhat anticipating the frontispiece to A Tale of a Tub was reused at least 
five times: for New Preachers, New, where the tub preacher was identified as Praisegod Barebone; 
for The Sermon and Prophecie of Mr. James Hunt, where it represents the title preacher; for Lucifers 
Lacky; for A Swarme of Sectaries, where the same image represents Samuel Howe, a cobbler given 
to “strange preaching (or prating)”; and finally for John Taylor’s A Tale in a Tub, which we have 
already looked at in the above introduction.149 All of these recycled woodcuts appeared in the 
span of roughly six months—in June through December 1641. Another recycled woodcut has 
the Adamites of 1641 (A Nest of serpents discovered) reappear as the Ranters of 1650 (The ranters 
religion). A third, perhaps the coup de grace, has a woodcut originally depicting a monstrous birth, 
Declaration of a strange and Wonderful Monster: Born in Kirkham Parish in Lancashire (1646), return as a 
Ranter in The ranters monster (1652). In these woodcuts “enthusiasts” are both salaciously 
individuated and indistinguishable, including from monstrous births—like so many rebounding 
atoms of religious and moral mistake. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 There are two interesting books on the Ranters: Morton, The World of the Ranters; J.C. Davis, Fear, Myth, and History: 
The Ranters and the Historians (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986). The latter achieved some notoriety for claiming that 
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148 See the wonderful blog entry on this subject in Mercurius Politicus: A blog about early modern books, history and culture. 
http://mercuriuspoliticus.wordpress.com/2010/11/06/recycled-woodcuts-part-2/ 
149 John Taylor, A tale in a tub. 
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 Finally, let’s return, now under the sign of enthusiast as mental wonder, to the polemical 
works of Thomas Edwards, author of three lengthy parts of Gangraena, or, A catalogue and discovery 
of many of the errors, heresies, blasphemies and pernicious practices of the sectaries of this time (1646), which 
offers the verbal equivalent of recycled Ranter-Quaker-Seeker-Monster woodcuts. Edwards both 
particularizes the sectaries, dividing them into sixteen “heads or sorts” of which “Enthusiasts” 
are the ninth, then cleaves them apart and reassembles them piecemeal. He presents himself as a 
connoisseur of heresies. After noting that “Independents” of Cromwell’s army are the best of 
this bad lot, he claims that only few “pure” Independents can be found living: 
 I do not think there are 50 pure Independents, but higher flown, more  
 Seraphicall (as a Chaplain, who knows well the state of that Army, expressed  
 it) made up and compounded of Anabaptisme, Antinomianisme, Enthusiasme,  
 Arminianisme, Familisme, all these errours and more too sometimes meeting  
 in the same persons, strange monsters, having their heads of Enthusiasme,  
 their bodies of Antinomianisme, their thighs of Familisme, their leggs and feet  
 of Anabaptisme, their hands of Arminianisme, and Libertinisme as the great  
 vein going thorow the whole; in one word, the great Religion of that sort of  
 men in the Army, is liberty of conscience, and liberty of preaching.150 
Much of Gangraena consists of horrified reports from various parsons reporting on the monstrous 
gatherings of these monsters:  
 A godly Minister who came out of Essex, related to me not long since that Oateswas now 
 preaching in that Country […] and that many loose persons of the Country follow him, 
 he preaching besides his Anabaptisticall opinions, the Arminian points; and this Minister 
 spake it upon his knowledge that notorious Whoremongers and Drunkards follow him, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Edwards, Gangraena, 14. 
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 such as have been convicted by witnesses, and taken notice of by the Country, and are 
 such still, yet go after him where he preaches from place to place.151 
The story is much the same in many similar pamphlets and screeds. A couple of points are worth 
underscoring. First, although this is sheer and crude polemic, it also witnesses a struggle to in 
some way control the perceived chaos unfolding around England by inhabiting it rhetorically—
whether in mockery, as John Taylor inhabits Mi-heele Mendsoale, or through a sort of field 
reporting, as Thomas Edwards does, or in some other manner. It may be hard to imagine that a 
direct line can be drawn from Mi-heele Mendsoale’s A Tale in a Tub to Swift’s early masterpiece. 
But this is obviously the case. Swift’s work might be a mockery of a mockery (of a mockery), but 
it finds an ancestor here. The process by which Swift perfects the art of literary inhabitation of 
another’s voice, another’s pen—and eventually, of any other’s voice, any other’s head—starts in 
cheap impressions of conventicle exegetes. This is the beginning of learning to turn mock 
enthusiasm into a performance of linguistic pellucidity. Second, these examples of anti-sectarian 
screed will impress no one with their sophistication; still, they are evidence of an acknowledged 
need to understand how this state of religion came to be, if only to know how it might be 
overturned.  
* 
9. The double role of the pagan enthusiast 
  The negative side of enthusiasm, associated with heresy, blasphemy, and false prophecy, 
is dominant throughout the early modern centuries—and indeed, well into the nineteenth. 
However, there is a more ambiguous side to the concept of enthusiasm as well, linked especially 
to poetic inspiration, but also to emotions of transporting ecstasy and what Nietzsche might call 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Ibid. 
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Dionysian fusion with others.152 Before moving on from the general historical context of 
enthusiasm, it is important to say more about this. 
 Enthusiasm first enters the English language dressed in Greek, as in one of E.K.’s notes 
to Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender, which describes poetry as “a certaine ἐνθουσιασμός and 
celestiall inspiration”—and roughly retaining its etymological meaning of “divine possession.”153 
Throughout the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the most involved meditations on 
enthusiasm appear in similar discussions of poetic inspiration. These early positive uses of the 
word are generally rapturous, wonder-struck—although they often retain a note of titillating 
danger familiar from Phaedrus (the usual locus classicus of this celebrated strain of enthusiasm), 
the delight-cum-risk of being pulled by some action on the soul, whether rhetorical, poetical, 
intoxicating, or erotic, into outright madness. Such enthusiasm is associated with tragic classical 
affects like fury, rage, rapture—which, if certainly dangerous, are also ennobled and heroic, 
particularly when bracketed, ironized, or otherwise knowingly performed. The ancient license for 
this special treatment of performed enthusiasm comes from Aristotle. As the translators of the 
1686 edition of Aristotle’s Rhetoric put it: 
 For we are apt to forgive one that is enrag’d, when he talks of some Heaven- reaching, or 
 Pelorian mischeif; and then especially when he hath already mov’d the Auditors, and put 
 ’em into a fury, either by praising or dispraising, by hatred or by love. Which Isocrates does 
 in his Panegyric toward the end, making use of  Fame, and memorials of what they 
 suffer’d. For things that are alike they generally bawle  out, who are in a heat; which they 
 who are alike dispos’d are willing to hear. Wherefore they are agreeable and Proper for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Friedrich Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14-21. Cf. Gordon Tesky, Delirious Milton: The Fate of the Poet in Modernity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), which argues that Milton’s creative process should be understood 
as oscillating between radical fusion with and radical distance from God. 
153 See the Argument to “October” in The Shepheardes Calender. Edmund Spenser, The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of 
Edmund Spenser, edited by William Oram et al. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 170. 
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 Poetry. For Poetry is a kind of  Enthusiasm. Therefore this must be the way, or else with 
 an Irony, as Gorgias did, or as we find done in Phaedrus.154 
High, enraged language can be successfully used either under the press of an emotion or 
ironically—either sincerely, or sincerely insincerely. Such staged enthusiasm is never, in short, the 
problem, so long as it is indulged generically stable forms by those who know the classical rules 
of the game—i.e., those whom Prophet Hunt would accuse of a Cambridge schoolishness 
contrasting with his Christian foolishness. 
 While usually this poetic strain of enthusiasm is found in classical genres, particularly the 
pastoral, occasional early uses clear a site of mysterious access to specifically Christian 
profundities, as in Thomas Dekker’s poetic rhapsody, Dekker his dreame In which, beeing rapt with a 
poeticall enthusiasme, the great volumes of heauen and hell to him were opened, in which he read many wonderfull 
things (1620), a work indebted to the tradition of English dream poems stretching back to 
Chaucer. Also interesting is the short sonnet sequence “Fancies Farewell,” written in Latin by the 
Scottish poet Robert Boyd and translated by Sir William Mure. Here one finds Neoplatonic 
Christianity articulated in terms of enthusiasm: 
 With sacred straines, reaching a higher key, 
 My Thoughts above thy [Fancies] fictions farre aspire: 
 Mounted on wings of immortalities, 
 I feel my brest warmed with a wountlesse fire. 
 My Muse a strange Enthusiasme inspires,  
 And peece and peece thy flame, in smoake expires.155 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, or, The true grounds and principles of oratory shewing the right art of pleading and speaking in full 
assemblies and courts of judicature made English by the translators of The art of thinking (London, 1683), 182-83. EEBO. See 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 3, Chapter 7, 1408b.20. 
155 Robert Boyd, A spirituall hymne or The sacrifice of a sinner to be offred vpon the altar of a humbled heart, to Christ our Redeemer. 
Inverted in English sapphicks, from the Latine, of the reverend, religious, and learned divine, Mr Robert Boyd of Trocborege. By Sr 
William Mure yo: of Rowallane knight. By whom is also annexed a poeme, entituled Doomes-day. Containing, hells horrour, and 
heavens happinesse. (Edinburgh: Printed by Iohn Wreittoun, 1628), ll. 9-14. EEBO. 
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The imagery is ultimately quite conventional, but interesting for imagining an enthusiasm that 
dissolves fancy—that lifts one out of the body, reaching for a state of abstraction in which the 
imagination, comparatively enfleshed, might burn and expire in smoke. Boyd’s attention to breath 
patterns—the Muse inspires into him an enthusiasm which leads him to breathe out (expire) his 
fancy as though in a stream of smoke—further draw together and abstract against one another 
body and soul. One clearly detects here a non-polemical application of the inhale-exhale pattern 
of enthusiasm, where the self is alternatively conceived under the aegis of body and spirit, materia 
and abstraction, which we’ve seen turned against and projected onto those who seized prophetic 
authority without permission. 
 As I see it, the concept of enthusiasm, even when it becomes central to the discourse of 
politics and religion, never fully loses such poetic license. Poetry is, one might say, the 
enthusiastic exception throughout the critique—the one allowable miracle. Poets are allowed to 
be enthusiastic, because they aren’t really enthusiasts in the political sense. Such poetic 
enthusiasts retain a distinction between fantasy and reality; indeed, they clarify this distinction. As 
More puts it, in a sentence that does much to encapsulate the discourse of enthusiasm, “[A] Poet 
is an Enthusiast in jest, and an Enthusiast is a Poet in good earnest; Melancholy prevailing so much with 
him, that he takes his no better then Poeticall fits and figments for divine Inspiration and reall 
Truth.”156 This statement that cuts to the quick of the perceived threat of enthusiasm—the threat 
of a total aestheticization of political imagination, a treatment of immanence as poetry and the 
world as an artwork that can be shaped at will.157 More—himself a writer of a collection of 
“enthusiastic” verses, Philosophical Poems (1647)—shows a marked interest in distinguishing both 
in poetry and in “good” Platonism between those who keep their speculations invisible and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Henry More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (1656), 20. EEBO. I cite this edition, the first, throughout. It was reprinted 
in 1662 as part of A collection of several philosophical writings of Dr Henry More. Hereafter cited as ET. 
157 Cf. the philosophy of Alain Badiou, which advocates a revolutionary utopian fidelity to the vision of a society that 
might yet come to be, which is glimpsed in a moment of searing clarity. See Meditation 9 in Badiou, Being and Event, 
translated by Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 104-10. 
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imaginary, as it were, and those who bring them into the material world, into the realm of action, 
whether through alchemical experiments or crowd-gathering exhortations. More generally, poets 
are widely considered to be “good enthusiasts” even into the 1660s.158 Eventually they are 
enshrined as such in by Dryden and Shaftesbury—precisely because they are enthusiasts “in jest,” 
that is, both without actually surrendering to rapture, and in a satirical mode mocking those who 
have thus surrendered, or at least who say that they have. 
 But pagan enthusiasm is not only a conceptual region of poetic exception and license. 
The classical side of enthusiasm plays an important polemical function as well. Those who 
surrender to enthusiasm are not poets—they’re possessed. Their possession is frequently figured 
in terms of sibylline—that is, automatically false prophetic—madness. In 1615, for instance, 
Thoman Anyan, the president of Corpus Christi College at Oxford, admonishes his 
undergraduates against “Monomachies” (duels), saying that they “are now become but recreations, 
and the least but suspicion of disgrace is a iust cause of a single combate. But this is madnesse not 
manlinesse; this kinde of courage is in the head, not in the heart, it is not hardy valour, but a soft 
and moist enthusiasme of Bacchus.”159 The various metaphoric fields evoked in Anyan’s words, 
buttressed by Latin quotations—pagan, orgiastic, emasculating, pseudo-prophetic—are soon 
refined for more religious polemical purposes.160 
 We will see many examples of this use of enthusiasm in the chapters to come—beginning 
with John Smith and Henry More. In addition to drawing upon patristic sources opposing early 
heresies, the early modern discourse of enthusiasm inherited much from the polemics developed 
in persecuting witches, who were seen as latter-day incarnations of the demon-possessed sibyls 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 See, for example, Nathaniel Ingelo, Bentivolio and Urania in four bookes (London: Printed by J.G. for Richard Marriot, 
1660). I hope to look more closely at this work--and to develop the importance of poetic enthusiasm for the late-
century romance genre--in a future version of this project. 
159 Thomas Anyan, A sermon preached at Saint Marie Spittle (Oxford : Printed by Joseph Barnes, 1615), 31. EEBO. 
160 It might be worth recalling that Meric Casaubon took a B.A. from Christ Church in 1618. If he wasn’t present for 
this particular tongue-lashing, he might well have been for others much like it. The various resonances it contains 
certainly carry into his Treatise and his other counter-enthusiastic works. 
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worshipped by pagans.161 Enthusiasts too were seen as types of sibyls—as opposed to true 
prophets. Alternatively—or really concurrently—those who claimed to be prophetically inspired 
outside of the official channels were variously seen as reincarnated pagans, Gnostics, 
“Mohammedans,” or Anabaptist super-villains from the rogues-gallery of European religious 
war.162 (The title of William Russel’s 1674 pamphlet puts it bluntly: Quakerism is paganism.)163 
Enthusiasts, in the purely polemical version of this view, were understood as theological zombies 
returned from the past, dragging with them undead ideas about God’s role in the world.  
 Thus the discourse of enthusiasm has a complicated but clear double relationship to 
ancient understandings of inspiration. It withholds from critique the poetic performance of 
enthusiasm modeled on ancient literary genres and philosophies—and, beyond literal poetry, an 
ironized indulgence in enthusiastic moods and thoughts, marked by style and comportment as 
not entirely sincere. This is the enthusiasm claimed by John Dryden in the 1677 preface to State of 
Innocence, his operatic adaptation of Milton’s Paradise Lost: “Imaging is, in it self, the very heighth 
and life of Poetry. ’Tis, as Loginus describes it, a Discourse, which, by a kind of Enthusiasm, or 
extraordinary emotion of the Soul, makes it seem to us, that we behold those things which the 
Poet paints, so as to be pleas’d with them, and to admire them.”164 It is the understanding 
enthusiasm advocated by the critic John Dennis in The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry 
(1701) and The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704).165 It is further famously recuperated by 
Shaftesbury, who advocates a classical Platonic enthusiasm—albeit a socially regulated variety. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 See Heyd, 61-64. 
162 For instance, Thomas Tenisen, Of idolatry a discourse, in which is endeavoured a declaration of, its distinction from superstition, 
its notion, cause, commencement, and progress, its practice charged on Gentiles, Jews, Mahometans, Gnosticks, Manichees Arians, 
Socinians, Romanists: as also, of the means which God hath vouchsafed towards the cure of it by the Shechinah of His Son (1678), 
passim.; Ibid., An argument for union taken from the true interest of those dissenters in England who profess and call themselves 
Protestants (1683), 8-9. EEBO. 
163 EEBO. 
164 Dryden, The state of innocence and fall of man an opera, written in heroique verse and dedicated to her Royal Highness, the 
Dutchess (London, 1677), x. EEBO.   
165 John Dennis, The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry (1701), The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704). 
Accessed using Eighteenth-Century Collections Online (ECCO). See Klein, 165. See also Heyd, [xxx]. 
 80	  
This strain of the discourse is sometimes seen as revolutionary and original.166 In fact, it is 
recuperative. It returns to an emphasis on poetic inspiration present in the earliest uses of the 
term “enthusiasm,” and continually available through the seventeenth-century to those like Henry 
Vaughan, Henry More, and Nathaniel Ingelo who know how to evoke enthusiastic raptures and 
experiences of divine possession—and how to keep these experiences safely tucked away from 
the political.  
 I would further suggest, looking forward, that it is in this mode, however subtly, that the 
three positive recuperations of enthusiasm I will identify in More, Locke, and Swift should be 
understood to participate. For More and Locke, positive enthusiasm involves recovering the 
ancient meaning at the center of revealed texts. More sees this recovery in terms of typological 
allegory: all meaning refers to the Incarnation of God’s Word in the person of Jesus. Locke sees 
this recovery in terms of careful hermeneutics that respects both the complexity of words as such 
and the added complexity of recovering the distant historical context informing the meaning of 
ancient writing--in his case, the Epistles of Paul. Both thus disavow the pagan context of the 
positive enthusiasm associated with classical pagan philosophy and poetry. But at the same time 
they participate in a discourse of ancientness requiring the knowing reader to suspend his current 
perception of the world and enter into a distant and strange experience of meaning centered in 
the distant past. This emphasis bridges these Christian modes of “ancientness,” as it were, and 
the more familiar pagan modes (which I will discuss below). Swift, meanwhile, participates more 
openly in the pagan form of positive enthusiasm both in his erudite recoveries of ancient literary 
forms like the Menippean satire and in his subtle evocation (as we will see in the reading of 
“Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift” that closes Chapter Five) of classical poetic and theatrical 
elements such as the chorus precisely where his writing presses toward transfiguration. In sum, a 
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major tendency of fifty years of Anglican polemic” (166). 
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positive sense of enthusiasm persists through the seventeenth century, as we will see, and 
subsequent valorizations of the term should be understood as drawing on this source of the 
discourse in particular. 
 At the same time, the classical concept of enthusiasm has a polemical side. It is used to 
cast enthusiasts in terms of paganism, drawing on tropes of sibylline madness, feminized false 
prophecy, pagan abandon, etc. We will see many examples of this polemical strain of the classical 
discourse in the chapters to come—particularly in the discussions of More and Swift. And this 
observation regarding the double orientation of the discourse of enthusiasm toward pagan 
sources draws out an important but not often noticed dimension of the more general use of 
ancients in seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century polemics. As Larry F. Norman has 
recently suggested, it is far too simple to conflate (as many have done) “progressive” views with 
the Moderns and “conservative” views with the Ancients in the vesions of the Quarrel of the 
Ancients and Moderns that wracked France, England, Europe more generally in the seventeenth-
century and beyond.167 Norman shows that persons who identified as an “Ancient” in the so-
called war of ancients and moderns did not always simply believe that, say, Homer and Virgil 
were unsurpassed poets, and Aristotle and Plato inexhaustible philosophers to whom we are 
always catching up. Rather, they believed the ancients to have been very much different from the 
living—and found it important to cultivate the ability to appreciate just how different they were, 
just how strange, how distant.168 In this view, those called enthusiasts were to some extent 
ancients in earnest. They believed that they were interacting with spirits, restoring the primitive 
church, and so on. This was, from the Ancient perspective, farcical. But it was dangerous 
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precisely because it didn’t know that it was farcical—didn’t appreciate the impossibility of being or 
really imitating the ancients, rather than understanding them with sensitivity, imitating them 
formally, and so on. Ancients knew they were living in the modern world. Ancients depicted 
Moderns as believing they were living in the ancient world. Ancients respected the distinction 
between person and personae, between the experiencing being one is and the prosthetic 
experiential forms one puts on. Moderns collapsed this distinction, seizing on Francis Bacon’s 
observation that those living now are the true ancients living in “a more advanced age of the world, 
and stocked with infinite experiments and observations,” who should thus be bold not to read 
but to be new Aristotles, Galens, and Homers.169 Thus Moderns frequently mock Ancients using 
those tropes of enthusiasm which emphasize a failure to differentiate between one’s own 
subjective experience, and the sorts of subjective experience characteristic of past epochs—and, 
increasingly, as in Hudibras, the comic-generic materials of Don Quixote. We will have further 
occasion to develop this point, as might be expected, in the chapter on Jonathan Swift. 
 For now, the two sides of ancientness in the discourse of enthusiasm offers a segue to the 
last subject of this chapter—the importance of the figuration of totalities in this discourse. Good 
enthusiasm—classical-poetic-tragic enthusiasm—is performative. This means, quite simply, that it 
imitates enthusiasm without being absorbed into the ontological, theological, or sociological—or 
otherwise logical—perspective being marked as enthusiastic. Poets, as More says, are “enthusiasts 
in jest.” Aesthetic awareness acts like a sort of buffer in the discourse of enthusiasm protecting 
one from being absorbed into a genuinely paganistic or heretical viewpoint mistakenly self-
conceived as a new, fresh revelation.170  
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169 Francis Bacon, Novum Organon, in The Works of Francis Bacon Volume 4: Translations of the Philosophical Works 1, edited 
by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
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170 This is one way of arriving at a point endorsed quite bluntly by Geoffrey Hartman, who sees literary criticism 
itself as a tradition of “civility” rooted in opposition to enthusiasm. Hartman, Minor Prophecies: The Literary Essay in the 
Culture Wars (Harvard University Press, 1991), 177. Cited in Mee, 25. 
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11. The enthusiast as prosthetic totality 
 As I have shown, the discourse of enthusiasm is split between those admiring—
wondering at—those who claim prophetic authority, and mirroring them—both satirically and, in 
modified ways, formally. Counter-enthusiasts recognize the seriousness of the challenge to 
political order represented by those who claim to oppose things as they are on the basis of 
scripture. The enthusiast is the multifaceted means of thinking through this challenge. 
 I suggested at the outset that my general thesis in this chapter in tracing the emergence of 
the discourse of enthusiasm from the discourse of heresy concerns the role of the enthusiast in 
the cultural framing of what I have called limited totalities. The enthusiast becomes a proxy for 
some (subjectively considered) total truth which is (intersubjectively considered) no bigger than 
his own brain. This process of critique and polemic helps to differentiate the categories of 
experience associated with the process of rationalization—self, society, and nature. Previous 
studies have emphasized particular sides of this process. Jon Mee emphasizes the very important 
intersection of individuality and society.171 Others emphasize the equally important intersection of 
material nature and subjective experience. J.G.A. Pocock, for instance, in the course of suggesting 
that enthusiasm is the “antiself” of “enlightenment,” considers enthusiasm as denoting “any 
intellectual system of the universe in which the mind [is] of the same substance as the universe it 
[apprehends].”172 There are clear reasons for this emphasis, and the importance for the discourse 
of enthusiasm of a materialist monism which would collapse the distinction between mind and 
matter will be especially stressed in the next chapter. But in my view these approaches miss the 
provisionality of the enthusiast’s purported perspective. In short, rather than consider enthusiasm 
as mapping meaningfully onto beliefs, it must be seen as avoiding the question of what those 
called enthusiasts believe. The discourse of heresy is concerned with erroneous belief. The 
discourse of enthusiasm is concerned with the erroneous use of reason. It emphasizes not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Mee, 39-40. 
172 Pocock, 18.  
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doctrinal errors, but category errors. The discourse is motivated by the real threat of unlicensed 
prophetic authority. But it takes this threat as an occasion to imagine the coordinates concerned 
in belief and knowledge, to arrange those coordinates, to figure them.  
 In my view, then, enthusiasm is a discourse designed to allow the provisional inhabitation, 
contemplation, and organization of totalities, each understood as coherent-yet-partial, and held 
together by the process of totalizing itself. The impulse to totalize follows from the real subject 
of enthusiasm—prophecy, an ancient notion fusing natural, subjective, and political dimensions 
of experience. One might say that the enthusiast is a prosthetic prophet, used by those who wish 
to defend instituted order to imagine the threats to that order, and to participate in the process of 
radically reimagining the organization of the world without committing to revolution. He is a 
heuristic developed in the process of rationalization—and necessary for this process, given its 
centrality in the figuration of the basis of the legitimacy of the crisis-ridden cultural institutions of 
church and state.  
 The enthusiast continues to operate in this way throughout the eighteenth century—as a 
means of projecting and ordering totalities. If space permitted, it would be fruitful to include in 
this study Voltaire’s uses of prophets—and particularly Quakers—in figuring his political 
philosophy.173 Likewise, one could include Samuel Johnson’s more sympathetic engagements with 
enthusiasm—among them the student, in The Rambler, who tries on so many philosophies that he 
loses all sense of himself; and the astronomer, in Rasselas, who secretly thinks that his thoughts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 For example, Quakers are the focus of the first four letters of Voltaire’s Lettres Philosophiques (translated as Letters 
Concerning the English Nation) (1733, revised 1778). This was his first major work of philosophy and set the standard 
for a number of subsequent works, including the Philosophical Dictionary. Voltaire’s recorded conversations with a 
Quaker in these letters modulate in tone between amusement at the “singular” opinions and sudden frenzies of his 
interlocutor, and poignant sympathy for a number of his ideological positions, including his opposition to war. 
Voltaire concludes: “England is properly the country of sectarists. […] An Englishman, as one to whom liberty is 
natural, may go to heaven his own way.” See Voltaire, Letters Concerning the English Nation, edited by Nicholas Cronk 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 26. The various editions of Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary further display 
a concern with prophets and prophecies bordering on obsession. This is a dimension of his thinking which is 
certainly able to bear much greater critical emphasis. 
 85	  
control the weather.174 One might do well to include David Hume in an expanded study as well, 
particularly his letters, where he voices the fear that he is losing his balance, as it were, and 
slipping into enthusiasm in earnest in the course of preparing to write his Treatise of Human 
Nature.175 And, as mentioned already, one might connect the discourse of enthusiasm to the rise 
of the novel. The centrality for the novel of Quixotism might be illuminated by its place within 
the polemic of enthusiasm in the English seventeenth century—and in related polemics across 
Europe through the Wars of Religion.176 
 At present, this project focuses on the foundations of the discourse in the mid- to late-
seventeenth century. It casts the counter-enthusiast as occupying a position of what one might 
call “intermodality”—a position through which the interconnections of nature, self, and society 
might be imagined, even as these spheres are delimited and differentiated. The figure of the 
enthusiast allows counter-enthusiasts, as orchestrators of enthusiasm, to provisionally entertain 
potential ontologies and epistemologies without committing to them. We turn next to Henry 
More and the other Cambridge Platonists, who exemplify the extent to which counter-
enthusiasm projects and orders totalistic perspectives as part of the project both to discredit and 
to take over the revolutionary prophetic energy of the English Civil Wars. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 See Samuel Johnson, Rambler 95, on Pertinax the skeptic, who eventually loses all sense of center. Samuel 
Johnson, The Rambler, ed. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, volumes 3-5 of The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel 
Johnson, ed. Allen T. Hazen et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 4: 143-46. This was one of the two most 
reprinted Rambler essays during Johnson’s own lifetime. See Roy McKeen Wiles, “The Contemporary Distribution of 
Johnson’s Rambler,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 2 (1968), 167. For the astrologer, see Johnson, The History of Rasselas, 
Prince of Abissinia, “Chapter XL: The History of a Man of Learning.” 
175 “I have notic’d in the Writings of the French Mysticks, & in those of our Fanatics here, that, when they give a 
History of the Situation of their Souls, they mention a Coldness & Desertion of the Spirit, which frequently returns, 
& some of them, at the beginning, have been tormented with it many Years. As this kind of Devotion depends 
entirely on the Force of Passion, & consequently of the Animal Spirits, I have often thought that their Case & mine 
were pretty parralel, & that their rapturous Admirations might discompose the Fabric of the Nerves & Brain, as 
much as profound Reflections, & that warmth or Enthusiasm which is inseperable from them.” David Hume, 
“Letter to [Dr. George Cheyne], March or April 1734,” in The Letters of David Hume Volume 1: 1727-1765, edited by 
J.Y.T. Grieg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 17 
176 For a quite different reading of Don Quixote which stresses its role in the “disenchantment of the world,” see 
Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 




























3. ALLEGORIES OF ENTHUSIASM: INCARNATION AND INSPIRATION IN HENRY 
MORE AND THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS 
 
       Here we are all, by day; By night we’re hurl’d 
       By dreames, each one, into a sev’rall world. 
          -Robert Herrick177  
 
1. Into the Enthusiast 
 As the last chapter has shown, enthusiasm comes to life (as an English-language concept) 
within a complex discourse that frames and pathologizes the popular appropriation of scriptural 
authority. There is a flow or rhythm to the discourse of enthusiasm. It begins, frequently, at the 
headwaters of the post-Reformation crisis of theological-political authority—with lay 
interpretation of the Bible. But it quickly carries attention away from this source, rearranging the 
conceptual mise-en-scene so as to satirize and undermine the overweening lay reader of scripture.  
 It does this in a number of ways. At times, it contemptuously reproduces extra-
hierarchical claims to illumination. For instance, consider the Cambridge Hebraist and (likely) 
latitudinarian John Spencer: 
 Among the many giddy Fancies and Errors of the late Times, bred, like the Worms in 
 the Manna, out of the Body of our corrupted Government and Discipline, this was that 
 … lea[d]ing imposture, That the true Seculum Spiritus Sancti was now coming on upon the 
 World, wherein the immediate Teachings of God should antiquate the more dead an 
 obscure Teachings of the Gospel, as those did the more weak and cloudy Instructions of 
 the Law; that the Minds of Holy Men should conceive (like the Virgin Mary) by the sole 
 overshadowings of the Holy Ghost, without any Assistances from Man or Humane Literature. 
 That Men should be autorized and assisted to the due performance of the Duties of 
 publick Preaching and Praying by the incitements of God upon the place. […] That the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Robert Herrick, The Complete Poetry of Robert Herrick, Vol. I, edited by Tom Cain and Ruth Connolly (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 21. This is the 57th poem in Hesperides.  
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 mighty impressions and propensions upon the spirits of the Faithful, was an interpretative 
 Voice from Heaven, a kind of Bath-Col to supply the defect of Scripture-Prophecy in 
 Dispensations more dark and  aenigmatical.178 Whence it came to pass that every morbid 
 heat of Passion and blind Zeal was christened by the name of an Ignis sacer, the sacred 
 impress and discovery of the Holy Ghost, and every crazy Fancy and Dream dub’d a 
 Prophetick Vision.179 
Spencer’s own ostentatiously casual learning—“Seculum Spiritus Sancti,” “a kind of Bath-Col,” “Ignis 
sacer”—reasserts the hermeneutical distance that those called enthusiasts have sought to close. He 
dresses them up as dunces in theologian’s clothing—as so many proofs that a little learning is a 
dangerous thing.  
 At other times, the discourse refuses the Judeo-Christian frame altogether. Where a 
radical reader of the Bible might think of his prophetic reading as typologically harmonious with 
the tradition of Adam, Moses, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, Paul—and, of course, Jesus—the 
discourse of enthusiasm shifts the cosmological background, situating this unlicensed reader in 
the company of sibyls, witches, and other pre-discredited pagans. The enthusiast’s God is 
hollowed out into a god among gods—which is further hollowed out into an unconscious 
allegory of his own prideful, licentious desires. (We have seen—and will see in this chapter—a 
number of examples of this strain of discourse.) 
 Thus the discourse of enthusiasm does not initiate the exceedingly sensitive battle 
regarding the proper structure of authority. But it does seek to fight it on advantageous rhetorical 
terrain. Indeed, it develops an extensive repertoire of framing genres in order to handle the 
question of prophetic authority in a way that evacuates its force. On a conceptual level, ne might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Bath-Col, literally “the Daughter of the Voice,” was a voice from heaven, alternately interpreted in Jewish 
traditions as a genuine or delusional interpretive aid in reading scripture. See the helpfully extensive note to John 
12.20-44 in George Townsend, ed., The New Testament, arranged in chronological and historical order (London: J. G. & F. 
Rivington, 1838), 283. 
179 John Spencer, A discourse concerning vulgar prophecies wherein the vanity of receiving them as the certain indications of any future 
event is discovered, and some characters of distinction between true and pretending prophets are laid down (London, 1665), 2-3. 
EEBO. 
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think of these genres in terms of allegorical-discursive tinctures. Intincted this way, the 
enthusiast’s feverish, atomistically jumbled brain stands out as the real issue. Intincted that way, 
and the enthusiast is arranged in a long chain of enthusiasts stretching back to Simon Magus and 
forward to the Antichrist. Intincted yet another way, and the enthusiast is a modern-day pythia 
inhaling intoxicating vapors from the bowels of the earth. And the important point to take away 
is that the discourse of enthusiasm does not settle for any one rhetorical-generic intincture. It 
wants—and freely uses—them all. It shifts between allegorical cosmologies in order to settle the 
enthusiast—to limit prophetic totality—in the most convenient manner.  
 So far we’ve looked at examples of this process that are primarily, if not exclusively, 
concerned with the figure of the enthusiast as a surface. The enthusiast is recognizable, in (for 
example) the rational prophet tropology, as an irrational, disordered exterior—with clouded eyes 
and an unseemly grimace. From the perspective of the history of style, the enthusiast is 
recognizable by certain superficial features—a “high” rhetorical register, a bewitching impromptu 
delivery, a frantic piling-up of clauses, etc.—which have been traditionally contrasted with the 
cool, measured tones of neoclassical style.180 Meanwhile, we have seen few writers exhibit much 
curiosity about what is going on within the enthusiast—under the surface. Indeed, so far the 
enthusiast has been defined as surface—as a sort of living woodcut. 
 In this chapter, we will look at a number of writers who emerge later in the discourse and 
do propose to explain the internal mechanisms of enthusiasm. These writers—known as the 
Cambridge Platonists—shift the discourse in some very important ways. Most influentially, their 
concentration on the medical physics beneath enthusiastic language allows for the development 
of an explanatory vocabulary for the problem of popular spirituality that appears to avoid the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Classic studies arguing this point, in addition to those mentioned in Chapter One above (Williamson, Croll, Wiley), 
include R.F. Jones, “Science in English Prose Style” and “Science and Language in England of the Mid-Seventeenth 
Century,” The Seventeenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951). See also W.S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric 
in England 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).  
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problem of doctrine altogether. One needn’t listen to what a street preacher says. One can 
instead diagnose this enthusiast as a victim of melancholy. The Cambridge Platonists, and in 
particular Henry More, with whose works we will be particularly concerned here, are thus often 
seen as important thinkers in the development of medical psychology. Like Johann Weyer, whom 
Freud listed among history’s most important thinkers for his retrospectively courageous 
insistence that witches are not actually possessed by Satan, but are in fact mentally ill, Henry 
More and his colleagues have been seen as progressive agents of the scientific disenchantment of 
spirituality who rightly see false prophets not as possessed by demons but as (in current terms) 
depressed, schizophrenic, or manic.181 
 Thus the Cambridge Platonists are central to the development of an especially significant 
provisional totality for the process of the rationalization of prophecy—the medical materialist 
totality, discussed in the third section of this chapter. But it is important to note at the outset that 
their contribution to the discourse of enthusiasm does not end here. Indeed, it is seriously 
misleading to limit (say) Henry More’s approach to enthusiasm to the cultivation of the 
physiological gaze. I will show in this chapter that the medicalization of the prophet is just one 
dimension of a larger rationalization schema that includes other key dimensions. Some of these 
look more “modern” than others. Some of them look decidedly medieval. But to emphasize, as 
many scholars do, the ways in which the various dimensions of these systems do not cohere is to 
miss the degree to which these systems balancing natural philosophical, experiential, and political 
insights are themselves “modern.” They balance totalities—not committing fully to a given 
philosophy, whether empiricist, skeptical, materialist, or rationalist, but developing each of these 
strains according to its own logic and tethering them to a simple core of rationality—in a way 
that anticipates the idealist systems of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Their example 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 See, e.g., A. Rupert Hall, “Henry More and the Scientific Revolution,” Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary Studies, 
edited by Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1990), 37-54. 
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suggests the degree to which rationalization schema are initially motivated by and modeled on the 
crisis of prophetic authority.  
 In putting forth this larger argument, I stress two key points. First, I show that the 
development of a system of balanced totalities in Cambridge Platonist thinkers involves the 
provisional inhabitation of the figure of the enthusiast. In order to delimit enthusiasm as a 
symptom of material processes, counter-enthusiasts adapt the perspective they simultaneously 
polemicize. They play the enthusiast—but also indicate the provisionality of their playing. This is 
a crucial dimension of subsequent counter-enthusiastic rhetorics—from Swift’s to Carlyle’s to 
Stephen Colbert’s.  
 Second, I will show that this strain of the discourse of enthusiasm, which appears to be 
concerned with the interiority of the enthusiastic subject, was finally interested in a yet more 
elusive interiority—that of signification itself. The discourse pivoted, particularly in the thought 
of Henry More, from the incarnation of the enthusiast, to the incarnation of the Word. The 
discourse of enthusiasm thus offered—and More is very explicit about this—a way into the core 
of Christian doctrine, the nature of the creative and redemptive “word made flesh.” Thus the 
provisional inhabitation of the enthusiast—the polemical-philosophical use, as it were, of the 
enthusiastic avatar—enabled an unprecedented inquiry into the structure of signification as a 
proxy for human-divine relations. In Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660), which 
many scholars consider his major theological-philosophical work, More frames this as an inquiry 
into competing allegories of the self—where the false prophetic mode of signification refers all 
events, historical and natural, back to the enthusiastic subjectivity, and the true prophetic mode 
figures the reasoning self as a vehicle for a larger divine allegory centered on the incarnation of 
God in Jesus.182 For the false enthusiast, in More’s view, signification is all about oneself—
whomever one is. For the true enthusiast (and enthusiasm is a term More is somewhat unusually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Robert Crocker, “Henry More: A Biographical Essay,” Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary Studies, edited by Sarah 
Hutton (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1990), 7. 
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comfortable imbuing with a positive as well as a negative meaning), signification is all about God. 
In the one, oneself is the tenor of language; the past is an allegorical figuration of the experiential 
present. In the other, oneself is a transparent vehicle carrying the divine logos through time; the 
present is a figurative echo of history’s crux. Thus More carries forward the observations of 
Luther discussed in the previous chapter, and anticipates the still more direct turn of John 
Locke—a thinker very intimately connected to the Cambridge Platonists—to the issue of 
linguistic epistemology and signification as it bears on the problem of false prophecy.  
* 
2. The Cambridge Platonists 
 So who were the Cambridge Platonists? They were a cohort of Cambridge scholars that 
emerged in the course and wake of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. Core members of the 
group include Benjamin Whichcote (the longtime pastor of St. Lawrence Jewry, where he 
preached erudite sermons attended by Henry More, John Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet, Locke, 
and many others), Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, Nathaniel Colverwell, John Smith, and Peter 
Sterry. Their associates included More’s close friend and colleague Anne Conway, Joseph Glanvill, 
John Wilkins, Walter Charleton, Isaac Newton, Damaris Masham, John Locke, the 
aforementioned John Spencer, and many other influential scholars and thinkers.183 The core 
thinkers of the group share some common philosophical and political interests. They display an 
interest in Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy (although some members of the group were 
equally inclined to Aristotle). They confirm the Augustinian interpretation of evil as the privation 
of good, and emphasize the religious and moral importance of pursuing the unattainable goal of 
“deiformity,” or human conformity to divinity.184 And they hold a common sense of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 For a good review of philosophical themes in the Cambridge Platonists in general, see Charles Taliaferro, Evidence 
and Faith: Philosophy and Religion since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11-25. 
184 See, e.g., Aharon Lichtenstein, The Rational Theology of a Cambridge Platonist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1962), 206. 
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importance of the problem of enthusiasm both for the political legitimacy of the state and for the 
future of the Christian church. All of them were counter-enthusiasts.  
 The Cambridge Platonists are frequently depicted as bridging the magicians and mystics 
of the late medieval and Renaissance period and the rationalists and empiricists of modern 
philosophy. They are, as Charles Taliaferro puts it, a Janus-faced hinge in the periodization of 
philosophy, looking at once forward and backward.185 At a glance, this is undeniable. Some 
aspects of Cambridge Platonist thought are startlingly modern: their sophisticated post-Cartesian 
emphasis on philosophical rationalism, for instance, and their medico-psychological approach to 
the question of divine inspiration. Other aspects seem atavistic: for example, their impassioned 
late-century defenses of the reality of witches, demons, and other spirits.186 Many scholars have 
been puzzled by the degree to which these thinkers—and Henry More in particular—could have 
entertained such apparently discordant notions.187 Richard Popkin, displaying a more capacious 
view of seventeenth-century thought, has wondered how differently the history of ideas—and 
indeed history in general—might appear if the marriage of mysticism and science perfected in the 
Cambridge Platonists and adapted by (among others) their Cambridge colleague Isaac Newton 
had not been severed by positivists eager to stress the natural philosophical and suppress the 
alchemical-mystical side of their seventeenth-century synthesis.188  
 I take a different approach here. I see these thinkers as having balanced logics of inquiry 
in a way that did have a lasting influence on the longer course of rationalization—and not only 
because they were rediscovered and championed by later thinkers.189 They articulate an attitude 
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186 See Richard Popkin, “The Spiritualist Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway,” Henry More (1614-1687) 
Tercentenary Studies, edited by Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1990), 103; Allison Coudert, 
“Henry More and Witchcraft,” Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary Studies, edited by Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht, 
Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1990), 115-36. 
187 This is the central conceit of Daniel Fouke’s study of Henry More, The Enthusiastical Concerns of Dr. Henry More: 
Religious Meaning and the Psychology of Delusion (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
188 Popkin, 97. 
189 Such as, for example, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who uses a quote from More for the epigraph to his essay, “The 
Over-Soul.” 
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toward philosophy that emphasizes the degree to which apparently consistent perspectives might 
be provisionally entertained—tried on and put away as needed. This is not to say that they have 
no philosophical center. They are, after all, Platonists. And more importantly here, they are 
devout Christians dedicated to defending the established church (as they understand it) from the 
linked threats of atheism and enthusiasm.190 But they exhibit flexibility around this core—a 
willingness to play with the perspectives they initially oppose—and this attitude itself has a very 
long afterlife. One might trace it through Hume—who turns from rigorously establishing the 
non-existence of the self to a relaxing game of backgammon with friends.191 One might find it in 
the Millite notion of manysidedness.192 One might hear it echoed in the notion, voiced by 
Stephen Jay Gould, that religion and science are “non-overlapping magisteria.”193 And one might 
detect it in Richard Rorty’s ironist, balancing “final vocabularies.”194 In short, they help 
structure—around a theological core—a proto-liberal approach to ideology. 
 I will have more to say along these lines in my concluding section. For now, it is 
important to show this balancing act in action as it pertains to the discourse of enthusiasm. The 
following discussion will emphasize their provisional inhabitations of one family of totalities in 
particular: those associated with materialism. I emphasize the Cambridge Platonism interest in 
materialism for a number of interrelated reasons, which it is worth stating clearly at the outset of 
this chapter. First, it might appear to be initially unclear why thinkers who broadly endorse the 
idealist philosophies of Plato and Plotinus would be interested in materialism at all except to 
oppose and reject it. Indeed, this is ostensibly what these thinkers are doing—opposing what they 
perceive to be the rise and spread of atheistic materialism. As Cudworth writes, such “Epicurean” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 This link is especially clear in Cudworth’s True Intellectual System (see below) and in More’s Antidote against Atheism 
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191 See Book 1, Part 4, Section 7 of David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary 
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thinkers advocate a deterministic fatalism that leaves no room either for God or for human 
freedom. The links Cudworth perceives between this philosophical system and its political and 
theological ramifications are clear in the way he introduces the subject: “The Democritick Fate, is 
nothing but The Material Necessity of all things without a God: it supposing Sensless Matter, Necessarily 
Moved, to be the onely Original and Principle of all things: Which therefore is called by Epicurus, 
The Physiological; by us, the Atheistick Fate.”195 Democracy (in Cudworth’s view, a very bad thing), 
atheism, and materialism are here all bound in one unholy knot. He constructs his “true 
intellectual system of the universe,” then, to delineate and confute this knot. But at the same time, 
this project of delineating and confuting atheistic materialism required Cudworth 1) to take this 
perspective seriously and to reproduce its arguments in great detail, and, more significantly, 2) 
compeled him to adapt certain forms of materialist thinking against the Epicureans. Cudworth 
considered a certain sort of atomistic mechanism—which he calls “Mechanick theism” and 
associates with Descartes—to be useful (in doses) in opposing atheist materialism.196 As Charles 
Taliaferro and Alison Teply put it, “Cudworth supported Descartes’ attempt to revive atomistic 
philosophy and so distinguish mind from matter. Cudworth held that atomistic mechanism 
directly clashed with the ancient atheistic materialism that, in his opinion, Hobbes had taken from 
the Epicureans for his own natural philosophy.”197 In other words, he adapts dimensions of 
materialism to his greater theist idealist project. He is not the only Cambridge Platonist to do this. 
A similar balance is evident, as we will see, in Henry More and John Smith.198  
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 I see this balancing of idealist and materialist strains as highly significant both for the 
history of rationalization and the emergence of the balanced totalities of enlightenment. These 
thinkers employ a guarded materialism intended not to replace, but to defend the spiritual core of 
their perspective. At the same time, this guarded engagement with materialism allows these 
thinkers a deep archive of polemical resources for characterizing their intellectual, political, and 
theological opponents, against whom they deploy materialist thinking in order to despiritualize 
their claims to political legitimacy and religious authority. In keeping with the shift from heresy to 
enthusiasm traced in the last chapter, these selective applications of materialism avoid the 
question of whether those they accuse of atheist materialism actually are atheist materialists. 
Some, like Hobbes, might well be. But others, like Familists and Quakers, appear very much to 
believe in the reality of spirit. Their own beliefs, however, do not matter. The Cambridge 
Platonists either dismiss the question of belief altogether, or accuse such thinkers of being “secret” 
materialists.199 In short, their provisional occupation of materialist totality allows at once for the 
defense of one sort of spirituality, and for the despiritualization of another.  
 I see this structure of provisional materialism as important for the rationalization of 
experience and thus for the emergence of the categories of enlightenment. This is, to put it 
plainly, an important stage in the history of the concept of objectivity—understood as that 
dimension of reality which corresponds to natural, atomistic, mechanical laws as opposed to 
moral or aesthetic laws. It is important, in my view, that this dimension of experience was 
conceived of at the beginning of the enlightenment as a part with a share in a greater spiritual 
whole. Moreover, it is important that this part was formulated polemically, both in terms of what 
bad political subjects believe (they are atheist materialists, even if they don’t admit it), and in 
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terms of how bad political subjects can be described (they are at the mercy of their humors, 
frenzied, purely mechanical, determined, melancholic). Some of the Cambridge Platonists (like 
Cudworth) emphasize the first conclusion. Others (like Smith and More) emphasize the second. 
Both emphases work together to bring materialist thinking into mainstream defenses of 
institutional power as a dimension of reality to which undesirables can be consigned when they 
claim spiritual power. In the conclusion to this dissertation, I will further suggest that in this way 
the historical discourse of enthusiasm complicates the idea, voiced most powerfully by Jonathan 
Israel, that enlightenment should be thought of in terms of the gradual triumph of a “hylozoic 
monism” with progressive political and individualist upshots.200 
* 
3. False Prophecy and Provisional Totality 
 In recent decades, a number of prominent literary scholars have studied the revival of 
materialisms in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, usually framing these (though 
often implicitly) as part of a long narrative of enlightenment and secularization. Most starkly, as 
in the recent work of Stephen Greenblatt, the materialist ideas incubated in Lucretius’ De Rerum 
Natura are seen to have “made the world modern.”201 More subtly, the revival has offered a 
bridge between the materialist cultures of then and now, providing, if not a teleological arc, at 
least common ground for inter-epochal insights. 
 But why did this particular materialist revival find such fuel when it did—in the early 
seventeenth century, and particularly in the 1640s and 50s? Some have noted the importance of 
the “troubles” of mid-century for the awakening of atomist imagery. As Reid Barbour writes, 
“Especially in the years of the civil war, there is ample testimony that atomism was thought to 
represent and encourage ‘democratical’ and sectarian tendencies: the war itself was compared to 
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the jostle of atoms, and the jostle of atoms was likened to the anarchy of popular rule.”202 As 
Barbour suggests, initially these appeals to atomistic imagery make little distinction as to whether 
“schismatics” are themselves “licentious” Epicureans, or simply mindless atoms in a random 
atheistical swirl. Frequently, these are seen as complementary levels of the same analysis. 
Whatever those so-called prophets say they experience or believe, they’re obviously pagan 
receptacles of the “Mundane Spirit.” As Ralph Cudworth writes: “[These] Bewitched Enthusiasts 
and Blind Spiritati […] are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow and captivated Principle of 
Life, and, to use their own Language, In-blown by it.” By claiming to feel the spirit, to be moved 
by it, popular prophets unwittingly confess, for Cudworth, that they are Epicurean sensualists 
“captivated” by the “Principle of Life.” They are “that Blind Goddess, Natures Fanaticks.”203 One 
sees here the roots of Swift’s fragment on The Mechanical Operation of Spirit, in which “fanatick” 
inspiration is reduced to the “spiritual” drives to drink and fornicate.204 
 But in first appealing to Epicureanism as a monstrous lens through which to read the 
“enthusiast,” these defenders of the church (many of whom were affiliated with the Cambridge 
Platonists) also find an attractively precise system of polemical and philosophical resources. It is 
as though the need to critique popular spirit drives them deeper into a materialism that might 
permanently describe and delimit the popular body. As mentioned above, for Cudworth, whose 
True Intellectual System of the Universe: Wherein All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted, and 
Its Impossibility Demonstrated (1678) is a highly influential systematic attempt to synthesize 
understand all philosophies as emanating from a Christian-Platonic prisca theologia, a properly 
situated materialism (which he derives from Descartes) is the best defense against atheism. In 
fully accounting for the role of the senses in the production of experience, a Cartesian 
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materialism robs a fully atheist materialism of its explanatory power. And in showing the 
existence of “a human faculty above mere sense” that “perceive[s] and judge[s] other senses,” 
Cudworth purports to prove the connection of immanence and transcendence.205 His massive 
system is thus designed to swallow the leviathan—to absorb the despiritualized philosophies of 
Hobbes (whom he considers a neo-Epicurean) and Lucretius into a spiritualized—and indeed 
Trinitarian—totality.206 
 This appropriation of materialism in a way that continues but surpasses polemic has an 
importance for the shape of scriptural hermeneutics as well. I want briefly to isolate one of these 
resources—Lucretian poetics—as it offered a way of chaining unlicensed logos down to earth. So 
how did it do this? The Epicurean system, as depicted by Lucretius, makes no exceptions to its 
materialism. There is only atom and void. Thus Lucretius describes both speech and writing as 
purely material processes. He writes, “Every kind of sound and voice is heard, when they have 
found their way into the ears and struck upon the sense with their body.”207 He goes on to 
describe the voice as a physical scrape and spoken words as atomic bundles flying through space, 
striking eardrums. Lucretian writing, too, is atomic. Those who have read him will probably recall 
the several passages toward the beginning of the poem where he appeals to his own poetics as a 
means of illustrating the Epicurean atomism he is propounding. After suggesting that the four-
element theory of Empedocles is incorrect because all four elements can be reduced to the atom, 
Lucretius leans on the felicitous fact that elementa, the word that he uses for “atoms,” is also the 
Latin for “letters of the alphabet.” He writes, “Indeed scattered abroad in my verses you see 
many letters [elementa] in common to many words, and yet you must needs grant that verses and 
words are unlike both in sense and in the ring of their sound. So great is the power of letters by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Taliaferro and Teply, 22. 
206 Cudworth’s Trinitarian rationalism would be well worth further exploring at greater length in an expanded version 
of this project. 
207 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 4.524-29, edited and translated by Cyril Bailey, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), 
389. 
 100	  
mere change of order.” 208 Thus atoms are like letters. But this example is reversible as well. 
Letters are atoms. The Epicurean revivalist Walter Charleton, who was fascinated by this passage, 
writes: “For, if we assume only Two Letters, of them we can create only two words; if three, 6; if 
four, 24; if five, 120;” etc. Such factorial combinations soon “swell above our computation.”209 
Language might be built from the ground up, so to speak—from letters into “Syllables, Words, 
Sentences, Orations, Books.”210 It might emerge from below rather than descend from on high. 
 Lucretius thus offers a way to model language without spirit, without divine contact—
without, in Cudworth’s phrase, “a Knowing and Understanding Nature” behind signification.211 
Richard Kroll’s The Material Word, proposes that this Epicurean theory of language was 
tremendously influential in subsequent decades, supporting neoclassical theories of language and 
literature in general.212 But it’s important to keep in mind that such adaptations of the material 
word are generally provisional. They do not abandon revelation. They relocate its immanent form 
from God’s first book to his second—from scripture to nature. One might recall, as Joanna 
Picciotto has lately invited us to do, the widespread reimagining in the late-seventeenth century of 
the “primitive purity” of the Edenic scene as a space not of prophetic but of natural 
philosophical revelation, where (in Thomas Sprat’s well-known phrase) “men deliver’d so many 
things, almost in equal number of words.”213 In the right hands, the hands of the guarded 
enthusiast—the natural philosopher, the satirist, etc.—rhetoric cracks a window for revelation. 
But the popular prophet who would appeal eschatologically to Christian Logos is understood as 
fully Epicurean—a blind, closed, gross fragment of crude enthusiasm. 
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 One might thus think of the discourse of enthusiasm as approaching the embodied 
enthusiast through a guarded materialism. This is true beyond the adaptation of a strictly 
Lucretian materialism. A number of materialist ontological paradigms are taken to apply to 
them—but not to us. The situating of the enthusiast within an ontological “slice” of nature finds 
another important conceptual resource in the familiar Aristotelian ordering of the soul—which 
associates different soul functions with different levels of natural complexity: the vegetable soul 
of plants is devoted to material growth; the animal soul of animals adds to the vegetable 
properties the instincts; the intellectual soul of humans adds to the animal soul the capacity to 
think and reflect.214 Aristotle’s schema thus thickens the rational prophet trope introduced in the 
last chapter. The rational prophet is aligned with the intellectual, and the irrational, false prophet 
with the sensual soul. 
 Consider, for instance, the thought of John Smith. In his posthumously published 
discourse Of Prophesie (1660; this is cited from the 1672 edition), Smith summarizes this approach 
to the false prophet as follows: 
 [T]he Prophetical spirit doth never alienate the Mind, (seeing it seats it self as well  
 in the Rational powers as in the Sensitive,) but alwaies maintains a consistency and  
 clearness of Reason, strength and soliditie of Judgment, where it comes; it doth  
 not ravish the Mind, but inform and enlighten it: But the Pseudo prophetical spirit,  
 if indeed without any kind of dissimulation it enters into any one, because it can rise  
 no higher than the Middle regions of Man, which is his Fancy, it there dwells as in  
 storms and tempests [and] is also conjoined with alienations and abreptions of  
 mind.215 
According to the Aristotelian psychology on which Smith relies, the false prophetic spirit can 
only seize upon the lower and middle regions of the soul, the senses and the imagination. False 
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prophecy swallows one from the bottom up, travelling through the senses to abduct the 
imagination, but never reaching the crystalline upper region of the intellect. In so doing, false 
prophecy alienates and abrepts the mind from itself, dragging the fancy down to the realm of the 
senses. True prophecy, on the contrary, addresses at once the rational and sensitive faculties. In 
discussing true prophecy, Smith makes no mention of the fancy or imagination, although its 
presence is implied in the assumption that true prophecy is addressed instantaneously to the 
whole architecture of the soul. It is a divine address to the whole being. One might say that in the 
true prophetic experience, the imagination is safely provided for, defended on one side by the 
concrete solidity of sense, on the other by the serene ideal of reason. The fancy is locked up and 
safely sleeping in a tower.  
 For Smith, prophecy addresses the prophet instantaneously from above; false prophecy 
insinuates itself into the prophet gradually from beneath; true prophecy is at once sensory and 
reasonable; false prophecy is at once sensual and imaginative. When he turns to some of the 
many scenes of prophecy in the Bible that trouble his schema—the many instances of “panic 
fears, consternations, affrightments, and tremblings” found in the books of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, 
and Daniel, for instance—Smith continues to insist that the energy of the spirit in true prophecy 
is distinct from that in false.216 It is vital and direct whereas false prophecy is “more dilute and 
languid,” and “tending to nourish immorality and prophaneness.”217 Even in its most violent 
visitations, as in Jeremiah 23:29, true prophecy “enter[s] upon the Mind as a fire, and like a hammer 
that breaketh the rock in pieces.”218 So the sensory dimension of true prophecy is marked not by 
insinuation and pleasure but by pain and intensity. This is a manly way of prophesying. 
 Smith thus offers what I have called in my introduction a physiological theory of mimesis. 
He emphasizes the way in which false aspirants to prophecy are not able to reflect the divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




intelligence. They are only able to reflect their own embodiment—their own earthly imagination. 
The middle-region that should mediate between the material and intellectual regions of reality, 
the fancy, does not mediate at all. It is not clear. It does not let light through. Instead, like a 
mirror pointing downward at the material order, it only reflects the material and sensual 
conditions of the false prophet’s own body and experiences. The false prophet’s imagination can 
be described as acting here as a sort of solipsistic or monadic mirror situated at the level of the 
imagination, merely hurling around and recombining its own disordered reflection. One might 
recall those moments in Shakespeare’s Tempest when Ariel possesses the sensoria of the 
conspirators and fills their imaginations with visions of hell. But here there is no clear case of 
possession. False prophets are possessed by themselves alone. They are closed hermeneutical 
circles—all senses, no matter-escaping reason.  So this is Smith’s philosophical approach to the 
problem around which our discussion is centered—the problem of how, in conditions of 
widespread doctrinal difference, to sort true from false forms of contact with the divine. He 
rearticulates heresy as a form of merely materialist being—as possession of the imagination, here 
rendered as a type of pseudo-divine mirror or inner image-maker, by the body. True prophecy, 
Smith suggests, addresses the prophet serenely from above, as reason; false prophecy insinuates 
itself into the prophet gradually from beneath; true prophecy is at once sensory and reasonable; 
false prophecy is at once sensual and imaginative.   
 And, of course, the suggestions of gender are also crucial here. The association of women 
and workers with the sensual and mechanical rather than the intellectual dimensions of 
experience is of course at least as old as Aristotle. Here it is a polemical resource for discrediting 
and pathologizing those—including many prophesying women—who were accruing to 
themselves spiritual authority outside of traditional hierarchies of church and state.219 They are 
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out of their minds, Smith suggests, dreaming with eyes open, possessed by sensual imaginations, 
and divorced from the realm of sound and serene reasons. They might say that they come from 
God, or that we all come from God, or some such twaddle. But in doing so they only confess 
that they have taken leave of their better judgment. They are alienated from themselves. Don’t 
listen to them. 
 Smith’s fellow Cambridge Platonist Henry More takes this association of false prophecy 
with the mechanical and physical dimensions of bodily being still further. In Enthusiasmus 
Triumphatus (first published in 1656 and frequently reprinted through the eighteenth century), 
More systematically reduces all claims to spiritual authority to humoral disorders, fits of 
melancholy, literal bellyaching. As More puts it: 
 The Spirit then that wings the Enthusiast in such a wonderful manner, is nothing  
 else but that Flatulency which is in the Melancholy complexion, and rises out of the  
 Hypochondriacal humour upon some occasional heat, as Winde out of an  
 AEolipila [this is an alchemical vessel also known as a Hero engine] applied to the  
 fire. Which fume mounting into the Head, being first actuated and spirited and 
 somewhat refined by the warmth of the Heart, fills the Mind with variety of  
 Imaginations, and so quickens and inlarges Invention, that it makes the Enthusiast  
 to admiration fluent and eloquent, he being as it were drunk with new wine drawn  
 from that Cellar of his own that lies in the lowest region of his Body, though he be  
 not aware of it, but takes it to be pure Nectar, and those waters of life that spring  
 from above.220 
Whereas Smith despiritualizes the enthusiast in a Neo-Aristotelian register, distinguishing the 
lower levels of the false prophetic souls from the reasonableness of the true prophet, More draws 
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upon Galenic and alchemical-physiological concepts.221 It is as though he is saying, “You think 
you are a conduit for God, Enthusiast; others think you are possessed by demons. But I know 
that you are cut off from spirit altogether.” And, as is very important, More’s discussion has a 
rhetorical dimension as well. “You think you speak with an angel’s tongue, Enthusiast; others 
think you speak with a devil’s. But I know you are just a teapot boiling your own bowels and 
giving out a pretty whistle.” Both More and Smith rely upon the same basic model. The sensory 
regions take possession of the imagination and leave the intellect untouched. The intellect is 
reserved for the divine and associated with reason. The imagination is consigned to the 
disordered subject, the alienated self, and associated with mere materiality. The concept of the 
material self thus enters the intellectual vocabulary of England in large part as an innovative 
synonym for the false prophet.  
* 
4. Enthusiasms, Philosophical and Political 
 One of More’s key distinctions in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus makes this process—the 
provisional adoption of a materialist ontology in order to despiritualize the enthusiast—especially 
clear. In taxonomizing enthusiasm, More separates “political enthusiasts,” on the one hand, from 
“philosophical enthusiasts,” on the other. Political enthusiasts are those “whose temper carries 
them most to Political affaires, who love rule and honour and have a strong sense of civil rights[.] 
Melancholy heating them makes them sometimes fancy themselves great Princes (at least by 
divine assignment) & deliverers of the people sent from God.”222 These are the real problem 
enthusiasts—eager to seize political authority “by divine assignment” from the powers that be. 
Think of Prophet Hunt or the Saints of the New Model Army. These so-called prophets are 
neither inspired by the Holy Spirit (as they claim) nor possessed by the devil (as their opponents 
claim). They are simply material bodies “intoxicated,” More writes, “with vapours from the 
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lowest region of their Body, as the Pythia of old are conceived to have been inspired through the 
power of certain exhalations breathed from those caverns they had their recesse in.”223  
 But there’s also another, “philosophical” variety of enthusiasm belonging to the 
intellectual—the Paracelsian doctor, the alchemist, the Epicurean. Philosophical enthusiasts are 
those “of a more speculative and Philosophical complexion,” whom melancholy makes “prone to 
[…] the curious contemplation of things.” In this camp, More lists those alchemists, theosophists, 
and Epicureans who believe (for instance) “that Nature is the Body of God […], who is also the 
World, and whatsoever is any way sensible or perceptible.”224 Often, their problem is not that 
they’re material, but that they’re materialists. More writes, “[They] profess, That every thing is 
God in love or wrath”—reflecting the Heraclitian sense of atoms as subject to the forces of love 
and strife—“Which […] is no better then Atheisme. For it implies that God is nothing else but the 
universall Matter of the world […]. But to slice God into so many parts is to wound him and kill 
him, and to make no God at all.”225 
 More identifies both political and philosophical enthusiasms as dangerous forms of 
“melancholy.” In so doing he draws upon a long tradition of Galenic medicine which conceives 
of the bodily spirits as subject to four humors—blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm—
which must remain balanced for proper physical and psychological functioning. When one of 
these humors dominates the bodily system, illness results. Melancholy results from an abundance 
of black bile, the dry and cold humor associated with earth—and hence, in More’s philosophical 
interpretation of the humors, from a systematic overbalance of matter.226 Thus More takes 
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226 Cf. Galen’s description of the melancholy complexion with More’s application of the concept to enthusiasm: 
“[T]hey dream of frightful things, black, darkness, and terrible businesses.” See Galen, Galen’s art of physick ... translated 
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influence of Galenic medicine more generally on early modern representation—has attracted much attention from 
literary scholars in recent years. For a work that considers melancholy as a conceptual “assemblage” in a way that 
contrasts with my consideration here of the role of this humor in contributing the enlightenment rationalization 
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philosophical enthusiasm to be a medical condition. But it’s clear that he sees much more harm 
in the former—political enthusiasm—than the philosophical variety of this disease. Indeed, More 
thinks of philosophical enthusiasm more in terms of folly than treason. His earliest counter-
enthusiastic writings make this quite clear. They are directed against Thomas Vaughan—twin 
brother of the mystically-inclined poet, Henry Vaughan—an alchemist, hermetic philosopher, 
author of widely read works on “natural magic,” and Church of England clergyman.227 It’s hard 
to avoid the impression that More’s hostility to Vaughan, as he himself nearly admits in his 
polemical attacks, stems in part from a strong feeling of resemblance. As Daniel Fouke puts it: 
  The origins of More’s own understanding of the spiritual life in ecstatic, mystical,  
 and aesthetic experiences suggest a deeply ‘enthusiastical’ element in More. He  
 was not unaware of his own cast of mind, and turned it into a qualification for 
 criticizing Vaughan, because ‘wee are growne near kin in temper and complexion, so we 
 ought Mutually to allow each other in our actings alike, according to our common temper 
 and nature.’228 
More’s aversion to Vaughan’s enthusiasm, then, follows from a feeling of being almost Vaughan, 
or of having once been Vaughan, or of fearing he might be Vaughan—as though he sees in 
Vaughan a distorted and foolish version of himself.229 A particularly sore point is Vaughan’s 
simultaneous attachment to Platonism (which More professes) and alchemy (which More detests). 
In their exchange, More attempts at several points to wrestle Plato back to the side of “reason”—
for example: “Put thy soul into a crysiple, O pragmatical chemist [i.e. alchemist], and set it on that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
paradigm, see Drew Daniel, The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and Epistemology in the English Renaissance (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013). 
227 These attacks occur in [Alazonomastix Philalethes], Observations upon Anthroposophia Theomagica and Anima Magica 
Abscondita [by Eugenius Philalethes, i.e. Thomas Vaughan] (London, 1650) and Idem., The Second Lash of 
Alazonomastix: Conteining a Solid and Serious Reply to a very uncivill Answer to certain Observations upon Anthroposophia 
Theomagica… (London, 1651). See Frederic B. Burnham, “The More-Vaughan Controversy: The Revolt Against 
Philosophical Enthusiasm,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35.1 (1974): 33-49. 
228 Fouke, 102. 
229 A standard view of More is that he is as enthusiastic as any he attacks. See Lichtenstein, 19-20, which collects 
quotes to this effect from Leigh Hunt, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Tulloch, etc.  
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fire that will excoct and purge out thy drosse, and then judge of Platonisme.”230 Here, as in the 
passages from Enthusiasmus Triumphatus we’ve already seen, More takes alchemy to be a 
metaphorical resource for the handling of matter. He invites Vaughan to purify his soul in some 
imaginary crysiple. Elsewhere he compares the enthusiastic body—in this case imagined not 
according to the Epicurean paradigm of political enthusiasm but in terms of an alchemical 
paradigm—to alchemical equipment overheating one’s choler. At any rate, these are not images 
that bear much pressing. There is much evidence that later in his life More regretted these early 
quasi-satirical, quasi-serious attacks on Vaughan’s “enthusiasm”—and tried to write them off as 
more in jest than an actual reading (and Vaughan’s indignant responses) might suggest.231  
 The point is, philosophical enthusiasm is not the root problem for More. Political 
enthusiasm is. Indeed, More participates in his own sort of provisional philosophical 
materialism—offering his own recipe for reducing spirit to matter—in order to address the 
political core of the concept. As one will have noticed, More’s imagery draws on a different 
materialist vocabulary from Cudworth’s. Whereas Cudworth is concerned with the way in which 
enthusiasts are Epicurean atheists, More thinks of them in terms of alchemy and the Galenic 
humors. This difference is important, especially as it helps to establish the atheist materialism of 
political enthusiasts as more dangerous, ultimately, than the Galenic or Paracelsian materialisms 
of philosophical enthusiasts. But these two thinkers also share a broad structural similarity. They 
take up a materialist perspective in a provisional way in order to pathologize and despiritualize 
enthusiasts. The one, Cudworth, does so on behalf of a philosophical system. The other, More, 
does so ultimately—as we will see in the sections that follow—on behalf of a theory of meaning. 
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 Subsequently More’s distinction between philosophical and political enthusiasm is very 
widely adapted. One finds it in John Smith, Joseph Glanvill, and others.232 Even where it is not 
named, its basic structure is respected. The architects of enthusiasm — whether More, Locke, or 
Swift —provisionally occupy the materialist position of the philosophical enthusiast. They 
entertain materialism insofar as this provides a conceptual vocabulary for getting beneath or 
around popular appeals to spirit. But they keep their gloves on. They buffer their engagement 
with materialism, leaving room for true inspiration or some other means of conceptual escape.  
* 
5. The Sanguine Enthusiast 
 So far we have discussed the ways that the Cambridge Platonists explain the cause of the 
crisis of popular prophetic authority in terms of material-physical illness. Those calling 
themselves prophets are really melancholiacs. Such enthusiasts are trapped in their material 
bodies, mimetically entangled with the base layer of being, full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing. Their exegetical and exhortative language should be treated as basically meaningless—a 
sometimes incidentally gorgeous whistling produced by overactive spleens. And we have pivoted 
firmly to More as particularly representative of this tendency.  
 But this is not where More’s etiology of enthusiasm ends. While he is well known for 
reducing enthusiasm to melancholy, this is simply one move among several that he brings to the 
discourse—and, at least from his own perspective, it is not the most important. For the most part, 
More does present enthusiasts as afflicted by melancholy. But his counter-enthusiasm does not 
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limit enthusiasm to the prevalence of this one humor. The longest discussion of any individual 
enthusiast in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus concerns a person who is not melancholy at all (at least in 
More’s telling). On the contrary, this enthusiast, David George, is sanguine—flush with blood, 
cheerful, soft-spoken. If (to borrow a term from Shapin and Schaffer) the “virtual witnessing” of 
the enthusiast we’ve seen so far has been quite straightforward—with the enthusiast depicted as 
frenzied, prone to profound despair, visibly hallucinating, etc.—this sanguine enthusiast 
complicates matters.233 He raises new problems for the discourse of enthusiasm—what to do 
about an enthusiast who does not appear to be enthusiastic, whose enthusiasm is not so easily 
legible. 
 The enthusiast whom More chooses for this purpose is David George, known to 
historians as David Joris, a sixteenth-century Anabaptist from the Netherlands. A disciple of 
Melchior Hoffman, Joris rose to prominence following the failure of the Münster Rebellion. 
Though he was among the peacemakers who quelled the calls for vengeance among the 
Anabaptists following the retaking of Münster, his association with that event secured him a 
place among the rolls of radical Protestant monstrosities that haunted Europe for centuries.234 
We’ve already seen his followers classified in the rogues gallery of heretics in Featley’s Dippers 
Dipt. He appears as a similarly villainous figure in over two hundred additional English 
publications between the mid-sixteenth and the early eighteenth century.235 His theological 
views—which apparently included a theoretical defense of polygamy (though it is not clear 
whether he practiced this himself) and a standard Anabaptist sense that he was living in a time of 
a third divine dispensation of the Holy Spirit following the earlier dispensations of the Son and 
the Father—are regularly decried and distorted in these works. For the most part, he appears like 
other “fanatic” figures of the time—raving, milky-eyed, possessed, overheated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Shapin and Schaffer, 60 ff. 
234 For a selection and careful study of Joris’ theological writings, see David Joris, The Anabaptist Writings of David Joris, 
1535-1543, edited by Gary K. Waite (Huntington, IN: Herald Press, 2013).  
235 EEBO search. 
 111	  
 Henry More handles George very differently. His initial description of George is worth 
quoting at length: 
 This David George, a man of very low parentage, was yet, in the judgment of his  
 very enemies, one of notable natural parts, a comely person to look upon, and of a 
 gracefull presence. He was also square of body, yellow-bearded, gray-ey’d, bright  
 and shining, grave and sedate in speech; in a word, all his motions, gestures and 
 demeanours were so decent and becoming, as if he had been wholly composed to 
 honesty and godlinesse. He lived very splendidly and magnificently in his house,  
 and yet without the least stir or disorder. He was a religious frequenter of the  
 Church, a liberall reliever of the poor, a comfortable visiter of the sick, obedient to the 
 Magistrate, kind and affable to all persons.236 
Nothing about George’s appearance or “motions” gives him away. He has no “pale wasted 
Melancholy countenance.”237 He doesn’t speak zealously or shrilly. And yet, hiding within this 
square, bearded surface is a viper’s nest of doctrinal errors, all tending to reinforce a belief that 
“David George is the true Christ and Messias,” who will “restore the house of Israel.”238 He further 
claims, according to More, “the power of the remission of sins,” and the power to remit or 
pardon “all sin and blasphemy against the Father or the Sonne” (but not against “the holy Ghost, 
that is, against David George”). He declares, “the holy Scriptures, the sayings and testimonies of the 
Prophets, of Christ and of his Apostles do all point, if rightly understood in the mystery of them, 
to the glorious coming of David George.” And he further declares that many other aspects of the 
scriptures should be interpreted morally, not literally: e.g. “That Angels and Devils are onely good 
men and evil men, or their Virtues and Vices.”239 
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 More’s description of George—this particular piece of virtual witnessing—is almost a 
fable itself. George appears to be upright, healthy, doctrinaire. But peer into his actual beliefs—
and behold a deadly sinkhole. More does offer a physiological explanation for this particularly 
dangerous sort of enthusiast. He is dominated by sanguine. As such, he appears fresh and healthy. 
His language is orderly. His surface is in fine repair. But the sanguine enthusiast is in fact the 
worst kind. Whereas the melancholy enthusiast does not conceal enthusiasm, the sanguine 
enthusiast does. This is a Machiavellian sort of enthusiast—a hypocrite. He conceals his 
doctrine—which thus only poisons his followers gradually, insinuatingly. He is, as More says, 
“discreet in all things, very cunning in some, as in his closenesse and reservednesse in his 
Doctrine to those of Basil [where Joris lived after leaving Münster] … to whom he communicated 
not one Iota of it, but yet he sedulously dispersed it in the further parts of Germany both by books 
and letters.”240 Many leaders of sects and founders of false doctrine are similarly sanguine 
enthusiasts. Henry More includes among these “Mahomet,” whose prominent role in the 
figuration of enthusiasm deserves a study unto itself, and Henry Nicholis, the founder of the 
Familists, whom we will consider below.  
 On one level, Henry More solves a particularly difficult problem for the discourse of 
enthusiasm—what to do about enthusiasts who do not appear enthusiastic—by appealing to 
another material cause, not melancholy but sanguine. But this is not the final point of his 
discussion of David George. George is not just provisionally materialized. His figuration provides 
an occasion to explore a deeper problem in the discourse of enthusiasm—and allows both More 
and the present discussion to pivot to what we might call a mature counter-enthusiasm 
concerned not merely with a medical symptomatology but with an allegorical symptomatology. 
More sees enthusiasm ultimately not as a humoral disorder but as a typological disorder. What 
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must be interrogated, finally, is not the enthusiast himself, but the theory of the Word and its 
relation to history and experience which the enthusiast professes. 
 To state the point directly, the political enthusiast—and the sanguine is the most 
successful, most insidious sort of political enthusiast, because he is able to conceal and insinuate 
his motives—is ultimately an advocate of a scriptural allegory which reads the Bible as 
anticipating his or her own present experience. The ultimate referent of the scripture, in this view, 
is the reader’s own life. This is why the doctrinal revelations fall with such tragicomic gravity in 
More’s rehearsal. The ultimate savior prophesied by the scriptures is—David George. The person 
on whom the dispensation of the spirit is balanced is—David George. People should feel free to 
marry as many people as they wish—So saith David George. The alpha and the omega is—David 
George. More obviously wants to deflate this perspective. But he also finds it terrifying—because, 
I would suggest, from some solipsistic or skeptical threshold, “David George” (or the 
overweening reader for whom this figure is itself an allegory) has a point. Any given reader is an 
experiential horizon within whom signification—even divine signification—maps its 
constellations. The enthusiast refers language to himself. This is his great error. This is the great 
temptation that must, for More, be identified and resisted. He is—literally—a self-fulfilling 
prophet. 
 Thus More finally theorizes the incarnate dimension of the enthusiast as a bad sort of 
allegorical framing. He sees the enthusiast’s body as grossly distorted by pride such that it takes 
itself to be the tenor of scripture, the prophesied reincarnation of divinity on earth. He must 
show, then, that “it is the Reign of Sanguine, not the Rule of the Spirit,” which dominates enthusiastic 
hermeneutics.241 (One can see how similar this perspective is to Luther’s—albeit here tethered to 
a medical discourse as well as a theological.)242 
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 He does this in part by virtually witnessing the degree to which the sanguine enthusiast 
cares for his own flesh and blood. Unlike Jesus Christ, who willingly dies in the most agonizing 
manner to prove his divinity, David George and his followers bear such “tender love … to their 
own dear carkases” that they would not “suffer the least aching of their little fingers by way of 
external Martyrdome for any Religion.” More continues, “and therefore their prudence and 
discretion consists most in juglings, equivocations, and slight tergiversations, peaceable 
compliances with any thing rather than to suffer in body or goods: which is the natural dictate of 
Sanguine triumphant.”243 David George’s self-care, far from exhibiting anything like sanity, in fact 
shows him to be a false prophet so idolatrously devoted to his own corporeal soundness that he 
would rather hide his doctrines—that is, the doctrines referring the whole universe back to 
himself—than suffer for them. 
 More’s counter-enthusiasm thus sees the enthusiast as having replaced the incarnation of 
the Word—that is, the life of the Messiah—with his own incarnation. He finally diagnoses not 
the melancholy, but the allegory of the enthusiast. Where the Christian ought to route all meaning 
through the incarnation of Jesus Christ, and read all events—natural, social, and personal—as 
shadows of that event, the enthusiast does the opposite. He reads Jesus Christ—and all things 
else—as types of himself, mapped on to his own psycho-sexual cosmos. 
 The force of this point might be developed by turning briefly to two sources: first, the 
Biblical precedents for the figuration of the prophet as a hypocrite—a wolf in sheep’s clothing, as 
the phrase has it; and second, Erich Auerbach’s discussion of Christian figura as “historically real 
prophecy.”244 More himself certainly has the former source constantly in mind as he thinks about 
the arcane semiotic structure of enthusiasm, and Auerbach’s careful situating of the place of 
figuration in the history of representation should prepare for the discussion of More’s Explanation 
of the Grand Mystery of Godliness, the work in which he systematically distinguishes enthusiasm and 
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orthodoxy on the basis of their different attitudes toward incarnation—with the former 
understanding incarnation as reference to the immanent body of the reading subject, and the 
latter understanding incarnation as the literal, historically real transformation of the Word of God 
into flesh—the prophetic Eucharist at the basis of orthodox Christian doctrine. This chapter will 
close with a discussion of this work. 
* 
6. Allegories of Enthusiasm 
 We have already mentioned the Mosaic test for determining a false prophet. A true 
prophet, according to Deuteronomy, 1) professes to be a messenger for the doctrinally 
recognized deity, not for a rival deity (in which case that prophet must be interpreted as a 
temptation sent by God to see who really fears him); 2) performs miracles and accurately foretells 
events (and in thus controlling and foreseeing natural events channels the creator of nature).245 
Doctrine precedes empirical evidence. False prophets might work miracles—but if so, they will 
profess strange gods. Likewise, they might profess the true God—but in this case, their miracles 
and predictions will fail. While there are a number of moments in the Old Testament where this 
two-gate schema is tested, it consistently holds.246 
 But this is not the only schema for detecting false prophets. There is also the very well 
known hypocrisy test formulated in the Sermon on the Mount:  
 Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly  
 they are ravening wolves. Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather  
 grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good  
 fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. […] Wherefore by their fruits ye  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Deuteronomy 13.1-3, 18.18-22. 
246 See, e.g., Jeremiah 28, 1 Kings 22. In the former instance, Jeremiah foresees the Babylonian Captivity and 
Hananiah counter-prophesies against this. Soon after, Hananiah dies, “proving” Jeremiah to be the true prophet in 
the contest. In 1 Kings, Micaiah prophesies the defeat of Ahab and Jehosaphat at Ramoth-gilead. Four hundred 
other prophets prophesy victory. The kings are defeated, revealing Micaiah to be the one true prophet and the four 
hundred to be deceivers sent by God to test the faithful. 
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 shall know them.247  
As the chapter continues, Jesus expressly compares the hypocrisy test to the Mosaic test of false 
prophets, suggesting (as the Sermon on the Mount often suggests) that he is surpassing and 
fulfilling the earlier standard: “Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not 
prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many 
wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that 
work iniquity.”248 According to Jesus, a prophet might come in his name, and work miracles, and 
still be false. Prophetic truth and falsity is to be judged not by the evidentiary standards of the 
Mosaic checkpoints—doctrinal and then empirical. It is to be judged by the prophet’s works—
their fruits. Miracles and predictions aren’t enough. As he says later in Matthew: “For there shall 
arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it 
were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.”249 And this idea is developed by Paul in 2 
Corinthians: “For such are false apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into the 
apostles of Christ. And no marvel; for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light. 
Therefore it is no great thing if his ministers also be transformed as the ministers of 
righteousness; whose end shall be according to their works.”250 Thus Christianity extends the 
temporality of prophetic judgment. It is not enough for a prophet to seem to profess the right 
doctrine and perform miracles. One must wait for the fruits of a purported prophet’s ministry to 
judge whether they come from God or Satan.251  
 One can clearly see the indebtedness of More’s depiction of David George to this 
discursive context. He is literally depicted as a false Christ almost capable of deceiving “the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Matt 7.15-17, 20. 
248 Matt 7.22-23. 
249 Matt 24.24. 
250 2 Cor 11.13-15. 
251 And indeed, this shift in prophetic judgment largely mirrors the increased theological emphasis on Satan as a 
formidable rival to God. Prophets might come not from God (and in the Old Testament, all prophets, even Gentile 
prophets like Balaam, are ultimately controlled by God) but from “the father of lies.” Cf. Numbers 22.21-38, John 
8.44.  
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elect”—for example, those parishioners of Basel among whom he worshipped. And not just 
George but also the sanguine enthusiast in general appears to be “an angel of light,” golden and 
serene. Beneath the surface, of course, there lurks a wolf.  
 But what are the fruits or works by which such a prophet might be known? This is a 
famously difficult question. Must one merely wait around to see whether the prophet does 
something unholy—like accept money for their services? (This appears to be one key upshot of 
the stories regarding Simon Magus, who was widely taken to be the original false prophet during 
the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and beyond.)252 Or does one wait to see whether mostly good or 
mostly bad things stem from their lives? And do they have to be living when they are revealed to 
be evil? And what internal mechanism produces the evil fruits and works? Mixed intentions? An 
intention to deceive? Can a false prophet think that he is working for God? Or must he know he 
is in the service of Satan?  
 The tendency, at least in the broadly Protestant traditions with which we are primarily 
concerned in this study, is to locate the source producing good versus evil fruits not in the 
evidence of this life but in the attitude toward the divine experienced by the purported prophet. 
Is the prophet appropriating the name of God for his own glory, or seeking “the glory of the one 
who sent him”?253 As Calvin puts it: 
 [W]hat are the fruits which Christ points out[?] Those who confine them to the life  
 are, in my opinion, mistaken. As pretended sanctity, and I know not what masks
 belonging to greater austerity of life, are frequently held out by some of the worst  
 impostors, this would be a very uncertain test. Their hypocrisy, I do own, is at  
 length discovered; for nothing is more difficult than to counterfeit virtue. But Christ  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 For a thorough study of the history of the representation of Simon Magus, see Alberto Ferreiro, Simon Magus in 
Patristic, Medieval, and Early Modern Traditions (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005). 
253 John 7.18. This is the New International Version translation, where the sense of the passage is clearer than in the 
KJV.  
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 did not intend to submit his doctrine to a decision so unjust in itself, and so liable to 
 be misunderstood, as to have it estimated by the life of men. 
Calvin charges Christians nevertheless to observe the manner in which a prophet or teacher of 
religion professes and to rely on the scriptures to determine whether or not these teachings come 
from God or Satan. He continues: “Believers are never deprived of the Spirit of wisdom, where 
his assistance is needful, provided they distrust themselves, renounce their own judgment, and 
give themselves up wholly to his direction. Let us remember, however, that all doctrines must be 
brought to the Word of God as the standard, and that, in judging of false prophets, the rule of 
faith holds the chief place.”254 
 In the case of David George, More supports—while adjusting—Calvin’s conclusions. 
The fruits by which he is known are his writings—his “works” in a sense not intended in the 
Gospels. These reveal his evil doctrines, which in turn reflect his interest in his own glory rather 
than the glory of God. Indeed, More literalizes and exaggerates these elements. George’s concern 
for his own bodily integrity proves the degree to which he situates himself at the heart of doctrine. 
Thus his doctrines are obviously self-worshipping. The problems with George’s purported 
theology are still clearer when read in light of 1 John:  
 Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God:  
 because many false prophets are gone out into the world. Hereby know ye the  
 Spirit of God: Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is  
 of God: And every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is  
 not of God: and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it  
 should come; and even now already is it in the world.255 
In a way, John’s schema for detecting false prophets returns to the Mosaic schema. He sets up a 
new doctrinal gate. Does the purported prophet confess the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ? 
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255 1 John 4.1-3. 
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If so, listen. If not, don’t listen. Indeed, the second standard of miracles and predictions is even 
more subordinate in John’s schema. The confession of doctrinal faith is itself testimony to a 
miraculous presence of spirit. Doctrine and miracle are here folded into one another.  
 Clearly, George, as presented by More, fails this test. He does not confess “that Jesus 
Christ is come in the flesh”; rather, he interprets his own flesh as the tenor to Christ’s vehicle. 
The universe is an allegory of himself. He reverses the valence of prophetic figuration, claiming 
to be the arcane signified hidden in the allegory of Christianity, and finally revealed. Further, to 
claim to fulfill the law and the prophets is, of course, profoundly anti-Christian. The Christian 
allegory of history situates present experience not at the end—not at the fulfillment—but within 
a period of waiting, during which one might be filled with spirit (if one recognizes and accepts 
the incarnation of God) but only as a vehicle or channel for that spirit, not as its signified. As 
Erich Auerbach puts it: 
 We thus see—as in several of the earlier writers, but more pronouncedly in  
 Augustine—that the juxtaposition of two poles, figure and fulfillment [which  
 characterizes an earlier form of figuration], is sometimes replaced by a three-step  
 process: first, the Law, or the history of the Jews as a prophetic figura of the coming  
 of Christ; then, the Incarnation, or the fulfillment of this figura, which is  
 simultaneously a new promise of the end of the world and the Last Judgment;  
 and, finally, the future advent of these events as the final fulfillment.256 
This captures the correct orientation toward temporality, according to More. Oneself might be 
understood as present in a larger history of the progress of the Word in the world—but not as 
the Word made flesh. One is located between the cosmic realities of Incarnation and Last 
Judgment. One can refer backward or forward to these events. But one cannot claim them as 
one’s own. 
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 The discourse of enthusiasm is revealed, in More, as a philological quest for the 
allegorical core of professed belief. The false enthusiast reads experience as an allegory of 
presently lived experience. The literality supporting this allegory is his own flesh. The true 
enthusiast reads experience in the opposite way. The literalities supporting one’s own shadowy 
existence are, on one side, the Incarnation of God’s creative Word, and, on the other, the 
Judgement and the hereafter. As Auerbach puts it: “this life is only an umbra and figura of the 
actual, future, final, and authentic truth that, both unveiling and preserving the figure, contains 
true reality.”257 
* 
7. Against the New Man 
 Thus More shifts the stress in the discourse of enthusiasm from embodiment—that is, 
from an emphasis on the humoral conditions of false prophetic experiences—to incarnation—to 
an emphasis on the attitude toward the literal divinity and historical reality of Jesus. He sees the 
denial of the literal reality of Christ as the doctrinal core of enthusiasm. The allegoricization of 
Christ becomes the means by which false prophets in the new age both claim Jesus and work in 
his name—and deny him, and subvert true religion. Thus the distorted figure of the enthusiast we 
see in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, in which the enthusiast is generally depicted as a surface agitated 
by internal humors, gives way to a distorted enthusiastic figura, a mishapen allegorical surface atop 
a corrupt doctrine. 
 This allegorical counter-enthusiasm is presented at length in More’s Explanation of the 
Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660). The preface to this work presents it as at once the presentation 
of his mature theology and the culmination of his counter-enthusiastic efforts—a third and final 
phase opposing enthusiasm following, first, his youthful attacks on Vaughan’s philosophical 
enthusiasm and, second, his medicalization of the enthusiast in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus. Indeed, 
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More sees these tasks as linked. By provisionally inhabiting, bearing witness to, and exploring the 
interiority of the false enthusiast, More is able to articulate what comprises true inspiration.258 He 
thus presents himself as a figure whom it is safe to occupy in a reader’s search for true doctrine.  
 More begins the Explanation with a short scholarly autobiography attesting to his 
education, his temperament, and the various works he has felt called to produce. This method 
contrast with that of the enthusiast (as he sees it). Where they hide their doctrines for as long as 
possible, until they have long insinuated themselves into their hearers, More proposes to make 
his doctrines directly clear: he will show “the Reasonableness and important Usefulness of 
Christian Religion in the Historical sense thereof, and in reference to the very Person of Christ our Saviour.”259 
Thus he shows the role his own life—his own embodiment—plays in his hermeneutics. It is an 
important role. But it is also explicit and limited. He is not going to allegorize himself and call it 
Christianity. He is going to show how he understands himself as a little means of helping to 
reveal a greater truth. As More puts it at one point, “The Divinity in Christ is as the Light in the 
Sun; the Divinity in his Members as the Sun-shine in the Aire.”260 Divinity streams through him. 
But it does not emanate from him. He is a medium, not a source of light. 
 This approach contrasts, as he sees it, with that of the enthusiasts, who “clothe their style 
with Scripture-language, though they were worse Infidels than the very heathen.”261 In 
Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, More similarly evinces a reluctant admiration for the surface style of 
enthusiasts:  
 For a man illiterate … but of good parts, by constant reading of the Bible will 
 naturally [and naturally is not a good thing here] contract a more winning and 
 commanding Rhetorick then those that are learned; the intermixture of Tongues and  of 
 artificiall Phrases [in the learned] debasing their style, and making it sound more after the 
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 manner of men, though ordinarily there may be more of God in it then in that of the 
 Enthusiast.262 
The Grand Mystery makes plain what More means when he says that there is more “of God” in 
the orthodox divine than in the enthusiast. He means that there is more of the doctrine of the 
incarnation in orthodox sermonizing, even if this doctrine is unnecessarily clothed in Latin and 
Greek phrases, and thus only darkly visible. The Incarnation is the kernel of God in a good 
sermon. The enthusiast does not profess the Incarnation, only his own flesh. While his style 
might be simple and attractive, and thus seem holy—and in this respect be very much worthy of 
emulation by the actually holy—the doctrinal core of his teaching shows it for what it is: an 
imposture. As he puts it: “[T]his is the wicked plot of the Devil in this Sect, that he clothes their 
Style with Scripture-language, that they may as it were wear the colours of the Kingdome of Light, 
and so covertly destroy or win the Christian Souldiers from their allegiance to Christ, and lapse 
them into the bondage of the dark Kingdome.”263 Style too becomes an element in a larger allegory 
of doctrine. It too is a sort of sheep’s clothing—like the ruddy and serene face of David George. 
 More understands this struggle—if an apparent oxymoron might be allowed—in literally 
allegorical terms. We’ve already looked at his observation that enthusiasts are “poets in earnest.” 
This can be paired with the observation that good theologians are allegorists in earnest, who see 
history as a drama of signification centered on the story of Jesus’ Incarnation, crucifixion, and 
resurrection. This is the real anchor of meaning in history. All other true meaning is a shadowy 
form of this true meaning, and thus allegorical—but allegory rooted in the invisible reality of the 
divine. More thus frequently compares his work that that of Edmund Spenser (who was 
incidentally one of More’s favorite writers from youth forward).264 When apologizing for the 
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264 This connection between More and Spenser is worth developing in an expanded version of this project (or in a 
separate article). The comparison would illuminate, I presume, the status of reality both in More’s uses of figuration 
and in Spenser’s own allegorical poetics. 
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presentation of enthusiastic doctrines in his work, he even expressly names Spenser: “But Duessa 
till unstripped will compare with Una; you know the story in Spencer.”265 Critics sometimes 
wonder about the role allegory like Spenser might have been understood to play in the 
articulation of Protestant doctrine. After all, if Protestants are so concerned with literal meaning, 
why do they produce allegories like The Faerie Queene and Pilgrim’s Progress, to name the two most 
obvious?266 More provides something of an answer. Spenser’s—and his—foregrounding of 
allegory clarifies the degree to which a dedication to the literal truth of scripture requires an as it 
were experiential suspension of literal satisfaction. One must believe in the incarnation of God. 
But one can only experience this incarnation symbolically, in a mediated fashion. The historical 
reality on which one’s faith is predicated is not physically present. Thus one’s own life must be 
treated as a sort of self-conscious dream lived in anticipation of ultimate reality. The meaning of 
doctrine is literal; the hermeneutics of doctrine is allegorical.  
 More draws upon Spenserian imagery throughout the Explanation in order to depict 
enthusiasts as types of Duessa: bewitching enchantresses bearing beautiful poisoned cups. For 
instance, in discussing the Family of Love (to which we will turn next), More writes: 
 What wonder is it therefore that those that truly hunger and thirst after 
 Righteousness, being starved at home with those dilute and corrupt doctrines of  
 the Needlesness of Sanctity, of invincible Infirmity, slight Attrition, frivolous  
 Penances, venal Indulgences, crawl out abroad to seek better food, and so get into  
 the lap and suck the nipples of this sweet Enchantress, the lovely Family of the  
 Love; whose breasts do promise such strong nourishment, that they that drink  
 thereof do not only pass from children to men, but from being men doe become  
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 Gods?267 
The Familists are seen as occupying a bower of bliss—a belated Eden—in which the true 
valences of signification are reversed. They think they are gods. They think that the scripture can 
be just that simply appropriated—that their bodies and their experiences can be understood as 
the tenor of those divine vehicles. Elsewhere the misogynist element in this figurative genre—of 
course central to Spenser as well—comes grotesquely to the fore, as when he considers the 
founder of the Familists, in his reflections on modesty, to have left “very foul spots in that Glass 
of his, as if it had been breathed upon by the mouth of a menstruous Woman.”268 In such 
moments it is clear how rooted More’s concerns are in the categories of purity and danger long 
ago explored by Mary Douglas. The enthusiastic mode of allegory, like the menstruating woman, 
distorts, corrupts, infects the holy object it purports to reflect. 
 This particular sect, the Familists or Family of Love, is without question Henry More’s 
objective correlative for the existence of evil. Founded by Henry Nicholis, the historical Familists 
were possibly influenced by David Joris. Purportedly—their doctrines, for reasons of self- and 
official censorship, are not easily deciphered, which is itself for More evidence of their 
corruption—they like Joris argued that the present age should be recognized as a new 
dispensation of spirit replacing the dispensations of the Law and the Incarnation.269 They thus 
presumptuously allegorize the Godhead, attributing each of its three parts to one phase of 
history: the Father to the Law, the Son to the Incarnation, and the Spirit to the present age. More 
objects to their over-division of the “Hypostases of the ever-blessed Trinity.”270 He insists that 
each dispensation comes from the whole Godhead: “Nor is the Father nor the Holy Spirit 
excluded in the œconomie of the Gospel, but their Glory is acknowledged coequal and their 
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Majesty coeternal. Nor again can the Church ever cease to be under the Belief of Jesus Christ, so as 
that any other God-service should justle that out by its succession.”271 The more general objection 
behind such language is that the Familists allegorize—or as he sometimes puts it, “moralize”—
religion in general.272 They treat the Bible not as a “true History, but a spiritual Romance.”273 And 
what’s more, they are Vladimir Nabokov’s least favorite kind of reader of romance—those who 
think the story is all about themselves. They are poets where they should be historians, and 
historians where they should be poets (that is, when they should be more open to the 
ephemerality of the immanent world and the divinity-disclosing self which is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for its appearance).  
 More’s exploration of the psychology of the Familists’ founder, Henry Nicholis, is by far 
the most intense of his enthusiastic inhabitations. If his inhabitation of Vaughan is finally quite 
sympathetic, and his inhabitation of David George is finally quite didactic, his inhabitation of 
Nicholis—whose name he frequently will not even commit to script, as though it carries a 
diabolical power to charm—feels at times like mutual possession.274 His name is indeed rich with 
significance—and not just for More, but historically. Nicholis frequently signs his writings “H.N.,” 
which he interprets as also standing for “Homo Novus,” New Man. He is, as it were, the latest 
model of humanity—and a model for you, too, if you follow his teachings precisely.275 More, of 
course, thinks that this new man is in fact a very old figure—a belated pagan doing Satan’s 
ancient work. Indeed, in an interesting section of the Grand Mystery, More considers the 
philosophical basis of the comparison of enthusiasm and paganism. Just as pagans hypostasized 
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dimensions of the total divine reality and separated them from the Godhead—calling them by 
particular names like Zeus, Aphrodite, Isis, etc.—so too enthusiasts wrongly deify the individual 
elements of creation, whether things or themselves. This is the essence of idolatry—to worship 
the created part rather than the creator, the attributed rather than the actual totality.276 
 But More also feels the power of H.N.’s call to allegorize the self into the drama of 
creation—and not the abstract self, as some sort of Renaissance microcosm, but the actual self of 
lived experience. That’s what makes this “witchery” so dangerous. Accordingly, his virtual 
witnessing of H.N. begins with a flair: “I shall first present him to you in all his ruffe and glory, 
adorned with the testimonies of his own style, such as he would appear to the World to be.”277 As 
with David George, he will show the sheep’s clothing before he shows the wolf. But unlike with 
George, More has virtually no interest in disclosing the humoral causes beneath H.N.’s 
enthusiasm. He does mention that H.N. is a sanguine enthusiast—a term that operates almost as 
a pure synonym for “political enthusiast” at this point in his thinking.278 But he turns quickly to 
H.N.’s doctrinal hermeneutics. He is much more interested in exploring—one might say, in 
presenting or projecting—his understanding of H.N.’s disfigured figura than his mechanical 
psychology.  
 For More, H.N. presents the history of prophecy as a series of events leading up to his 
own existence:  
 Moses in figures and shadows set out the true being of the true sanctuary of God in  
 the Spirit; and … to David and the Prophets was shewn the true Being in the Spirit  
 of their sight: … John the Baptist was a Preparation by Repentance to an  
 entrance into the Holy of the true Tabernacle; and … this Holy of the true  
 Tabernacle is the Service of Christ in the Belief: But the Holy of Holies, or the  
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 Most Holy, this he reserves to himself and his Service of the Love.279 
Each major figure in the Biblical narrative anticipating Jesus’ Incarnation is taken, by H.N., to 
anticipate his own incarnation. The history of prophecy becomes, in his twisted, self-centered 
allegory, a history of life before his own existence. Even Christ is reduced to a prophet foretelling 
and foreshadowing the fulfilled covenant of the Family of Love—the Most Holy. More points out 
how readily H.N. adapts the allegorizing method to justify his carnal desires: 
 And in the Spiritual Land of peace, That which is writ Luk. 20.35. concerning the  
 children of the Resurrection, that they are neither married nor given in marriage,  
 but are as the Angels of God, he applies to the state of the Service of the Love, and  
 makes it fulfilled in his life. Which is an Allegory so cross and crooked, that  
 nothing but an unbelief of the literal sense could ever have put a man upon the  
 framing of it: besides that scurvy intimation it bears along with it of community of  
 wives, the very same doctrine that David George is said to have vented.280 
And More offers another example of H.N.’s allegorizing that seems to invite the abandonment of 
scripture:  
 And he insinuates further in the same place, that the Seven Devils cast out of Mary  
 Magdalen were those seven deadly Sins. And I am certain that the most knowing of  
 the Family have freely professed that there are no Devils nor Witches nor Angels  
 but those in us. Which things being supposed, it is necessary either to cast away  
 the Scriptures, or else to allegorize them away into a mere moral or mystical  
 sense, as these Enthusiasts have done.281 
In More’s view, H.N. reads the Bible not as history, but as fable. In so doing, he implicitly denies 
the particular importance of this book. It becomes just one of any number of possible morality 
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tales. Moreover, there is a hint of antinomianism detectable in H.N.’s reading practices. The 
ultimate root of sin is supposed to be not in the spiritual world, but in the living self. What is to 
stop these “sins,” then, from being interpreted in a totally selfish manner? If Mary Magdalene’s 
demons become sins in general become one’s own sins in particular—might they become, More 
fears, one’s own inconveniences and annoyances in particular? For once this hermeneutic train 
has started, who can stop it? Who is to say what sin is? Why is it not interpretable as pain to oneself? 
And why is virtue or good not interpretable as pleasure to oneself? Where is the external standard for 
fixing what these stories mean? 
 Hence for More it is crucial to defend the reality of Mary Magdalene’s demons—and 
indeed, as he does in a long work co-authored with Joseph Glanvill, the reality of demons and 
spirits in general. These are literal facts pertaining to the drama of the universe in which we play 
only the briefest and most fragmentary role. They are, to borrow a Neoplatonist vocabulary, real 
forms informing reality. To miss them is to miss the nature of signification in general—and, more 
practically, to be damned to hell. This is also why miracles are so important for More. They are 
factual proof of the divine provenance of a prophet. Prophets without miracles are prophets 
without divine attestation.282 And as crucial as it is to believe in the reality of Magdalene’s demons, 
it is far more crucial to believe in the literal crux of significance—the incarnation of Jesus. This 
“Substantial History”—this history of the fate of substance itself and its relation to the Word—
underwrites everything else. Thus, for More, one must believe that the Historical Jesus lived, 
preached, performed miracles, died by crucifixion, and was resurrected, then ascended to 
heaven.283 An allegory of Jesus Christ has finally no force to motivate us to be good.284 Unless 
there are real consequences waiting for us in the afterlife—which becomes the repository of the 
literal tenor, or import, of the Gospel—one needn’t heed the Christian revelation at all. To hedge 
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on any of the key points of doctrine is thus to court madness and damnation—which two states 
become, for More as for Milton, variations on the same underlying diabolical condition.  
 And damned madness is, for More, the predictable final destination of all of H.N.’s 
allegorizing. This monstrously aggrandized New Man—a self constructed in the forge of 
solipsism, but then revalued with a communicable positivity—commits the ultimate allegorical sin 
of not only reading humanity in general as the incarnated tenor of scripture, but his own particular 
self. As More writes: 
 [H.N.] is therefore upon his own Hypothesis very consonant to himself, in  
 removing the Humane person of Christ as a thing that has perished one thousand  
 six hundred years ago, and in riveting the Godhead into his own person  
 sothwackingly and substantially, as that he may give the World to understand that  
 he was as much God as that Christ that died at Jerusalem, and that all those that  
 attained to the perfection of the Love were so too: that he might abundantly  
 compensate thereby the loss of that one that died upon the Cross, having fallen into  
 the hands of merciless sinners. This, I say, is a consistent dream of his.285 
And that is the arcane heart of H.N.’s doctrine, and, for More, of enthusiasm in general. Its 
diabolical significance cannot, for More, be overstated. Enthusiasm is hell’s own hermeneutic 
vehicle:  
 You see what a wild and exorbitant thing this blind Enthusiasm is, the very Vehicle  
 of Hell that carries to Antheisme and Prophaneness, and the Triumphal Chariot of  
 the Devil; in which questionless this begodded Mock-Prophet was hurried away,  
 though haply he might not know it, but gloried in his shame, and prided himself  
 in his own Captivity. The condition of whose Spirit, what it is, and whitherto it  
 tends, if I know mine own heart, I have thus carefully discovered, out of no other  
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 Principle at all but that Love and Loialty I owe to my crucified Saviour and  
 Sovereign, and out of that dear Compassion I bear to my fellow-members of his  
 Body the Church. For verily I cannot but melt into sorrow and pitty, to consider  
 how deceivable many well-meaning Souls are, and how captivable by the witchery  
 of a Fanatick Eloquence into a strange belief, that there is a more then ordinary  
 share of Divinity residing upon this Person, whom I am so well assured is but  
 Epicurus turned Enthusiast, and one sunk as low beneath the light of the Gospel as  
 any wretched Pagan that never heard thereof.286 
More fears that ordinary people might be swayed by enthusiastic appeals because they aren’t 
purified—because, in John Smith’s terms, they are too prone to the imaginative rather than the 
intellective aspect of the soul.287 Thus the flow of bewitching rhetoric replaces the literal water of 
baptism:  
 For the People are already sufficiently inured to things irrational, contradictions  
 and unintelligible, whereby the perfectest Non-sense must appear to them the most  
 pure Dialect of the Spirit. And therefore there will be no stop but they must needs  
 be carried on with such Torrents of Ecstatick eloquence, and be washed away from  
 the body of the Church into this or that Fanatick Sect, according as the  
 sutableness of their natural humour and opportunity exposes them to their  
 assaults.288 
Put simply, as Luther long before noticed, enthusiasm attacks human beings precisely where they 
are most vulnerable. It whispers to each person what each person wants so desperately to hear—
you matter. All of this—this goodly frame the earth, this most excellent canopy the air, this brave 
o’er hanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire—it is all for you. This is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 GM, 273. 
287 GM, 254. 
288 GM, 275. 
 131	  
appeal of the serpent to the first humans in the garden. And it is so sunk into the weakness of 
human nature—pride—that it has a power, for More, even to challenge the invincible divine 
truth—or invincible aside from this one soft point. He is in utter earnest when he writes, in the 
preface to the Explanation, “I dare pronounce with a loud voice aforehand, That if ever Christianity be 
exterminated, it will be by Enthusiasme. Of so great consequence is it rightly to oppose so deadly an evil.”289 
* 
8. Conclusions 
 Henry More’s counter-enthusiasm—and that of the Cambridge Platonists in general—
certainly makes recourse to the materialist perspectives, particularly those of Epicurus and Galen, 
in accounting for the physiological causality of the enthusiastic soul. And this dimension of their 
philosophical polemic is highly influential. But it should be understood as part of a broader vision 
fundamentally rooted in theological hermeneutics. Any adaptation of materialist tools is 
projective and provisional. The enthusiast might be analyzed using Epicurean notions because he 
is himself an Epicurean monstrosity. A counter-enthusiast might turn Epicurus against “Epicurus 
turned Enthusiast.”290 But this is not the only strategy one can adapt in explaining away the 
enthusiast. Indeed, at times it seems to More that it doesn’t matter whether one interprets the 
enthusiast as humorally disordered, or diabolically possessed, or “atheistical” (that is, a rogue and 
a cheat).291 All three explanations are at bottom interchangeable. Atheists—that is, genuine 
epicures—are, consciously or unconsciously, pledged to Satan. Melancholics—that is, practical 
epicures—are, generally unconsciously, likewise. And why shouldn’t Satan himself get in on the 
fun from time to time, providing a “worser Assistence … then mere Complexion” to the 
enthusiastic hermeneut?292 In short, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the problem of enthusiasm 
can be approached at a number of interlocked and set levels of analysis. One might focus on the 
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enthusiast’s material brain, or nefarious motives, or cosmic demonic assistance. All three are 
happening at once—in a dark intermodal swirl. To return to the terms introduced in Chapter 
One, in the figuration of the enthusiast, intermodality and rationalization show themselves to be 
dialectically linked. In concluding this chapter, it is important to describe what I mean by this. 
 What matters more than the particular causal explanation offered for enthusiasm is the 
act of virtual witnessing or virtual displaying of the enthusiast incarnate. The various 
philosophical vocabularies we’ve looked at—Lucretian, Aristotelian, Platonic—are marshaled to 
the more basic task of bringing the enthusiast to life vividly in the pious imagination of the reader. 
They are provisional totalities available not for the analysis of actual enthusiasts, but for the 
fleshing out of virtual ones—that is, for the positing of psychological depths and humoral 
clockworks beneath the woodcut faces of the absent monstrosities on whose shoulders the 
political chaos of England and Christianity has been heaped. The enthusiast thus is a virtual 
embodiment—and a conceptual means of thinking about and adjusting the mimetic qualities of 
imaginary embodiment in general. This comes across very clearly in More. Following his lengthy 
rehearsal of H.N., for example, he asks the reader directly, “What think you of this hideous 
Monster that I have so lively set before your eyes?”293 There is a real panache in such a sentence. 
He appeals to the reader’s imagination—and confines the enthusiast to that same imagination. 
That is where the enthusiast belongs, stuck in the mimetic rebounding of sensuality and 
imagination, never able to escape into the intellect. He is bottled up in a mere slice of the 
experience over which he claims such totalitarian sway. One can see in such a moment how 
indebted Edgar Allen Poe is to Henry More’s example—and how Henry More is something like 
an Edgar Allen Poe in earnest, who—and such adjustments to collective poesis could only have 
been done in earnest—tweaks the virtual presentation of reality in response to the problem of 
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unlicensed prophetic authority, at once bringing new life to the presentation of subjectivity and 
distorting, objectifying, and limiting that subjectivity.294  
 More has, in short, a penchant for bringing enthusists to bodily life in some ways—as 
closed selves—in order to close them off in others—as communicative selves. For instance, 
consider the moment when he is railing against the tendency in H.N. and other radical 
Protestants to lard their (in his view) anti-Christian sermons with quotations from scripture:  
 Again, When I consider the ineptness of your Allegations out of Scripture for such  
 Opinions as you are so zealous for, and the solemn adorning of the margins of  
 your Theological Treatises with such insignificant citations out of the undeniable  
 Oracles of God, as that when one examines them he shall find his understanding  
 as much abused as a mans eye-sight is by that mockery of drawing ones hands one  
 from the other, and twisting with his thumbs and forefingers as if there were some  
 subtil string betwixt; (For assuredly the connexion betwixt your Quotations and  
 your Conclusions is utterly as invisible as that imaginary line to the eyes of the  
 sleepy).295 
More thus compares the relation of scriptural marginalia to the body of text in enthusiastic 
writing to the fluttering of two hands linked “by subtil strings” only in the imagination—as 
though the enthusiastic book is a sort of ham prestidigitator at a children’s birthday party. It’s a 
fantastic image. And it does real polemical work—substituting mentally the fingers and hands of 
the enthusiast for the text. The ultimate enthusiastic heresy—reading outward from one’s own 
incarnation—is thus projected ironically onto the figuration of the enthusiast. Just as he uses the 
Epicurean gaze against Epicures, so More uses techniques of rhetorical incarnation against the 
falsely allegorizing incarnators. Put more practically, More represents the enthusiast in a way that 
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gives them embodied experience—but not your embodied experience. He reveals their tricks. 
They can think they can communicate. But they can’t communicate.  
 And so the enthusiast is a means of figuring the rationalized distinction of selves from 
selves, and of logics within any given self. The enthusiast is a frightful figuration of 
epistemological disorder. But he is also the occasion, for More and the other Cambridge 
Platonists, to articulate a more positive notion of inspiration—one grounded, as my preceding 
section emphasized, not in one’s own confused incarnation, but in the incarnation of God’s 
Word. More’s Explanation is filled with expressions of this contrast—of the way in which the 
enthusiast offers a felix culpa against which to posit a good allegoricity, a good imaginativeness, a 
good intermodality. For instance, More writes:  
 For God is not in these fanatick Herricanoes, no more then he was in the  
 tempestuous Wind, Earthquake, or Fire that passed before the Prophet Elias. But  
 the Divine Truth is to be found in that still small voice, which is the Echo of the  
 Eternal World; not urg’d upon us by that furious Impulse of complexionall  
 Imagination, but descending from the Father of lights, with whom there is no  
 shadow of change.296 
A bit later, More declares that he is looking for the still, small voice of “Incomplexionate Reason” 
within which his own being is a participant.297 This is the dimension of More’s thinking that 
current advocates for a Cambridge Platonist revival take to heart—his assurance that there is a 
simple core of reason available to the sufficiently purified and meditative soul. As More exhorts 
his readers: 
 And therefore I beseech every man in these daies of Liberty to take heed how they  
 turn in thither, especially those that are of an Enthusiastick temper, such as are  
 most of the honester and better-meaning Quakers. For if in their bewildred  
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 wandrings they take up their Inne here, let them look to it that they be not robbed  
 of all the Articles of the Christian Faith, and be stripped into naked Infidelity and  
 Paganisme, and (which is worst of all) be so intoxicated with the cup of this  
 Inchantress, as to think this injury their gain, and to prefer false Liberty before  
 their Christian Simplicity, and those gaudy and phantastick Titles of being Deified  
 and begodded before the real possession of Christian Truth and Godliness.298 
This Truth and Godliness is intermodal—indeed, is Trinitarian. But it is also unified. It is rooted 
on earth in the Incarnation—“the ancient and Apostolick Faith according to the Historical 
meaning thereof”—and anticipates the Second Coming—“the Offices of Christ are never to be 
antiquated till his visible return to Judgement according to the literal sense of the Creed.”299 
During the present age, it must struggle with enthusiasm over the basic structure of signification. 
It is locked in a war of allegories—where the one deposits the essence of language in an originary 
telos exceeding subjective experience, and the other reads the world as an allegory of the self as 
really lived. The following chapter’s discussion of Locke will develop these links between the 
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4. THE ARBITRARY WORD: LOCKE READS PAUL 
 
      And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast  
      of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto  
      Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever  
      Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.  




 In 1656, when John Locke was 24 years old, the Quaker James Nayler and “his Proselytes” 
were brought before Parliament on charges of blasphemy and treason for imitating the coming of 
Jesus into Jerusalem—with Nayler playing the role of the Son of God, and his mostly female 
companions embodying the cohort of women announcing his entrance into the city.300 Locke did 
not simply witness Nayler’s examination, he produced an account in a letter to his father 
reflecting a profound fascination with Nayler and his followers—and in particular with what he 
sees as their peculiar and troubling relation to language and meaning.  
 For example, when the Parliamentary Committee asks Nayler why he has assumed the 
identity of Christ, Locke carefully records Nayler’s “evasion”: “That Christ being the same today 
and forever, what honour was given to him at Jerusalem might be given to him where and in 
whomsoever he is manifested from God.”301 Nayler claims, to Locke’s horror, to be a prophetic 
participant in the eternal spirit of Jesus—to be, as it were, a living type of Christ, an embodiment 
of the Word. Jesus is not, in other words, a man. Rather, he is a force—the Word—available in 
full to those who can pick up its signal.  
 Following the Committee’s initial questioning, Nayler and his followers—“one man more 
and three or four women of the tribe”—were ordered to a small room adjacent to the main 
chamber. Locke followed them there, where his observations of the Quaker’s strange linguistic 
“carriage” continue:  
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 One of the women made a continued humming noise longer than the reach of an 
 ordinary breath, without motion either of lips or breath that I who stood next to her 
 could perceive. She ceasing, another sung, ‘Holy, Holy, Holy,’ with the addition of some 
 other words. Then the other (her song being done) gave some of their ordinary 
 exhortation, with their common mixture of judgment and threatening. And after a little 
 pause, they went over the same round, without answering any of the questions which by 
 the standers by were proposed, and those which by the Committee were urged. I 
 observed they either not answered or did it with a great deal of subtlety, besides the cover 
 and cunning of that language which others and I believe they themselves scarce 
 understand.302 
These Quakers, Locke is at pains to emphasize, are not responsible users of language. Whereas 
bystanders and Parliamentary committee-men pose reasonable questions in expectation of 
reasonable answers (and one can imagine the degree to which Locke overlooks or downplays the 
inevitably coercive atmosphere of the interrogation in his characterization of this exchange) the 
Quakers offer a range of numinous utterances: almost supernaturally drawn-out humming, 
meditative intonations of the psalms, bursts of prophetic doomsaying and haranguing, spools of 
half-conscious language which can be, for Locke, paradoxically both “cunning” and 
unencumbered by the understanding. Like Nayler, these Quaker women seem to participate in a 
present flow of ineffable meaning—to claim the authority not of words, but of something 
beneath words, subtending the ordinary acts of naming and responding.  
 Our discussion of Henry More in some ways helps prepare for Locke’s reaction. Locke, 
like More, distrusts these Quakers because of how they are using language. But these two 
thinkers take very different approaches to this issue. They disagree on why Quaker speech—and, 
to put it more generally, the approach to significance exhibited by those claiming unlicensed 
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spiritual authority—is erroneous. As we’ve seen, More claims to have found the root of the 
problem of enthusiastic signification in a latent allegory of the self which refers all meaning not to 
its religious source—the Incarnation of Jesus—but to the “New Man” whom a given enthusiast 
happens to be. For Locke, the issue is at once much simpler and much deeper: they are not using 
language reasonably. Although he is certainly influenced by More’s thinking—and more directly 
influenced by the thinking of his Cambridge Platonist colleague Ralph Cudworth via his daughter 
Lady Damaris Masham, one of Locke’s closest friends from 1681 until the end of his life—and is 
particularly concerned with the problem of enthusiasm identified and articulated by More’s 
generation, Locke does not share More’s diffuse, speculative, allegorical approach to this issue.303 
Locke’s exposure to enthusiasm does not lead him to construct or endorse a typological theory of 
meaning that refuses overweening claims to prophetic experience; it leads him to ask and to 
answer the more basic questions, “What are words? What are reasons? What is knowledge?” 
 Locke’s correspondence with Lady Masham on the issue of enthusiasm helps clarify the 
way in which he departs from the Cambridge Platonists while extending some of their key 
conclusions. Soon after Locke met Masham they began exchanging letters, in particular regarding 
John Smith’s Selected Discourses, parts of which we considered in the last chapter. Smith proposes 
in one of his discourses that the highest form of knowledge belongs to that person “who running 
and shooting up above his own Logical or Self-rational life, pierceth into theHighest life: Such a one, 
who by Universal Love and Holy affection abstracting himself from himselfe, endeavours the nearest 
Union with the Divine Essence that may be […] as Plotinus speaks; knitting his owne centre, if he 
have any, unto the centre of Divine Being.”304 Although she could not share Smith’s Plotinian 
convictions, Masham, in a letter to Locke, claimed that it is possible to feel that something like 
this ideal, deiform knowledge that exceeds logic and reason. Locke would have none of this. He 
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denied that there can be any knowledge above reason. Any claims to knowledge above reason—
including Smith’s—must be understood as “enthusiasm,” a term which Locke carefully defines in 
his reply to Masham: “[By] enthusiasm [I mean] a strong and firm persuasion of any proposition 
relating to religion for which a man has either no or not sufficient proofs from reason but 
receives them as truths wrought in the mind extraordinarily by god himself and influences 
coming immediately from him.” For Locke, such a conviction “can be no evidence or ground of 
assurance at all nor can by any means be taken for knowledge.”305 
 Thus it is evident that Locke is centrally concerned with the problem of enthusiasm—not 
only in his 1681 correspondence with Masham, but from a very early age, as evidenced by his 
fascinated reporting on the interrogation of Nayler and his followers. Indeed, I will argue in this 
chapter that his revolutionary theory of language in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is 
centered on this problem. It recognizes claims to extraordinary inspiration to be dependent on (in 
his view) an inadequate theory of language—the Adamic theory, which (as I will discuss at 
length) claims a fundamental correspondence between words and things grounded in Adam’s 
naming of the animals in Genesis 2.19. Further, as I will show, Locke extends this counter-
enthusiastic theory of language to the heart of unlicensed authority—the Bible—and produces 
both a Biblical hermeneutics and a reading of the Epistles of Paul that complement his theory of 
signification. But at the same time that he extends the concern with enthusiasm so central to the 
Cambridge Platonists, he radically reorients his approach to this issue.  
 As we saw, the Cambridge Platonists identify the enthusiast in order to preserve for 
themselves a form of inspiration. They delimit bad spirituality and false prophecy in order to 
protect their own good spirituality and true prophecy. They cast the enthusiast as a creature 
mimetically limited to matter and the imagination, reflecting only his base embodiment. In 
contrast, they cast themselves as participating mimetically in the larger cosmic arc of Incarnation 
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and deiformity. They are able to transcend the imagination and attain to the intellect—to “Union 
with the Divine Essence,” as Smith puts it. They entertain materialist provisional totalities, but 
only insofar as these clarify the larger spiritual being in which they take themselves to participate. 
That, then, is the Cambridge Platonist approach to enthusiasm—to delimit it and transcend it.  
 Locke’s approach totally abandons the idea that one might participate in a true inspiration 
or a pure communication with the divine essence that avoids the structures of signification and 
knowledge common to all human experience. Those who claim to be able to do this are no better 
than enthusiasts themselves. Locke thus transposes the discourse of enthusiasm from a tenor in 
which significance and knowledge are imagined to work according to different “levels,” to a tenor 
in which significance and knowledge are rationally interrogated as such.306 He wants to know 
what they are at all. While his investigation is similarly motivated by concerns regarding 
unlicensed political and spiritual power, these questions drive him to delineate the structure of all 
inquiry. Moreover, this effort produces, as I will suggest, a more precise and logically sound 
rationalization schema than that seen in the Cambridge Platonists. In Locke, one can see the 
basic distinction between self, society, and nature much more clearly than in the Cambridge 
Platonists. Where their counter-enthusiastic rationalization might be seen as an assemblage of 
limited totalities or provisional philosophical lenses which roughly reflect concerns with 
objectivity, subjectivity, and sociality arranged around a theological core, Locke’s rationalization 
schema divides experience according to more logically consistent principles—albeit principles still 
organized around the concept of God and the conviction of the truth of Christianity—and 
produces a stronger differentiation of natural things from private things from public things. 
Locke’s God, meanwhile, is not in any way super-rational or extra-logical. For Locke, God is—as 
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the second half of this chapter will emphasize—absolutely committed and beholden to reason 
and consistent logic, especially in matters of revelation. 
 In forming this argument, I draw upon a number of venerable historical perspectives—
particularly the work of Hans Aarsleff, which first proposed the centrality of “the Adamic word” 
for Locke’s theory of language, and John Marshall, who meticulously situates Locke’s thinking on 
religion within the roiling anti-sectarian context of seventeenth-century England.307 But I also 
challenge some of the abiding assumptions of Locke scholarship, which often prefers to treat 
Locke, especially in his language theory, as though he is participating in a purely academic debate 
regarding the true nature of language—as, in short, an anti-Scholastic thinker, frustrated by the 
sloppy foundations of the degenerated Aristotelian language philosophy of his time, rather than 
an Adamic innovator, concerned with the political consequences of a surging prophetic culture 
laying claim to power by way of the Word.308 As I’ve suggested already, any distinction between 
philosophy and politics is not easily made in the later seventeenth-century: sectarian arguments 
rolled inevitably into philosophical arguments in Locke’s century, and many philosophers were 
driven to embrace radical and innovative philosophical positions precisely because they provided 
ammunition in the war of ideas stemming from the mid-century crisis of religious authority. 
Moreover, as the research of Nicholas McDonnell has suggested, those who advocated sectarian 
positions often did so from more learned positions than has sometimes been assumed—not 
advocating an “illiterate” approach to the question of the Word, but translating into popular 
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terms the philosophical and theological positions they had inherited from their own religious 
training at Oxford and Cambridge.309  
 The first two parts of this chapter, then, revisit the relation of Lockean language 
philosophy and the Adamic Word with an emphasis—missing in Aarsleff’s classic account—
upon the relevance of this debate for the broader problem of popular spiritual authority. I argue 
in these sections that Locke does not discard the Adamic Word, as Aarsleff has claimed; rather, 
he trivializes it, universalizes it, and deflates it. The distinction is important for the politics of 
language. When Nayler is Adam—or, as More’s counter-enthusiasm leads one to fear, the Second 
Adam (or perhaps the Third, after Christ)—there is a problem for an authority that has 
predicated its legitimacy on an exclusive claim to the inheritance of the fundamental right to 
organize the naming and thus the shaping of creation. But when each language user is an Adam, 
this problem loses its bite. Locke understands this explicitly in his writings on the nature of 
language in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and his solution to this problem—the 
theory of the arbitrary word—provides the ensuing century with philosophical grounds for 
denying the intelligibility of sectarian claims to divine authority, even (indeed especially) when 
these claims are articulated in the cadences reserved for church and state. In so doing, Locke 
participates centrally in the process I have been calling the rationalization of the word—the 
refusal of the intermodal character of the divine Word in favor of a trifurcation of language into 
linked but independent objective, subjective, and social dimensions.  
 But this is not Locke’s only contribution to the discourse of enthusiasm. Like all counter-
enthusiasts, his critique of enthusiasm is paired with a need to reclaim—in adjusted form—
enthusiastic authority. In the third part of my chapter, then, I take a close look at Locke’s reading 
of St. Paul, connecting his philological efforts in that work, his last to be published (and among 
those he counted as his most important), both to the context of enthusiastic invocations of 
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Pauline theology, and to his theory of arbitrary signification.310 Locke too, I will claim, inhabits 
the enthusiast—but in a form meticulously disambiguated and rededicated to a notion of the 
word governed by the principle of non-contradiction. He imagines an enthusiast, in short, who is 
as responsive and responsible as he is himself to the submerged logical structure of language. 
Thus he refuses Smith’s participation in divine essences that exceed reason—but finally endorses 
a participation in the divine as fundamentally rational and logical. Reason and logic are 
themselves revealed, in Locke, to be divine properties in which all humans participate—if not 
through immediate inspiration, still, in a sense, prophetically. 
* 
1. Locke’s Vox Populi 
 During his 1663-64 appointment as Censor of Moral Philosophy at Christ Church, 
Oxford, roughly seven years after he had witnessed the interrogation of James Nayler and his 
Quaker entourage, John Locke delivered eight lectures later published under the title, Essays on the 
Law of Nature. The essays were delivered in Latin and remained unpublished during his lifetime. 
Nevertheless, as Mark Goldie observes, they exerted considerable influence in his intellectual 
circle.311 Moreover, and importantly for the argument of the present chapter, they demonstrate 
the extent to which his philosophical thinking was rooted in the theological-political assumptions 
and anxieties of the Restoration. In particular, these lectures reflect an interest in simultaneously 
defending and critiquing the notion of natural law—that is, in the common use of the term at the 
time stemming from the thought of Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, and others, the idea that the divine 
being and our duties vis-a-vis that being are decipherable by reason from the evidence of nature.312 
The simultaneity of defense and critique in Locke’s treatment reflects the political-theological 
imperative we have already seen as so central to revolutionary and post-revolutionary England—
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to defend a magisterial prophetic relation to God while discrediting those (such as, most 
outrageously, Nayler) who would reroute the divine spirit so as to bypass the hierarchical 
monopoly on revelation and claim participation in the spirit for themselves and people like them. 
Locke sees a defense of natural law, and hence a defense of a form of collective divination such 
that human beings can deduce God’s will from natural and moral evidence, as essential to the 
order of the world. At the same time, he wishes to refine the idea of natural law such that certain 
forms of reason don’t count as evidence of the divine will—in particular, such that the evidence 
of widespread agreement among language users is not taken to count as natural evidence of 
God’s plan for worldly power. Natural law, in short, must be conceptualized independently of the 
people’s voice—as it was known in Latin, the vox populi.  
 This concern is clearest at the beginning of the fifth essay—on the question of whether 
natural law might be discovered in “the general consent of men”—where we read the following: 
 ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God.’ Surely, we have been taught by a 
 most unhappy lesson how doubtful, how fallacious this maxim is, how productive of 
 evils, and with how much party spirit and with what cruel intent this ill-omened 
 proverb has been flung wide [lately] among the common people. Indeed, if we 
 should listen to this voice as if it were the herald of a divine law, we should hardly 
 believe that there was any God at all. For is there anything so abominable, so  wicked, 
 so contrary to all right and law, which the general consent, or rather the conspiracy, of a 
 senseless crowd would not at some time advocate? Hence we  have heard of the plunder 
 of divine temples, the obstinacy of insolence and immorality, the violation of laws, and 
 the overthrow of kingdoms. And surely, if this voice were the voice of God, it would be 
 exactly the opposite of that first fiat whereby He created and furnished this world, 
 bringing order out of chaos; nor does God ever speak to men in such a way—unless He 
 should wish to throw everything into confusion again and to reduce it to a state of chaos. 
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 In vain, therefore, should we seek the dictates of reason and the decrees of nature in the 
 general consent of men.313  
One might hear in this passage a conventional denunciation of “our late troubles,” typical of any 
given Oxford lecturer of the 1660s, and argue that this has little bearing on the larger 
philosophical question of natural law. But the urgent stakes of Locke’s rhetoric here ought to 
discourage stopping further inquiry with such a view—or, better, ought to suggest that such 
views are all the more to the extent that they might have counted as commonsensical. As Locke 
puts it, the vox populi is not an instrument of the divine nature, unless by this instrument (as at 
Babel) God wishes to foment chaos in his creation. At least at this stage in his philosophical 
career, Locke grounds natural law not, despite his reputation in High School Civics courses, in 
“the consent of the governed,” but in evidence free from the pitfalls and vicissitudes proper to 
the minds and languages of human beings.  
 He does so, I want to suggest, as a result of his concern with the freedom of Logos 
associated at the time with those called enthusiasts. Unlike Hugo Grotius, who grounds his 
account of natural law and hence his account of the legitimate power of the state in “collective 
agreement,” and unlike John Milton, who in Areopagitica and elsewhere celebrates the apparent 
chaos of the budding public sphere as evidence of the spreading spirit of prophecy, and who 
welcomes the rise of “a Nation of Prophets,” Locke seeks to conceptualize natural law 
independently of human discourse precisely because, as he sees it, the confusion of the two led to 
civil war and tyranny.314 Consent—voice—cannot be trusted with the divine prophetic burden, at 
least not as philosophically formulated in the mid-17th century. If God speaks, he does so in a 
language utterly different from those languages used by his image-bearers, not, anyway, in the 
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murmurs and shouts of James Nayler and his followers—or those of any other self-authorized 
group of like-minded human beings.  
 As is well known, despite his repeated insistence upon the centrality of moral questions 
for any philosophical system, Locke never produced a positive moral theory.315 He maintains 
throughout his career a commitment to natural law, to the idea that reason can discern the divine 
will, even as he cultivates (looking, as many philosophers and historians of ideas do, from Hume 
backward) a radical empiricism that necessarily undermines any such commitment. My purpose is 
not to reopen the question, ably handled elsewhere, of what Locke’s moral system might have 
been, or how it might have reconciled these apparently competing vectors. Rather, I would like to 
suggest that both approaches might be organized around a single—albeit complicated—problem: 
what I have called the problem of popular prophetic authority. 
 More precisely, Locke’s fixation on the problem of enthusiasm—or, more accurately, the 
problem behind the problem of enthusiasm, the late-Reformation crises of legitimation—leads 
him to one of the most innovative turns in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding: the emphasis 
on the unreliability of language and the arbitrary nature of signification. With this emphasis, 
Locke finds the root of popular prophetic authority—and he strikes at it. He recognizes that 
sectarian claims to authority rely for their coherence, for their mysterious power, on an 
understanding of language inherited from centuries of feudal arguments defending sovereign 
monopolies on revelation—that human language, and particularly the language of the prophets, 
provides a bridge between the divine and human orders, between the Cities of God and Man, in 
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Augustine’s terms. Locke’s approach to language undermines this relation. In effect, although this 
is almost surely not Locke’s actual purpose, it trivializes this relation—following the argument of 
so-called enthusiasts, that the divine spirit is already here among us, to the point where this claim 
loses its radical force, becoming so ordinary that it becomes, by the same turn, meaningless.   
 Given that Locke’s approach to the problem of enthusiasm engages with the basic source 
of this problem—the relation of language to God’s creation (the natural world), to God’s favorite 
creatures (human beings), and to those creatures’ ability to understand one another and 
communicate their inner experiences—it is worth reviewing the existing suppositions regarding 
the relations of humanity, divinity, and language that he inherits. The notion that language is a 
special invention of the gods gifted to human beings is, of course, extremely ancient. In the major 
monotheistic religions, the linguistic link between humans and God is still more precise—and 
perhaps still more important. In Eden, God’s creation of Adam—by breathing into clay, itself a 
prophetic transmission from God’s “mouth”—is quickly followed up with Adam’s naming of the 
animals in Gen 2.19, a sign that Adam is a steward of creation who acts, in naming its parts, as a 
sort of sub-creator. If God’s words create, Adam’s words reflect this creation, making it 
comprehensible and bringing its infinite parts into conceptual focus. The word, as much as the 
human form itself, is thus the reflective surface of the divine image—the means by which 
humanity is like the divine, and is connected to the divine. The sequence of prophetic vessels 
who (according to scriptural tradition) literally clarify and codify God’s nature and laws for the 
Judaic, Christian, and Muslim confessions further establish the role of language as an aperture 
linking finitude and eternity. In the Bible, as I suggested in the introduction to this project, divine 
knowledge is transmitted though speech. The prophet is called. The prophet listens. The prophet 
speaks. The divine is not perceived—except by Moses—face-to-face. But it is heard, and it is 
channeled in speech.  
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 As James Bono has shown in The Word of God and the Languages of Man, the fact of the 
linguistic connection between God and humanity was not disputed in dominant late antique, 
medieval, and early modern theorizations of language.316 The shape of this connection, however, 
was disputed. Although he does not emphasize the theological context and its relation to post-
Reformation politics—a context which is obviously central to this study of Locke and to this 
project in general—Bono’s work shows that most language theorists of the time approached the 
problem of redefining the divine-human relation by appealing to the originary scene of prophetic 
contact as represented by the figure of Adam in the Garden of Eden, naming the animals. These 
reconceptions of signification took the form of a variety of “Adamic” theories of language.317 It is 
important to emphasize that these Adamic theories did not agree with one another. There was 
not one reading of the Edenic origin of language. There were many. The scene of Adamic 
contact might be seen, in this way, as a battleground in a rhetorical-conceptual struggle for 
representation. Joanna Picciotto’s States of Innocence, a work perhaps more familiar to literary 
scholars than Bono’s, similarly demonstrates the ubiquity of Adamic theories and Adamic 
impersonations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—even (or especially) among those 
natural philosophers and virtuosi whom a later historical tradition would claim for the rise of 
secular modernity.318 Such impersonations, Picciotto suggests, are the condition for the 
reconceptualization of objectivity in terms of the eye of the innocent laboring in a Garden that 
has only apparently melted into a prelapsarian past—which is, in reality, still here. But what 
Picciotto’s recovery of the ubiquity of Adamic impersonations does not emphasize is the degree 
to which the political force of Adamic appropriations varied greatly depending on the state and 
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condition of the appropriator. When Gerrard Winstanley, for instance, prophetically declares his 
right to common land on the basis of the common Adamic inheritance of all men (and perhaps 
women too), this falls with a very different force than when Joseph Addison assumes the 
prelapsarian gaze of the Spectator in order to comment on the manners and mores of a 
burgeoning preindustrial London.  
 Adam, then, is a figure in a struggle for representation. He is occupied by many 
perspectives, to many competing ends. He is, as the first human vehicle of prophecy, an 
especially valuable figure in this struggle—but one playing a role within a larger cultural narrative 
regarding the nature of prophetic authority. In this light, Locke’s theory of language—famously 
described by Hans Aarsleff as articulated against Adamic theories of language—assumes a 
perspective at once literally radical (centered on the root of this question of authority) and 
ultimately preservative of the spiritual distinction between the state and the individual.319 As I will 
show, Locke gives us an especially original version of the Adamic word—one so original that it is 
frequently mistaken for a total rejection of the theory. Rather than argue, as did the earlier figures 
in the debates over the Adamic word, for a particular conceptual arrangement of divine and 
human forms of signification, Locke identifies, accepts, and trivializes the basic claim of the so-
called enthusiasts he seeks to undermine. He articulates a theory of the Adamic word such that 
every speaker is always, in a sense, being Adam-like—naming the world as though for the first time. 
At the same time, he proliferates this prophetic capacity to call the world into a reflective 
relationship to the divine to such an extent that it becomes meaninglessly trivial. This is the 
polemical basis of what Aarsleff has called his pioneering approach to the word as arbitrary 
signifier.320 It is arbitrary precisely in the double-sense of the term—at once judge-like in its 
authority, and vanishingly petty and frivolous. Thus, contrary to Aarsleff, Locke does not reject 
the Adamic word. Rather, he pursues it to an unexpected logical conclusion—the result of which 
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is the dominant account of linguistic signification not only for the centuries immediately 
following The Essay Concerning Human Understanding but for ours as well. 
* 
2. Locke’s New Adamism 
 Hence the Adamic theory of language is crucial for understanding the force of popular 
prophetic authority in the seventeenth century. Those claiming popular spiritual authority were 
able to draw such power in part by appealing to the prelapsarian relation of God and Adam in 
Eden, and claiming that present times were witnessing a return to that Edenic relation –a return 
to clear and plain communication between God and humans. Thus the Leveller John Lilburne 
writes: “[W]hen God gives his law unto the sonnes of men, he doth it plainly, without ambiguous 
termes, and in their owne language, as first for Adam.”321 And James Nayler, whom we’ve already 
met, writes, “Man was not created in sin, but pure and holy, in the Image of God, by which he 
was able to see into the wonders of God, and to give Names unto all Creatures.”322 As we’ve seen, 
this was not the only such source of spiritual authority. But, for Locke, it was crucial, because it 
addressed the basic question of what a word is at all. Unlicensed prophets accrued their power 
through words bearing mysterious truths; Locke sought to call into question the idea that words 
have any such special or essential power in themselves, and thus to pull the plug, as it were, on 
this form of spiritual authority. 
 But what, exactly, was this Adamic theory of language? Aarsleff’s summary remains 
helpful: 
 [It] held that languages even now, in spite of their multiplicity and seeming chaos,  
 contain elements of the original perfect language created by Adam when he named the 
 animals in his prelapsarian state. [...] Still retaining the divine nature of their common 
 origin, languages were in fundamental accord with nature, indeed they were themselves 
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 part of creation and nature. They were divine and natural, not human and conventional. 
 [...] The authority of scriptural revelation ensured that  languages held a nomenclature, that 
 words did name species and essences.323 
Locke’s discussion of language in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding centers on the 
question of whether words name species and essences—whether, in other words, words 
correspond to real natural things in the world.324 Locke finds that some do, those known as 
simple ideas. The word “triangle,” for instance, corresponds essentially to the geometrical figure. 
He finds that most words, however, either do not correspond to actual natural essences—which 
is the case with all named substances, such as (Locke’s omnipresent example) “gold,” simply 
because human beings are not conversant enough with the basic properties of a given named 
substance—or correspond to what Locke calls “nominal essences,” because these words do not 
name things in the world but rather complex ideas (or, Locke’s preferred term, “mixed modes”) 
built through convention and “voluntary association” of a variety of simpler ideas. Examples of 
such words to which Locke returns include “parricide,” “justice,” “gratitude,” and “adultery.”325 
For Locke, the distinction between these sorts of words, those that name substances and those 
that name mixed modes, is, at bottom, tied to the different relations humans have toward the rest 
of creation. It follows from the “maker’s knowledge” tradition then in circulation via Bacon’s 
philosophy—and which would, in the century to come, prove so fundamental to the thinking of 
Giambattista Vico.326 Humans cannot properly “name” substances because humans did not make 
substances. Humans don’t know what they are finally, basically made of. Only God, the Creator, 
has such knowledge. Humans can only, then, refer to substantial things conventionally, in a 
limited way, ever improving their definitions as they come closer in experience and experiment to 
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things themselves but never finally exhausting the fine physical details from which the properties 
of things emerge. On the other hand, humans can inquire with perfect confidence into concepts 
of their own making—or, as Locke puts it repeatedly, words created in “the workmanship of the 
understanding.” Because such words are only signs for ideas, one can infer the combination of 
ideas forming each mixed mode—or, at the very least, one can ask those who use the word how 
they themselves define it (and here one sees Locke restoring, in a way that wholly avoids the 
question of Platonic forms, the method of Socratic inquiry) and thus come to a clearer 
understanding of the term. A word like “justice,” for instance, which combines the simpler ideas 
of obedience, law, and punishment—each of which might also be broken down into their 
component conceptual simples—might be understood and defined by human inquiry. For Locke, 
it is humanity’s creation, not God’s, and so can be known to those that made it.  
 One upshot of Locke’s discussion, of course, is to observe that there is no such thing as 
(say) justice in itself, independent of human definition. Justice is a definite word with a stable 
nominal essence. Whereas the Adamic—or, better, a prior version of the Adamic—theory of 
language would posit that all words, whether they name things or ideas, are defined in the mind 
of God (which is to say, in Leibniz’s terms, the infinite domain of all possible existing concepts, 
mental or physical), and brought by divine gift into the languages of man by Adam, only to have 
degenerated after the fall, Locke proposes a distinction of type between words that name things 
and words that name ideas. The basic building blocks of things are made by the workmanship of 
the divine; complex ideas by the workmanship of the human.  
 This is not, as I have suggested, a total repudiation of the Adamic theory. It is quite 
explicitly a theory of language articulated within the Adamic discourse. But it exhibits a new 
attitude toward that discourse, treating Adamic coinage not as a special gift indicating a special 
discernment of divine reality, but as an ordinary fact in the history of all complex words. This 
undermines those who would claim any special insight into any special term—say, holiness, or sin, 
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or justice—and stake political authority on that purported ability to see into the essence of an 
idea. To put it in our key terms, he undermines one of the main rhetorical tools of the political 
enthusiast—the claim to special knowledge of key theological concepts. 
 One can feel Locke’s need to address the threat of the political enthusiast in his 
connection of the Adamic word to the history of civil society as well. In a long passage toward 
the end of his discussion of substances, Locke proposes to explain his theory of language by 
appealing (as he does elsewhere, and as the early modern philosophers often do) to an imagined 
version of the state of nature. He reimagines Adam not (cheekily) in Eden, but as a sort of 
governor sorting out the original problems of civil society. One of his subjects, Lamech, is 
unhappy because he suspects that his wife, Adah, has committed adultery. Observing both 
Lamech’s state of suspicion and the notion that Adah has been unfaithful, Adam coins two new 
words—Kinneah and Niouph, the one indicating suspicion in a husband, the other disloyalty in a 
wife. Locke insists that Adam, from the crucible of the problems of civil society, has made these 
two words voluntarily and perfectly. He has freely chosen to associate distinct ideas into a 
complex idea, so as “to express ... to others, by that one sound, all the simple Ideas contain’d and 
united in that complex one.” In subsequent years, Locke’s story continues, Adam’s children enjoy 
the same ability he did—of combining simple ideas into complex ones. But they do not replace 
Adam’s perfectly adequate words with their own coinages. Indeed, they do not have the same 
freedom of coinage that Adam did; having “found these two Words, Kinneah and Niouph, in 
familiar use,” they cannot “take them for insignificant sounds: but must needs conclude, they 
stood for something, for certain Ideas, abstract Ideas, they being general Names.”327  
 Adam’s legacy, in short—or, better, the legacy of those like Adam who founded new 
societies, voluntarily coined the complex ideas they deemed necessary—is to have bequeathed to 
subsequent society sets of words made by human ingenuity, which subsequent generations 
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cannot help but hear as significant, but which they cannot themselves properly understand 
without inquiring into the intention of the coiner as deductible from working usage. Locke thus 
reframes the notion of semiotic inheritance. It is not that Adam named things like Justice as they 
“really are.” It is that he named them at all—thus exercising, when this exercise was peculiarly 
significant, a capacity inherent in all human beings. Likewise, he and those like him named 
substances—“gold”—but in this case without knowing fully what it was they were naming. Over 
time, then, the inheritors of Adam’s lexicon can 1) refer to the original intention of the linguistic 
coiner, and gain a firmer sense of a complex idea’s meaning; and 2) through experiments and 
observations, contribute to the inexhaustible task of knowing substances down to their natural 
“Archetypes” (to use Locke’s preferred term for things as they are in nature). We still have the 
capacity to use language as Adam did—“to make any complex Ideas of mixed Modes, by no other 
Pattern, but by his own Thoughts” and to affix “any new name to any Idea.”328 But, like Adam’s 
children, “Men in Society” are “furnished already with Names for their Ideas, and common Use 
having appropriated known names to certain Ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot but 
be very ridiculous.” At times, new coinages are indeed necessary; but not often; and in any case, 
whenever using new words or old words in unfamiliar senses, humans are bound to respect 
communicative expectations—to use words as we understand them to be commonly used, to 
define our terms when asked to, and to clarify any new words or unfamiliar usages we find that 
we have need of. 
 Toward the end of his long discussion of Adam, Locke arrives directly at the problem of 
enthusiasm as related to the use of language. Indeed, it is worth pointing out, his concern with 
enthusiasm generally arrives at the ends of his sections, which is visible not just in this section but 
in the structure of Book III in general, which closes with chapters on “the imperfection of words,” 
“the abuse of words,” and “remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses.” A similar arc 
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toward the problem of enthusiasm can be perceived in the whole of the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding—the fourth edition of which closes with masterful denunciations of “enthusiasm” 
and “wrong assent” before offering a short (but, as we’ll see, illuminating) account of the 
“divisions of the sciences.” Locke added his chapter on enthusiasm (along with a chapter on 
“Association of Ideas”) to this fourth edition, a fact which might be taken to indicate that for 
Locke the application of his philosophy to the problem of enthusiasm is something of an 
afterthought. I disagree with this view—as does Locke’s biographer, Roger Woolhouse, who 
remarks that it is “surprising that Locke had waited until now before including a chapter on 
‘Enthusiasm’” given not only that his interest in this concept is evident in the correspondence 
with Masham we looked at above, but also that he maintained throughout his life an outspoken 
interest in enthusiasm and intellectual opposition to enthusiasts—in particular to Quakers, even 
though some of his good friends, including Benjamin Furly, belonged to this society.329 My sense 
is that the chapter on enthusiasm is not an afterthought; rather, it makes explicit one of the key 
motivating forces behind the Essay as a whole. It brings to the surface of the text one of the 
germs of Locke’s philosophy. Locke included the chapter following correspondence with William 
Molyneux on the question of whether or not Nicolas Malebranche could be considered an 
enthusiast, an exchange that might have prompted Locke—who thought it was perfectly obvious 
that Malebranche was indeed an enthusiast—to render as clear as possible certain inferences 
regarding enthusiasm and divine inspiration which he took to be implicit in his already thorough 
discussions of “the imperfections of words,” “the abuse of words,” and in other sections of the 
Essay.330 
 At any rate, in these culminating sections of the Essay, Locke more than hints at the 
urgency of his inquiry into this matter (which Aarsleff does not emphasize). He is concerned, 
above all, with the abuse of language, as he sees it, in sectarian discourse surrounding moral 
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and—especially—religious questions. It is well known that the Essay begins, as he puts it in his 
Epistle to the Reader (1690), with an impulse to clarify the terms of theological and moral 
discourse in his time.331 In these culminating or summary sections of the Essay, this urge comes to 
the forefront. As he puts it toward the close of Book III:  
 Where shall one find any, either controversial Debate, or familiar Discourse, concerning Honour, 
 Faith, Grace, Religion, Church, etc. wherein it is not easy to observe the different Notions 
 Men have of them; which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification 
 of those Words; nor have in their minds the same complex Ideas which they make them 
 stand for: and so all the contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a 
 Sound.332 
And as he continues some of the confidence of his earlier gestures toward what we might now 
call an “originalist” perspective on intention and interpretation are qualified: 
 And hence we see, that in the interpretation of Laws, whether Divine or Humane, 
 there is no end; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new matter for 
 Explications. And of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these 
 moral Words there is no end. These Ideas of Men’s making, are, by Men still having the 
 same Power [that is, the same Adamic capacity to name mixed modes], multiplied in 
 infinitum.333 
Locke, in short, sees his book on Words—a book that largely inaugurates the modern philosophy 
of language—as addressing the problem of public speech in the long wake of the Protestant 
Reformation. He hears, in the language of the proliferation of sects, a widespread abuse of the 
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Adamic capacity to form and understand the meanings of complex words. People are choosing to 
understand words in their own way, and to make new words that don’t need to be made. On one 
hand, as individual inheritors of Adam’s power to name, they are certainly able to do this; on the 
other, as members of larger polities born into societies with functioning linguistic definitions, to 
exercise this power is, in a sense, to abuse it. 
 In his theory of the arbitrary word, Locke thus finds a linguistic-philosophical means of 
reframing the problem of enthusiasm. And, as with the other counter-enthusiasms we’ve looked 
at, this reframing respects the divisions associated with the process of rationalization. His account 
of language is grounded in careful attention to subjective human capacity—evident in his 
emphasis on the role of ideas in mediating between things and words, and in his insistence that 
humans are free, like so many Adams, to define combinations of ideas (i.e. to create mixed 
modes). He insists that nature is separate from this subjective capacity—evident in his discussion 
of the names of substances, which belong to God and Nature, and thus cannot be known or 
finally defined by humans. And he finds that society mediates both the subjective and objective 
dimensions of language. One inherits the (freely-created) mixed modes of the past, and one is 
duty-bound to respect the intended definitions of those modes, and change them only cautiously 
and explicitly. The arbitrary word, in this view, is arbitrary in two senses. It is arbitrary in the 
sense that each word—whether a name for a substance or a coinage combining prior ideas—was 
named freely and arbitrarily by some person, who could have chosen any sound at all to represent 
the idea at issue. It is also arbitrary in the sense that one born into a language is in a sense legally 
beholden to that language, bound to respect its authority to judge between language users, to 
settle conflicts of definition, to establish conventional usage. Language, in Locke’s view, is thus 
intersubjective—moderating at once between subjectivities, and between society and nature. This 
conclusion feels, perhaps, obvious. But such a feeling should not overshadow the degree to 
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which it was innovative—and pitched against a much more widespread understanding of 
language as combining, rather than mediating, the distinct orders of God, society, nature, and self. 
 Thus Locke’s project continues the deep philosophical work of redefining prophetic 
authority through the distinction among and rearrangement of these three validity spheres—self, 
nature, and society. Indeed, although the point cannot be done justice here, the final division of 
knowledge proposed by Locke at the close of the Essay precisely respects the needs of 
rationalization—splitting the world into 1) things in themselves, proper to investigation by 
natural philosophy; 2) the art of happiness, proper to ethics; and 3) the doctrine of signs, most 
generally words, proper to a new sort of logician. Nature, self, and society. Science, self-help, and 
semiotics.334 This is the foundational tri-fold split of the secular, articulated against the intermodal 
power of unlicensed prophetic utterance.  
 At the same time, it is worth reiterating, Locke departs from the similar counter-
enthusiastic schema of earlier thinkers. John Locke, following but refuting the physiological-
metaphysical tradition of counter-enthusiasm practiced by the Cambridge Platonists, rearticulates 
the problem of false prophecy as confusion about the true nature of language. Words are not 
containers of essences linking humans and the divine. They bridge humans and divine things only 
through the untrustworthy media of complex ideas—which are wholly invented by humans, and 
assembled from simpler ideas. Instead of kinds of true and false prophets, Locke describes kinds 
of words (respectively naming things and ideas) which might be used well or badly. The knowing 
user of language, who knows the difference between significations of substances and of mixed 
modes, and who uses terms accurately and consistently, has taken the place of the prophetically 
attuned philosopher. The abuser of language, who takes the Adamic inheritance of humans, 
semiotic freedom, as an occasion to needlessly coin new terms, use established terms 
inconsistently, confuse the names of substances for substances as they are in nature, and otherwise 
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turn language against its own rational structure, emerges in Locke’s philosophy as a conduit for 
false prophecy. Such users muddy the stream of revelation, natural and human. They don’t 
necessarily do so maliciously or intentionally—but given the confusion they loose on the world, 
this hardly matters.  
 Hence Locke’s interest in the theory of language is not, as some Locke scholars seem to 
believe, pursued for its own sake. Nor is it merely pursued as a ramification of his interest in 
epistemology.335 It follows from his concern with connecting the structure of larger political 
authority to the microcosmic level of the word. He wishes to show that there are responsible and 
irresponsible ways to use words. And he wishes to show this because he sees the political-
theological discourse of the seventeenth-century as defined by linguistic difficulties. As he writes: 
 Many a Man, who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a Text or Scripture, or 
 Clause in the Code, at first reading, has by consulting Commentators, quite lost the sense 
 of it, and, by those Elucidations, given rise or increase to his Doubts, and drawn 
 obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think Commentaries needless; but to shew 
 how uncertain the Names of mixed Modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those, 
 who had both the Intention and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly, as Language was 
 capable to express their Thoughts.336 
 This is not simply an off-hand comment about the tendency of different people to interpret the 
same words and phrases in different ways. Locke is here identifying a fundamental religious issue. 
People need to know, in a clear manner, what the Bible says. But the structure of mixed modes—
which always refer to conventional associations of ideas that are not ever perfectly identical for 
any two language users—makes this task very difficult. He sees the value of his discussion of 
language to inhere in having clearly articulated this problem, in the hope that it might be 
redressed. Moreover, he believes that the proper definition of language might do much to stem 
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conflict in general—to prevent religiously-motivated civil uprisings like those that marked him so 
deeply in the 1650s, suggesting (Wittgenstein avant la lettre) that “the greatest part of the Disputes 
in the World, are ... merely Verbal” and that the careful reduction of disputed terms to “the 
simple Ideas they do or should stand for” would end “those Disputes” of themselves, and cause 
them immediately to “vanish.”337 In short, he sees the proper understanding and use of words as 
essential to identifying and avoiding what we have called the problem of enthusiasm. 
 As we turn to the next major work of Locke’s we will consider, it is important to stress 
this connection between his investigation of words in general and religious scriptures in particular. 
He sees his work in the Essay as having prepared the way for work in the latter area—in the clear 
and proper interpretation of scripture. Of course, this task brings with it a whole new set of 
problems—and Locke identifies these in the essay. In addition to attending to the inherent 
difficulties of language use, one who would elucidate the language of a person who lives in 
another country and uses another language must be greatly compounded. One who would 
elucidate the writings of a person who lived in “remote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers 
had very different Notions, Tempers, Customs, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, etc. every one 
of which, influenced the signification of their Words then, though to us now they are lost and 
unknown” faces an even more difficult task. And yet such tasks must be undertaken, as 
“Discourses of Religion, Law, and Morality … matter of the highest concernment.”338 
 Having identified in the Essay the difficulty attending one’s own language in one’s own 
context, he seeks next to attempt to attend to another’s language, in a foreign tongue, a different 
country, and a distant context. He seeks to do this because such people happen to have been, in 
his view, receptacles for the divine. Just as he investigates the nature of language in order to 
clarify abuses of religious and political authority in his own time, so he seeks to investigate 
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scripture in order to clarify the true nature of religious and political authority for all time. Again, 
he goes for the root of spiritual authority. 
* 
3. Locke Reads St. Paul Himself 
 The Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul is neither the first nor the most widely 
read work of Locke’s to address matters of religion. His “Letter Concerning Toleration” (1689), 
which argues for the strict separation of civil and religious authority, remains his best known such 
work. The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), an extended close reading of the Gospels in which 
he argues that Christianity can be summed up as a minimal belief in the divinity of Jesus and the 
saving power of his crucifixion, and that all additional doctrinal matters should be understood as 
supplemental to these basic articles of faith, has also been deeply studied in recent decades for 
clues as to Locke’s fundamental theological orientation.339 I don’t dispute the centrality of these 
works. But I do wish to recover the Paraphrase as a key document not only in his theological 
thought, but in his theorization of language. Indeed, the Paraphrase helps show just how deeply 
these two concerns are entangled for Locke. 
 I will suggest that the Paraphrase, written in the last decade of his life, undertakes to 
elucidate and overcome precisely the difficulties identified in the closing passages of Book III of 
the Essay cited above. In the Essay, he considers language as such, and the flaws and abuses 
attending its basic structure (and following, generally, from the fact that words are not signs of 
things, but signs of our ideas of things). In the Paraphrase, he considers a particularly significant 
set of documents—of foundational importance for his own faith (he emphasizes in his Prologue 
to the Paraphrase that he began this work as a private devotional exercise in exegesis, so that he 
might better understand the chief supplemental tenets of his Christian faith, i.e. those that go 
beyond the necessary beliefs outlined in the Gospels according to the Reasonableness) and, insofar 
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as he takes his faith to be (at least ostensibly) that of England, Europe, and the world, to 
important questions pertaining to the right conduct of the Christian. In the Essay, Locke 
expresses a hope that attending to the true nature of signification will improve public discourse. 
In the Paraphrase, similarly, Locke hopes to introduce a method for discovering the difficulties in 
interpreting an individual author, and thus (as we will see) to improve the tenor of theological 
discourse as it relates to a particularly important human vehicle of revelation.  
 Critics and scholars who have written on Locke’s Paraphrase have noticed some 
resonances between this work and his Essay, but these have generally centered on comparisons of 
the basic theological positions described in both works. This approach is evident, for instance, in 
the work of Arthur Wainwright, whose erudite critical edition of the Paraphrase further 
emphasizes the centrality of the defense of revelation in relation to reason in the Paraphrase—a 
connection which we will also develop below.340 John Marshall, meanwhile, draws on the 
Paraphrase in his investigation of Locke’s own religious beliefs, finding here (as he does in the 
Reasonableness and elsewhere) evidence suggesting that Locke was Non-Trinitarian.341 Others, 
including David C. Snyder and Mark Glat, find peripheral support in the Paraphrase for their 
understandings of Locke’s larger interests in, respectively, the tension between faith and doubt, 
and the importance of the study of history.342 Few are interested in Locke’s Paraphrase as it reveals 
Locke’s relationship to language theory—with the important exception of Frances Ferguson. She 
sees Locke on Paul as participating in a tradition of English Dissenting hermeneutics that 
contrasts in interesting ways with the Higher Criticism that developed in eighteenth-century 
Germany.343 Ferguson is wonderfully sensitive to the literary originality of Locke’s approach to 
the Bible, but without the background of the discourse of enthusiasm this originality is somewhat 
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skewed in her account. Locke appears to be merely annoyed at lazy rehearsals of Pauline 
catchphrases that are “famous for being famous.”344 In fact, as this study has prepared us to see, 
Locke is deeply concerned with the instant spiritual legitimacy available to those who employ 
Biblical verses—and in particular verses, like Paul’s, tending to obscurity—as vehicles for 
whatever meanings they happen to be carrying around. 
 In other words, the Paraphrase continues the work of reframing spiritual authority against 
those called enthusiasts. We are in a position to see this work as a logical continuation of Locke’s 
concern with the deepest questions of signification stemming from his interest in reforming 
moral and theological language following decades of religious war, hot and cold. I will argue in 
the following sections that one can identify in the Paraphrase a hermeneutic project—that is, a 
project concerned with the nature of interpretation, particularly as it relates to the discernment of 
the will of God through the reading of scripture—meant to complement and extend the semiotic 
project—that is, the project concerned with the nature of signs and meaning—we have already 
identified in the Essay. In the following, I will show that the Paraphrase extends and applies the 
theory of signification Locke introduced in Book III of the Essay, showing how a theory of 
interpretation might relate to a theory of the arbitrary word. As we have seen, Locke’s theory of 
arbitrary signification insists that we recognize the gaps and pitfalls that exist in any attempt to 
communicate meaning. People cannot communicate their impressions mind-to-mind, as it were. 
They must appeal to signs which have special associations that will be lost in translation unless—
or perhaps even if—both speaker and hearer are assiduously careful in defining the sort of thing 
being discussed (whether a substance or a “mixed mode”) and holding to that definition. 
Likewise, as we will see, his hermeneutics emphasizes the situation of words and ideas within the 
human minds that used these words. It asks readers to recognize the distance between their own 
understandings of words and the understandings of others—a distance exacerbated by the many 
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complex layers of intention and context evident in the interpretation of ancient writing that are 
not part of an ordinary speech situation. His hermeneutics situates the arbitrary word—with its 
emphases on distinguishing between one’s own mind, the minds of others, and the substances 
(known at bottom only to God) and mixed-modes (conventionally defined as certain associations 
of ideas) to which these minds refer—within deep historical time. 
 It is worth stating some of the central claims of my argument at the outset of this reading 
of the Paraphrase. I show that Locke’s hermeneutics emphasizes the minds making meaning in the 
reading process. He seeks to clarify the mind of the writer of the ancient words he is reading—in 
this case, the mind of Paul. This is why he emphasizes the authority of “St. Paul Himself” in his 
interpretations. Locke proposes to come as close as possible to understanding Paul’s words 
precisely as Paul intended them to be understood. From our contemporary vantage, this is 
perhaps not a revolutionary proposal. But in Locke’s own context, it certainly was revolutionary. 
It requires the reader to accept that the mind and the words of St. Paul exist independently of the 
revealed knowledge that they carry from God to humans. What matters is not the textual fact of 
his words in themselves, but his peculiar uses of these words. There is nothing holy about Paul’s 
language itself. It is not shot through him by God, as though God has commandeered his 
linguistic faculties.345 It is Paul’s own language, reflecting Paul’s own ideas. Those ideas, Locke 
believes, are indeed the result of divine revelation. They carry divine knowledge. But they carry 
this knowledge only through Paul’s knowledge—only through Paul’s reason. These divine 
messages must then be deciphered through a careful study of Paul’s words—which must be 
treated as his own, not God’s. Moreover, they must be treated as they reflect the particular tasks 
of his letters, not as holy nuggets available for reappropriation according to the preferences and 
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ideas of any given hearer. In his Paraphrase, in short, Locke’s general understanding of words as 
mediating things and ideas—views developed in response to the raging public contests over 
spiritual authority he witnessed in his lifetime—becomes, in his reading of Paul, a schema for 
thinking through the relation between God’s revelation and Paul’s particular modes of utterance: 
between, one might say, the truth and style. 
 These observations will find textual support in the discussion below. But first it is 
important to establish Locke’s reasons for writing about Paul at all. Why does he choose to write 
at such length about this particular figure, and these particular Epistles? First of all, Locke seems 
personally drawn to Paul’s letters above all the books of the Bible save Acts and the Gospels 
(which he already thoroughly covered in the Reasonableness). Allusions to Paul pepper his works. 
And the cadences of Paul’s language frequently undergird Locke’s most poetic moments 
(contrary to his wooden reputation, such poetic moments are not infrequent in his writings). 
Indeed, Locke’s attachment to the phraseology of Paul’s Epistles might be seen as problematic, 
as it expressly violates one of his chief hermeneutic principles—not to slice the Apostle’s 
language into verses and chunks, as the early stewards of his writings so ill-advisedly did in editing 
the whole of the Bible, and reapply their authoritative force to one’s particular thoughts and 
needs.346 At any rate, it is clear that Locke’s Paraphrase of Paul is, to a degree, a labor of love. 
 But it is not only this. Paul, as we’ve already had occasion to notice, was among the most 
frequently cited sources for dissenting and nonconforming Christians in the seventeenth century. 
His letters were, in short, a trove of spiritual authority available for appropriation by those daring 
enough to lay claim to them. We’ve already seen Prophet Hunt borrowing from Paul’s Letter to 
the Ephesians for his revolutionary call to “take up the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of 
God” (Eph 6.17). One might find the same phrase emphasized in the Digger Gerrard 
Winstanley’s Watchword to the City of London, as he recounts a prayer following physical persecution 
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for digging and planting “upon George’s Hill”: “And so I see Father, that England yet does choose 
rather to fight with the Sword of Iron, and covetousnesse, then by the Sword of the Spirit which 
is love.”347 Consider the Ranter Abiezer Coppe’s Fiery Flaming Roll, where (writing against the 
Diggers and Levellers, and in the voice of “the Lord”) he too takes up the spiritual sword of 
Ephesians: “I come not forth (in him) either with materiall sword, or Mattock, but now (in this 
my day —) I make him my Swordbearer, to brandish the Sword of the Spirit, as he hath done 
severall dayes and nights together, thorow the streets of this great City.”348 Or consider, in a letter 
of Oliver Cromwell (following his capture of Edinburgh Castle after the Covenanters sided with 
Charles I), the mingling of this phrase from Ephesians with (in Cromwell’s italics) cadences from 
2 Corinthians 10.5: “When [the Scottish resisters] purely trust to the Sword of the Spirit, which is 
the Word of God, which is powerful to bring down strong holds, and every imagination that exalts it self, 
which alone is able to square and fit the stones for the New Jerusalem; Then, and not before, and 
by that means, and no other, shall Jerusalem (which is to be the praise of the whole Earth) the City 
of the Lord be built, the Sion of the Holy One of Israel.”349 In short, consider the writings of 
most accused enthusiasts—and these three are among the ubiquitously named targets of this 
charge—and one will find not just this phrase, but many phrases of Paul’s Epistles recycled, 
repurposed, reemphasized to fit and undergird the political occasion at hand.350 In the writings of 
those called enthusiasts, Paul is everywhere.  
 Or rather, as Locke has it, not Paul himself—but only Paul’s phrases. In his Prologue to 
the Paraphrase, Locke bemoans the practice of “snatch[ing] out a few Words, as if they were 
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separate from the rest, to serve a Purpose, to which they do not at all belong, and with which 
they have nothing to do.” Locke continues:  
 But as the matter now stands, he that has a mind to it, may at a cheap rate be a 
 notable Champion for the Truth, that is, for the Doctrines of the Sect that Chance or 
 Interest has cast him into. He need but be furnished with Verses of Sacred Scripture, 
 containing Words and Expressions that are but flexible (as all general  obscure and 
 doubtful ones are) and his System that has appropriated them to the Orthodoxie of his 
 Church, makes them immediately strong and irrefragable Arguments for his Opinion. 
 This is the Benefit of loose Sentences, and Scripture crumbled into Verses, which quickly 
 turn into independent Aphorisms.351 
Here one can see the discourse of enthusiasm—the concern with unlicensed hermeneutics, the 
ironic evocation of an “Orthodoxie” that consists of one member’s “Opinion”—with, again, the 
etymological link to heresy. The problem with Paul, in brief, is that he is prone to enthusiastic 
appropriations. His letters are a stagnant pond breeding overweening readers of the Bible—and 
the pond needs to be cleared up. 
 Locke considers Paul, in particular, to be prone to problematic decontextualizations. 
Conversant in the myriad pamphlets disseminated in England and the Low Countries (his home 
during his exile from England during the reign of James II), Locke observes the degree to which 
Paul’s phrases were cherry-picked to support all sides in the political-theological disputes of the 
young public sphere. He notes that “sober Christians” of his acquaintance have tended to notice 
that “ordinary illiterate People,” that is to say, again, the unlearned and untrained, “who were 
Professors, that shew’d a Concern for Religion,” that is, who were particularly and outspokenly 
pious, “seem’d much more conversant in St. Paul’s Epistles, than in the plainer, and as it seem’d 
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to them much more intelligible Parts of the New Testament.”352 Locke here underscores the 
difficulty of Paul’s letters, and the degree to which certain—i.e. good—Christians, those who have 
been trained in ancient languages and comport themselves soberly, admit these difficulties, and 
generally find them “too hard to be master’d,” and find that they cannot “reach the Apostle’s 
Meaning all along in the Train of what he said.”353 Meanwhile, other—i.e., perhaps, bad—
Christians are peculiarly conversant in precisely these obscure letters, and act as though they 
understand them perfectly, leading the good Christians at a loss to “imagin what those saw in 
them, whose Eyes they thought not much better than their own.”354 To simplify, the good 
Christians find Paul obscure. The bad Christians find him—delightfully quotable.  
 By now these hermeneutical gestures should feel familiar. Locke is falling into the 
conventional register of the discourse of enthusiasm stretching all the way back to Cramner—
where unlicensed, untrained readers are contrasted with sober, well-behaved ones. As he 
continues, he connects this contrast (in the manner of the Cambridge Platonists) to what we 
might call at this point—albeit in a lightly rather than heavily foregrounded form—the reason 
versus imagination trope. Locke writes: 
 [T]he Case was plain, These sober inquisitive Readers had a mind to see nothing in St. 
 Paul’s Epistles but just what he meant; whereas those others of a quicker and 
 gayer Sight could see in them what they pleased. Nothing is more acceptable to 
 Phansie than plyant Terms and Expressions that are not obstinate, in such it can find its 
 account with Delight, and with them be illuminated, Orthodox, infallible at pleasure and 
 in its own way.355  
Locke links a certain kind of reader—one dominated by “Phansie”—to this sort of text—“full of 
plyant Terms and Expressions that are not obstinate.” Such readers take pleasure in bending 
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“Sacred Scripture to their Opinions … to make as they can a Cover and Guard of them.”356 Thus 
they can be “illuminated, Orthodox, infallible at pleasure.” And Locke stresses that such readers 
find this process “Delight[ful].” They take pleasure in bending the Good Book to their own ideas.  
  Paul may not be a problem for religion himself—but his particular way of writing creates 
problems. He appeals not to the sober so much as to the fanciful. The fanciful fill his obscure 
phrases with their own pet meanings. They find in Paul ample opportunity to exploit the inherent 
ambiguity of language outlined in the Essay. And so the central task of Locke’s Paraphrase is to 
stabilize the meaning of this source of so much delightful ambiguity. Paul’s words have been used 
as weapons in the battle of ideas. They need to be shown to be, at bottom, just words like any 
other words. As Locke puts it: 
 But if the Quotation in the Verce produc’d, were consider’d as a part of a continued 
 coherent Discourse, and so its Sense were limited by the Tenour of the Context, most of 
 these forward and warm Disputants would be quite strip’d of those, which they doubt 
 not now to call Spiritual Weapons, and they would have often nothing to say that would 
 not shew their Weakness, and manifestly fly in their Faces.357 
Paul’s words must be de-weaponized. One must hear in this passage a sardonic allusion to the 
very phrase considered above. In attending to the flow of Paul’s discourse, Locke proposes to 
turn “the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God” against those who have wielded it so 
arrogantly—not by flinging them back, as ammunition, but by treating them like any other words, 
as context-dependent and linked to certain stable definitions.  
 Locke’s approach to Paul’s language thus has a double quality that can be somewhat 
tricky for a modern reader. On one hand, he appears to want to disenchant Paul’s letters. He 
wishes them to be read like any other letters, and he wishes Paul to be treated as an author like 
any other author (as St. Paul himself). According to Locke, this is the only way his writings will 
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ever be made clear—if they are treated as ordinary. At the same time, Locke clearly thinks that 
Paul’s letters are more than ordinary. They are documents of revelation. Paul himself is a vehicle 
of revelation. As Locke writes, “St. Paul was miraculously called to the Ministry of the Gospel, 
and declared to be a chosen Vessel.”358 What he has to say is of the greatest importance, for it is 
guided by God. These can feel like contradictory observations. Paul should be read as any author, 
yet Paul is more than just any author—he is an apostle, a writer inspired by the Holy Spirit. And 
perhaps they are. But they are both central to Locke’s project. One might clarify this situation 
somewhat by noting that Paul’s words, insofar as they are words, are, for Locke, utterly ordinary. 
They are conventional signs (albeit referring to a context that is no longer accessible) used by a 
particular human being. But, for Locke, Paul’s general meaning—his larger message in each 
letter—is extraordinary. This is the dimension of his writing that can be called a vehicle of 
revelation—the larger point. And it must be added that Locke assumes this larger point is there 
in Paul as an article of faith. He accepts Paul into the canon of revelation. Thus he assumes that 
Paul must be—from some vantage, however difficult to obtain—perfectly consistent and clear. 
He writes, after all, under the influence of the divine, and the divine, for Locke, is consistent and 
clear. The divine does not equivocate. Therefore Paul must not equivocate—even if he appears 
to do so quite frequently, which is, of course, the whole problem in the first place, the quality of 
his writing that makes him so attractive to the “illiterate” and so confusing to the “sober.” 
 This, then, is Locke’s task in the Paraphrase—to show an apparently disordered mind to 
be, in fact, divinely ordered. And he marshals a sophisticated hermeneutical apparatus to this task. 
Just as he introduces, in his theory of signs, the notion of individual and distinct ideas interfering 
between things and human words for those things (whether physical or abstract), in the Paraphrase 
he introduces, as the medium between his mind and the words on the page, the mind of the 
author—Paul’s mind. Locke proposes to understand the language of the Epistles by attending to 
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a number of “difficulties”—or, as a structuralist might say centuries later, different semiotic 
levels.359 
 1) Locke attends to the peculiarity of the historical language Paul uses in the composition 
of the letters, at least from the perspective of the modern reader: “The Terms are Greek, but the 
Idiom or Turn of the Phrases may be truly said to be Hebrew or Syriak.”360 Thus Locke proposes 
something like an Adamic ear, able to hear things as they once sounded. This does not involve 
(as proposed by Jakob Boehme—or, more to the point in Locke’s case, the Quakers) 
understanding his language through attunement to a persisting essence vibrating within words, 
but through the literal assumption of hermeneutic context.361 Even if he is, as Locke puts it, “a 
chosen Vessel,” one must hear Paul not as a vessel of prophetic words, where a prophetic capacity 
is attributed to his words themselves, but as a user of what would have been in his day quite 
ordinary language. It’s not the words that are prophetic. It’s Paul who is prophetic. 
 2) Locke attends to Paul’s own personal peculiarities as they inflect his sense. Paul, Locke 
writes, was “a Man of quick Thought, warm Temper, mighty well vers’d in the Writings of the 
Old Testament, and full of the Doctrine of the New: All this put together, suggested Matter to 
him in abundance on those Subjects which came in his way: So that one may consider him when 
he was writing, as beset with a Crowd of Thoughts, all striving for Utterance. In this Posture of 
Mind it was almost impossible for him to keep that slow Pace, and observe minutely that Order 
and Method of ranging all he said, from which results an easie and obvious Perspicuity.”362 Here 
Locke comes close to falling into the traditional language of early counter-enthusiasm—the 
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wherein is shewed ... how several nations and people have made a distinction between singular and plural, and first, in the former part of 
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362 Paraphrase, 104 
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Lutheran language of “Schwaermer.” Paul is imagined as nearly manic-melancholic, beset by “a 
Crowd of Thoughts, all striving for Utterance.” But significantly this doesn’t discredit him as a 
vessel of revelation—as it would have in an earlier, simpler discourse (say, that of Jean Bodin or 
John Smith) which needs its true prophets to appear, physically as well as mentally, calm, rational, 
enlightened. Locke has moved past the physiological counter-enthusiasm of his predecessors.363  
 3) Locke proposes that understanding Paul requires attention to the range of personae 
this author inhabits: “[T]he frequent changing of the Personage he speaks in, renders the Sense 
very uncertain, and is apt to mislead one that has not some Clue to guide him; sometimes by the 
Pronoun I, he means himself; sometimes any Christian; sometimes a Jew, and sometimes any 
Man, etc.”364 Understanding Paul requires stepping into the range of Paul’s rhetorical self-
identifications.  
 4) And finally, understanding Paul requires paying attention to the history of interference 
with the meaning of these Epistles. First, there is the level editorial interference with his letters—
particularly perpetrated by those who divided the letters, in a way totally inimical to the epistolary 
genre, into chapters and verses, “whereby they are so chop’d and minc’d, and, as they are now 
Printed, stand so broken and divided, that not only the Common People take the Verses usually 
for distinct Aphorisms; but even Men of more advanc’d Knowledge, in reading them, lose very 
much of the strength and force of the Coherence, and the Light that depends on it.”365 Second, 
there are those commentators, ancient and recent, whose “Philosophy also has its part in mis-
leading Men from the true Sense of the Sacred Scripture.”366  
 Thus in reading Paul, Locke proposes that the best way to properly understand scripture 
is to stop treating it as a special kind of writing. Treat it, rather, as you would treat any book—
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and treat Paul’s Epistles as you would treat any epistles: as a flow of thoughts related to a 
particular subject, not as a gathering of decontextualized aphorisms. “If Tully’s Epistles were so 
printed, and so used,” Locke observes, “I ask whither they would not be much harder to be 
understood, less easy and less pleasant to be read by much than now they are?” (106). The correct 
way to read Paul, then, is “to understand the Mind of him that writ it,” and the way to do this is 
to “read the whole Letter through from one end to the other, all at once, to see what was the 
main Subject and Tendency of it: or if it had several Views and Purposes in it, not dependent one 
of another, nor in a Subordination to one chief Aim and End, to discover what those different 
Matters were, and where the Author concluded one, and began another.”367 The reader of Paul is 
charged with pushing beyond Paul’s actual words, which are arbitrary signs, to “the Notions St. 
Paul then had in his Mind” when he first wrote them. “That is,” Locke writes, “what we should 
aim at in reading him, or any other Author, and ’till we from his Words paint his very Ideas and 
Thoughts in our Minds, we do not understand him.”368 
 Thus Locke’s hermeneutics superficially resembles the much more radical approach of 
Spinoza, who, as is well known, proposes in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus to treat the scriptures 
as writings like any other writings. But, unlike Spinoza, Locke is certain that Paul is inspired by 
the Holy Spirit, and that the proper reading of his works might “make us rejoyce in the Light we 
receive from those most useful Parts of Divine Revelation.”369 As mentioned, he believes this in 
part in a circular way—Paul is divinely inspired because the Bible says so, or, in Locke’s more 
emphatic language: “I remembred that St. Paul was miraculously called to the Ministry of the 
Gospel, and declared to be a chosen Vessel; that he had the whole Doctrine of the Gospel from 
God by immediate Revelation, and was appointed to be the Apostle of the Gentiles, for the 
propagating of it in the Heathen World. This was enough to perswade me, that he was not a Man 
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of loose and shattered Parts, uncapable to argue, and unfit to convince those he had to deal with. 
God knows how to choose fit Instruments for the Business he employs them in.”370 Here one 
hears the figure we saw otherwise diminished in Locke’s counter-enthusiasm—the rational 
prophet, who one can assume is reasonable because (one takes it according to tradition and by 
faith) the Bible says he is a prophet. 
 But there is more going on in this observation than might at first seem. Locke’s reasoning 
here follows from his arguments regarding the relation of revelation and reason in both the Essay 
and The Reasonableness of Christianity. For Locke, God is the author of reason, which is necessary in 
his favored creature, the human being, because the huge majority of the workings of his Creation 
cannot be discovered by immediate sense perception. Such workings can only be discovered by 
reason—that is, by chains of certainty and probability formed by the diligent comparison of 
ideas.371 And thus, only through reason can God’s own existence be discovered. (In a very real 
sense, then, although Locke doesn’t press the point, our existence as rational creatures is 
entangled with God’s existence.) This is Locke’s path to a thought familiar from early modern 
thinkers (and likely borrowed by Locke directly from Descartes): that God does not create 
contrary to reason, in a manner that would thus overthrow his own best creation, the human 
understanding.372 
 Revelation, in this way of thinking, is wholly compatible with reason. It is, for Locke, 
knowledge arrived at more quickly than by reason alone—but in a manner totally compatible 
with reason. As Gilda Radner says of comedy, it is truth—only faster. Locke puts it this way in 
Reasonableness: “[T]he first knowledge of the truths they have added, are owing to Revelation: 
Though as soon as they are heard and considered, they are found to be agreeable to Reason; and 
such as can by no means be contradicted. Every one may observe a great many truths which he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Paraphrase, 110. 
371 Essay, 4.17.2-3. 
372 Essay, 4.18.5. 
 175	  
receives at first from others, and readily assents to, as consonant to reason; which he would have 
found it hard, and perhaps beyond his strength to have discovered himself.”373 The vessel of 
revelation, the prophet, then, is simply one who has heard the truth from the author of reason—
who has been told what she or anyone would have been able to discover eventually, given 
enough time, patience, and intellectual strength. The prophet’s mind is marked with a reasonable 
future, which she tells in the clearest terms possible (in simple language, and often using 
appealing imagery and vivid genres like parables) to those she addresses. What she says seems 
surprising only because we haven’t followed the careful and clear chain of rational inferences 
from what we know now to the knowledge revealed—and indeed neither has she. The prophet 
provides solutions—and leaves proofs to natural reason. Or, as Locke puts it in the Essay, “In all 
that is of Divine Revelation there is need of no other Proof but that it is an Inspiration from 
GOD: For he can neither deceive nor be deceived.”374 
 
4. Non-Contradiction 
 Naturally, then, when one turns to the epistolary paraphrases themselves, one is stuck by 
Locke’s balancing of a respect for the peculiarities of Paul’s speech situation, and of a trust in the 
underlying coherence of his writings. Paul’s words are restless in themselves, suggesting a mind 
roiling with ideas; but they also rest upon a God who respects above all the self-evident principle 
of non-contradiction. Just as there can be no two things in one place, so also for Locke there can 
be no one word with two meanings.375 Paul’s thoughts are crowded—and whose wouldn’t be, if 
they had known the truth immediately, by revelation, before the chain of inferences could arrive 
there—but, upon examination, orderly. Thus the process of interpretation mirrors the dance of 
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revelation and reason Locke sees as fundamental to revealed religion. Just as reason catches up 
with revelation, so the interpreter catches up with the prophetic writer. At the same time, the 
prophetic writer is never inconsistent with reason. Reason always lies packed into his words—in 
the firm and consistent correspondence of these words with fixed ideas. The interpreter only 
unpacks this condensed matter and draws it out in an easily understood chain. 
 One key upshot of this dance of reason and revelation in Locke’s reading of Paul is that it 
is difficult at times to distinguish Locke’s views from Paul’s. On one hand, Locke is committed to 
proceeding in his reading of the text according to the principle of radical hermeneutical 
immersion in “St. Paul himself.” He proposes to disappear as an interpretive presence, insofar as 
he can, and allow Paul’s own thoughts to appear as clearly as they can be rendered into English. 
He is thus guided, theoretically, by no designs other than those of clarity and precision of 
interpretation. This should not affect the content of Paul’s letters at all. Where Paul is clear, his 
meaning should be clear; where Paul is confused, his confusion should be clear.  
 However, in practice, Locke seldom finds confusion in Paul. Instead, he finds that Paul 
conforms in the great majority of his writings to the general current of sense—that is, to Locke’s 
all-important principle of non-contradiction. Thus the content of Paul’s letters is found to be in 
harmony with the method of Locke’s hermeneutics. Both, it turns out, aim at consistency. Both, 
one might aver further, conform to the logical clarity of the universe—and thus to that of the 
Creator behind the universe. In this way, Locke’s reading of Paul performs his sense of the 
relation between reason and revelation. Locke’s reason catches up to Paul’s revelation—but finds, 
upon close examination, that revelation to be perfectly consistent and reasonable. It is as though 
Locke and Paul are complementary figures in an prophetic allegory of reading, with Paul 
producing compact and gnarly phrases which Locke finds, after some contextualization and 
unpacking, to be quite lucid. Thus Paul plays sibyl to Locke’s priest.   
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 Locke detects Paul’s reasonableness above all in the “main designe” of the letters he 
considers. In his Preface, Locke argues that the best way to understand Paul is to read a given 
letter all the way through a number of times, just as if it were an ordinary letter sent to oneself. 
Only then can one discover the larger gist of the whole. 1 Corinthians, for instance, is written “to 
support his own authority dignity and credit with that part of the church which stuck to him; to 
vindicate him self from the aspersions and calumnies of the opposite party; To lessen the credit 
of the cheif and leading men in it by intimateing their miscariages and shewing their noe cause of 
glorying or being gloried in,” etc.376 When the larger design of Paul’s letters is emphasized, the 
particular ambiguities hiding in each turn of phrase seem less daunting. They can be reconciled 
with the larger sense of the letter, or they can be recognized as tangential and even extraneous. 
Not all parts of Paul’s letters, in other words, are equally important—or, in a sense, equally 
revealed. What is really revealed is the larger gist; that’s the indispensible message from the Holy 
Spirit. The individual words and phrases must be weighed according to this larger goal. 
 When one turns to the paraphrases themselves, however, this emphasis on the main 
design—the spirit of the word as gist—is frequently lost, as Locke devotes his hermeneutical 
efforts to meticulously disambiguating Paul’s every phrase, word, and letter. Take, for instance, 
the “sword of the spirit” passage we’ve already looked at (Ephesians 6.17). Locke contextualizes 
this phrase within a more “general Exhortation” to the Ephesians “to stand firm against the 
Temptations of the Devil in the Exercise of Christian Vertues and Graces, which he proposes to 
them as so many pieces of Christian Armour, fit to arm them Cap a pie, and preserve them in the 
Conflict.”377 His paraphrase itself adds clarifications, taking care to tether the vehicles of Paul’s 
allegory to stable tenors. Locke’s primary text (the KJV) has this: “Above all, taking the shield of 
faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked. And take the helmet 
of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God” (Eph 6.16-17). Locke 
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paraphrases this passage as follows: “Above all taking the Shield of Faith, wherein you may 
receive, and so render ineffectual all the fiery Darts of the wicked one, i.e. the Devil.—Take also 
the hopes of Salvation for an Helmet: and the Sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God.”378 
He adds a footnote: “In this foregoing Allegory, St. Paul providing Armour for his Christian 
Soldier, to arm him at all points, there is no need curiously to explain wherein the peculiar 
Correspondence between those Virtues and those Pieces of Armour consisted, it being plain 
enough what the Apostle means, and wherewith he would have Believers be armed for their 
Warfare.”379 Locke’s purpose, as one can see, is to disambiguate this troublesome passage. “The 
wicked” must not be taken for actual people. That would foment accusation and 
misunderstanding. This word is tied instead to the idea of “the wicked one”—the Devil. The 
phrase, “the helmet of salvation,” shouldn’t be turned around curiously—as though we ought to 
ponder why salvation would be a helmet rather than a breastplate or a pair of sandals. Locke 
merely clarifies that the Ephesians were to take, for a helmet, the “hopes of Salvation”—shifting 
the emphasis from this distracting vehicle, the helmet, to a sounder doctrinal link of hope and 
salvation (incidentally the primary focus of Locke’s theological commentary in the Paraphrase). As 
for the sword of the spirit, Locke passes this by, perhaps to avoid controversy, without further 
specific comment.  
 In short, Locke positions himself as merely reading Paul. But in practice he is giving us his 
Paul—a Paul committed to clarity of expression, who without fail means his words to be 
interpreted in the most concrete and least ambiguous manner. He gives us, to be blunt, Paul as a 
late antique Locke. Consider another moment when Locke shows remarkable dexterity in 
rendering Paul’s texts consistent, which also touches directly on the subject of prophecy. In 1 
Corinthians 11.4-5, Paul writes, “Every man praying or prophesying, having his head covered, 
dishonoureth his head. But every woman that prayeth, or prophesieth with her head uncovered, 
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dishonoureth her head: for that is even all one as if she were shaven.” And in 1 Corinthians 14.34, 
he writes, “Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to 
speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law.” Locke paraphrases 
the first passage:  
 Every man that prayeth or prophesieth i e by the gift of the Spirit of god speaketh in the 
 church for the edifying exhorting and comforting of the congregation having his head 
 covered dishonoureth Christ his head, by appearing in a garb not becoming the authority 
 and domination which god through Christ has given him over all the things of this world, 
 the covering of the head being a mark of subjection: But on the contrary a woman 
 praying or prophesying in the church with her head uncovered dishonoureth the man 
 who is her head by appearing in a garb that disowns her subjection to him. For to appear 
 bareheaded in publick is all one as to have her hair cut off.380  
And the second:  
 As to your women let them keep silence in your assemblys for it is not permitted 
 them to discourse there or pretend to teach, that does noe way suit their state of 
 subjection appointed them in the law.381 
Locke appends to the first of these passages a long note explaining the pains necessary to imagine 
himself into Paul’s situation and thus to discover how these two passages can be understood in a 
consistent manner. For, as Locke points out, Paul appears in the first passage implicitly to allow 
women to speak in church, and in the second to disallow the same. Locke explains that it was the 
custom at the time for women to be veiled in public, and that some women took off their veils in 
public religious assembly when praying, in order to be, like the men among them, exposed to 
God. Paul forbids this, as it symbolically upsets the patriarchal order. But he does not forbid 
them from praying and prophesying—so long as they keep their veils on. Locke infers that 
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praying and prophesying, then, were exceptions to the general state of women’s silence imposed 
in the second passage above. As Locke puts it:  
 The women in the churches were not to assume the personage of Doctors, or 
 speak there as teachers, this caryed with it the appearance of superiority, and was 
 forbidden. Nay they were not soe much as to aske questions there or to enter into  
 any sort of conference. This shews a kind of equality, and was also forbidden.   
 […] But yet this subordination which god for orders sake had instituted in the 
 world hinderd not but that by the supernatural gifts of the spirit he might make   
 use of the weaker sex to any extraordinary function when ever he thought fit, as   
 well as he did of the men. But yet when they thus either prayd or prophesied by  
 the motion and impulse of the holy-ghost care was taken that whilst they were 
 obeying god who was pleased by his spirit to set them a speaking, the subjection   
 of their sex should not be forgotten, but owned and preserved by their being  covered.382 
Locke imagines a Corinthian lifeworld in which careful distinctions were observed between the 
sorts of spiritual movements felt in the congregation. All were able to pray aloud and subject to 
spontaneous prophesying. But even in the grip of the Holy Spirit, a distinction of power had to 
be observed—the veil had to remain.383 In didactic matters, on the contrary, there was no reason 
for women to speak. They could only have done so voluntarily, not through the ventriloquizing 
movements of spirit, and thus to speak up either to teach or ask questions would have been 
perceived as insubordination.384 
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383 This leads, for Locke, into another affirmation of the reasonableness of the Christian female prophet, who, unlike 
“the Bacchai or Pythiai,” does not need to “quit … their ordinary modest guise” when in the throes of spiritual 
raptures (221, 451). 
384 Locke’s interpretation of Paul’s apparent inconsistency in this matter—his orderly arrangement of Paul’s ideas 
concerning women in the church—sparked considerably interest and controversy at the time, particularly (for 
obvious reasons) among Quakers. Although other interpreters, including Henry Hammond and Joseph Mede, had 
anticipated Locke’s management of this problem, it was far from the consensus view at the time. Calvin, for instance, 
argued that Paul did not intend to give women permission to prophesy and pray aloud in church; he merely wanted 
to forbid them from removing their veils. Others insisted that Paul only permitted prayer and prophesying in private 
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 The point I wish to bring out is quite simple. Locke presents himself in the Preface as 
committed to reading St. Paul himself, in his actual words, in his actual context—Locke, with 
something like false modesty, apologies in his Prologue “for having indeavoured to make St. Paul 
an Interpreter to me of his own Epistles.”385 But he ends up producing a Paul that shares his own 
meticulous commitment to differentiating between what Habermas will later call validity domains. 
His Paul distinguishes consistently between matters of individual, subjective experience—say, 
whether women can receive inspirations from the Holy Spirit—and matters of intersubjective 
political order—say, whether they should keep their heads covered as a sign of submission to 
their fathers and husbands. He finds too that Paul shares his commitment to the principle of 
non-contradiction. His words mean only one thing. They mean the simplest thing. At times, as in 
the allegory of the Christian soldier’s armor, he doesn’t bother to foreground this simplest 
meaning—but he would have been understood within his own context as having been perfectly 
clear and straightforward. For instance, he writes, the “evil.” But he plainly means, “the evil one.”  
 Locke’s method is thus reflected in Paul’s meaning. He finds his own cherished divine 
principle—the principle of non-contradiction—within this ancient conduit of revelation. This 
turn in Locke’s handling of Paul is similar, finally, to that we saw in More’s handing of H.N.—
although, clearly, the one is inhabiting a positive, and the other a purely negative exemplar of 
Christian doctrine. Where More finds his own most cherished doctrinal principle—the 
Incarnation—opposed in the secret heart of the arch-enthusiast, H.N., Locke finds his own most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
homes, not in public assemblies (a reading that Locke rejects on the basis of Paul’s consistent use of the term 
“prophesy” in the context of public worship). As Arthur Wainwright puts it, “Locke’s interpretation, restrained and 
cautious as it appears to be, posed a threat to the accepted practice of restricting leadership in public worship to the 
male sex” (443). Locke appears, in short, to tease open the prophetic loophole whereby women could claim a sort of 
paradoxical spiritual authority through surrender of their autonomy to the movements of the Holy Spirit. He seems 
to be, in a very limited way, siding with so-called Quaker so-called enthusiasts — although, at the same time, he does 
so expressly in the interest of understanding the past workings of the church as they were actually practiced. He 
doesn’t suppose that these miraculous happenings, which are limited to the age of the gospel, translate to his 
contemporary circumstances. The only revelation happening in the present, in Locke’s view, is that proper to 
interpretation itself—to the reaching across time to meet the mind of another. 
385 Paraphrase, 113 
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cherished doctrinal principle—albeit one more philosophical than theological, the principle of 
non-contradiction—respected precisely where, in the scriptures, it seems at first most absent. 
 Locke emphasizes, in his Preface, the ultimate fallibility of his attempt to read St. Paul 
himself. He insists that his exercise is finally his alone. Each reader must understand Paul on his 
own—must “believe for [one]self” one’s own “Interpretation of the Sacred Scripture.”386 In this 
way, Locke’s Paraphrase rather models than accomplishes the task of rendering Paul intelligible. 
He shows how hard this task is, in the abstract. He outlines why it is so hard—how many levels 
of potential ambiguity one must navigate in order to settle one’s sense of what Paul means. But 
he cannot finally produce Paul’s own content definitively. Instead, he gives us a Paul who speaks 
to Locke. And in so doing he shows, albeit in a quieter way than either More or (as we’ll see) 
Swift, that one can only defeat the problem of enthusiasm—the problem, from Locke’s view, of 
irresponsible and unlicensed appropriation of scripture—by becoming enthusiastic oneself, in as 
careful a way as possible. Locke takes Paul back from the “illiterate.” But in the course of doing 
this he remakes Paul in his own image. That he encourages you to do likewise—and to likewise 
be careful in doing so—perhaps somewhat mitigates this irony, but not totally.   
*  
5. Totality within the bounds of reason alone 
 Neither Locke’s exegetical findings (which despite his commitment to reading “St. Paul 
Himself” are much assisted by the prior work of Beza, Grotius, Hammond, Lightfoot, and Mede, 
among others)387 nor his hermeneutical procedure (which is influenced by Maimonides, Lodewijk 
Meijer, and, as mentioned, Spinoza) is finally all that original.388 But Locke’s aspiration, to paint 
his ideas in accordance with Paul’s own ideas—to boldly and centrally interject this new 
hermeneutic domain, Paul’s mind, into the process of interpretation—certainly is revolutionary. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Paraphrase, 115. 
387 Paraphrase, 692. 
388 Nadler, 124. 
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Locke has been cast by Jonathan Israel and others as part of a strain of compromised 
enlightenment thought—adapting the radical insights of Spinoza, d’Holbach, and others to the 
practical and ultimately half-democratic aims of magisterial state management. There is certainly 
something to this argument; my work here has, it must be clear, helped add detail to this thesis.389 
At the same, time, though, Locke’s contribution to the shape of enlightenment is far from 
peripheral. He is a crucial figure for articulating what I have repeatedly emphasized as a key 
feature of enlightenment discourse—not its commitment to scientific materialism, but its 
commitment to intermodality, to the notion that there are separate spheres of validity impinging 
upon the world that need to be at once differentiated and at the same time interpreted according 
to a prevailing paradigm of reason.  
 Locke accomplishes this through his emphasis on the domain of language use. Language, 
for Locke, at once differentiates things and ideas and brings them into common circulation. This 
double action of distinction and communication is indispensible to both his semiotics and 
hermeneutics. Spinoza, despite the “hylozoic monism” so admired by Israel, in many ways 
remains within the Adamic perspective on the universe—in which all things must be understood 
as always already existing within the mind of God. We participate in a larger logos. We bring 
God’s thoughts into actuality—but not in any actually free manner. We are spoken by the 
ineffable word of God—of Nature—of what is. For Locke, on the contrary, the mind is a region 
at once free from actual determination and also constrained, through words, by convention. It is 
the seat of an intermodal struggle or conversation between natural, subjective, and social 
elements. Locke perhaps intends this as what we might call a conservative gesture—as a means of 
quenching the rhetorical fire of those called enthusiasts and preserving the legitimacy of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 See Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
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state—but the implications of the idea he pursues to make this gesture, the arbitrary word, far 
exceed any such local political efforts.390 
 One can see Locke as continuing the work of the Cambridge Platonists—of limiting and 
balancing enthusiastic totalities within a larger system. But he does this in a different way. Henry 
More puts on and takes off philosophical totalities quite carelessly, switching between 
explanatory modes without ever really hammering down his reasons for choosing one mode 
rather than another. His totalities are, as we’ve said, provisional and partial. Their relation to the 
doctrinal core More sees himself as defending is somewhat undefined. They might be envisioned 
as temporary stylizations of the theological whole—brief departures from reason. Locke arranges 
his logically consistent totalities differently. They are rooted in some fundamental aspect of 
creation. The material dimension of reality is that which can be known all the way down only by 
the Creator. The experiential dimension is that node of associations unique and exclusive to each 
mind. Totalities are, for Locke, dimensions rather than excursions. If, for More, knowledge can be 
pictured as a series of stylizations centered on reasons, for Locke, it can be pictured as a carefully 
divided triad—things in themselves, subjective experiences, and conventional meanings—
centered on the capacity of language-using creatures to provide reasons for their beliefs. 
 Again this way of combining totalities is pitted directly against—and thus modeled in 
distinction to—the idea of enthusiasm. The problem with enthusiasts, from Locke’s point-of-
view, is not that they claim spiritual authority unto themselves, but that they ask others, without 
reason, to respect that authority too. By abandoning reason—in the sense that they refuse to give 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 This might be due in part to Locke’s English context. Whereas Spinoza, for instance, articulates his radical 
hermeneutics against Reformed Calvinists who might be thought of as the seventeenth-century equivalent of 
conservative fundamentalists, who cast “human fabrications as divine teachings” in order to seize and hold political 
power, Locke is just as concerned with totally unlicensed thinkers, which we might perhaps imagine as the 
seventeen-century equivalent of anarchists, who want to dissolve state authority altogether and prepare the world for 
an utterly stateless eschaton. Locke is concerned in a way that Spinoza is not with understanding and accounting for 
the form of private faith, of inner light, of reason. Thus he gets behind the question of whether scripture is written 
by God or humans, behind questions of theological doctrine, and examines the tissue of doctrine – words – as it 
interacts with the tissue of sense experience—ideas. He is not perhaps the first to have done this. But he is perhaps 
the first to have done it so thoroughly and rigorously. 
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reasons to others for what they claim, to explain why they have special authority, what that 
authority consists of, etc.—enthusiasts abandon any claim to such authority. As Locke puts it: 
 Here it is that Enthusiasm fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus   
 possessed boast of a Light whereby they say, they are enlightened, and brought   
 into the Knowledge of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they 
 must know it to be so either by its own self-evidence to natural Reason; or by the 
 rational Proofs that make it out to be so. If they see and know it to be a Truth, 
 either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be a Revelation: For they know it  
 to be true by the same way, that any other Man naturally may know, that it is so 
 without the help of Revelation. For thus all the Truths of what kind soever, that   
 Men uninspired are enlightened with, came into their Minds, and are established 
 there. If they say they know it to be true, because it is a Revelation from GOD, the 
 reason is good: but then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation 
 from GOD. If they say by the Light it brings with it, which shines bright in their 
 Minds, and they cannot resist; I beseech them to consider, whether this be any more, 
 than what we have taken notice of already, viz. For all the Light they speak of is but a 
 strong, though ungrounded perswasion of their own Minds that it is a Truth.391 
For Locke, authority can only come through reason, because only through reasons can we 
communicate across the otherwise impassable divide that separates unique minds, formed from 
unique sense experiences, with unique (although they shouldn’t be) definitions of complex 
terms—terms able to rile up, more because of the obscurity than the clarity of the ideas they 
convey, violent passions. Enthusiasts, in Locke’s definition, ask for an audience to take them at 
their word without any further interrogation. They ask for faith. But God’s revelation proceeds 
through reasons.  
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 Language, then, is the basis of Locke’s counter-enthusiasm—and of what we might call a 
subsequent liberal enthusiasm, focused on the intersubjective role of language in linking 
otherwise isolated subjectivities at once to the natural world and to the thoughts and reasons of 
the other.  
* 
6. Lockean rationalization and enlightenment 
 This chapter has devoted most of its space to reading with Locke—to unpacking his 
theories of signification and hermeneutics as they bear on the seventeenth-century crisis of 
spiritual authority which gives rise to the discourse of enthusiasm. That said, it is certainly 
possible to read him less generously than I have here.392 Above all, readers surely ought not to 
pretend that Locke can get away with relying on reason for every point in his philosophy except, 
apparently, the existence of God. He asks in his epistemology a that special and unique status be 
afforded to God—a “Real Existence” which is beyond reasonable interrogation.393 Similarly, 
Locke asks us in his exegeses of the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles to grant the revealed 
nature of the scriptures—a point which he appears willing to doubt himself at points in the Essay, 
as when he suggests that accepting the miraculous status of scripture itself requires a miracle (i.e., 
one must be oneself inspired to know that these particular words were inspired).394 Locke’s 
Socinian reputation, and his influence on Deism, are both, of course, well known from the work 
of John Marshall and others.395 And a modern reader will have little trouble finding, as did the 
Bishop Stillingfleet, many points in the Essay that appear to undermine religious authority. I have 
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perspective on the world. It’s not an accident—though he nowhere registers his own awareness of this 
significance—that he chooses gold as the object of his investigations of substance. Nor is it an accident that the 
mixed modes his Adam coins name a husband’s suspicion of a wife’s infidelity and the crime of infidelity itself. For a 
classic—but also deeply contested—account of Locke’s role in establishing the theoretical bourgeois individual, see 
C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962). 
For a classic account of his role in establishing bourgois patriarchy, see Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract 
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393 Essay, 4.1.7. 
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not emphasized these fissures in Locke’s work, not because I don’t think they’re there, but 
because I find that they are compatible with the hermeneutics constitutive of the emergence of 
rationalization in response to the pressure of the question of enthusiasm. In this sense, they 
comprise certain persistent contradictions in post-enthusiastic arrangements of subject, self, and 
nature—which Locke, in his political theology, attempts, heroically but imperfectly, to harmonize.  
 There has been a scholarly tendency in the last thirty years has been to deemphasize 
Locke as the spearhead of enlightenment and instead locate enlightenment in longer arcs of 
secularity. Scholars have emphasized a consistency of enlightenment—a devotion to republican, 
atheist, materialist principles. Thus the Machiavelli-Hobbes-Spinoza enlightenment articulated, 
albeit in brilliant and carefully differentiated ways, by J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner; and 
the related “Low Countries first” view of enlightenment advocated, again in quite different ways, 
by the historians Margaret Jacobs and Jonathan Israel.396 One might add that Leo Strauss is a 
complementary advocate of this broad historical view, although instead of endorsing the most 
consistently secular thinkers as the bearers of this tradition he argues that those who seem 
inconsistent—such as Locke, who is a sort of locus classicus for Strauss’ thesis—were not, in reality. 
They were atheists. They were secularists. But they were forced to hide these views and code 
them in their writings—which were designed to be read one way by the masses, and another way 
by the learned few.397  
 I hope the work of this chapter has been to complement rather than dismiss this work, 
which has been so long dominant for a reason. I do hope to relocate Locke to the beginning of 
what we call enlightenment—but not out of any simple celebratory impulse. I find that his 
contradictions define him, and define the subsequent movement to which our social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003); Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008); See the discussion of Israel in the Epilogue below. 
397 See the discussion of Strauss in Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought 
From Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages (New York: Verso, 2011), 5 ff. 
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arrangements owe so much. One can see in Locke, more clearly perhaps than in any other 
thinker considered in this project, the characteristic turn of enlightenment at once toward 
rationalization and toward a new sort of intermodality. He separates the parts of discourse. And 
yet they come together, quite literally in eschatological twists, at his beginnings and ends. In this 
rhythm of rationalization and intermodality, in which the strands of the rope of modernity are 
pulled apart, examined, and twisted back together, is the deep rhythm of scholarly practice, of 
institutional self-examination, and perhaps of life within capitalism—where, much like Locke’s 
language user one is at once an autonomous Adam capable of self-definition, and one of the 
myriad children of Adam born into old and deep systems of conventional signification. One is 
both an arbiter and subject to arbitration. This is also, of course, the rhythm of crisis—of the 
moment when the separate parts of production, abstracted and differentiated as autonomous 
parts, smack back into one another—recognizing, horror-struck, that they are not differentiated 
at all, but absolutely interdependent.  
 I don’t mean to drift too far from the point at hand—though it is important, I think, to 
suggest the breadth of the implications of what might seem like a quite recondite chapter in 
intellectual history: the relation of Locke’s theory of signification to his theory of hermeneutics. I 
hope finally to suggest that Locke’s arbitrary word, which (as Aarsleff knows and shows) he 
bequeaths to the dominant strain of subsequent linguistic theory, is created in a profound 
struggle with the problem of popular spiritual authority enabled by an essentialist understanding 
of the Adamic word. The marks of Locke’s bias are still very much with us. They can be heard, I 
wish to suggest—and as I have addressed more fully in my introduction—in the rejections of 
essentialism, and the celebrations of performativity, that dominate the academic discourse 
concerning language. Cautiously, fully aware of the compromises involved in this line of thinking, 
it is worth investigating further the degree to which radical political positions, and meaningful 
political change, have been associated with what we might call “essentialist” attitudes toward 
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language—where words are felt to convey a power all their own, at once dependent on speakers 
and their situations and reaching beyond that particular voice to a—at least perceived—larger 
truth communicable to a larger audience. And likewise, it is worth considering the degree to 
which a determined insistence on contextualizing meaning, on pinning it to particular persons in 
particular situations, has been part of a larger effort, visible from the long view of history, to 
silence popular voices as soon as they learn and speak the vocabulary of power in terms of which, 


















5. SWIFT’S TWO ENTHUSIASMS 
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       …the Poet shall be burlesque’d upon with his  
       own doggrel ryhms… 
.           - Erasmus398 
 
1. A Woman’s Hair 
 Following Jonathan Swift’s death in 1745, a strange object was found in a drawer of his 
writing desk—an envelope, on which was written, “Only a woman’s hair.”399 Tucked inside was, 
as advertised, a lock of hair. Swift’s biographers, from Walter Scott forward, have assumed that 
the lock belonged to Esther Johnson, known from her correspondence with Swift as Stella, with 
whom he had a lifelong, enigmatic, not-quite romance.400 Scott, in first publishing this anecdote, 
wrote: “If Stella was dead, as is most probable, when Swift laid apart this memorial, the motto is 
an additional instance of his striving to veil the most bitter feelings under the guise of cynical 
indifference.”401  
 Following Scott’s publication of the anecdote, many have latched on to this image of 
Swift’s movingly failed cynicism. But in doing so, they tend to bring out an aspect of the 
memento Scott doesn’t emphasize: its more general religious significance. For example, when 
Eyre Crowe, the German-British historical painter, exhibited at the Royal Arts Academy a widely 
admired portrait of the bereaved Swift inscribing the envelope, he paired it with a depiction of 
Luther nailing the 95 Theses to the church door in Wittenberg, as though marking two 
milestones in the privatization of faith.402 And in a rapturous poem titled, “Only a Woman’s Hair,” 
Lewis Carroll compared Swift’s “relic” to the hair of the woman who kisses and anoints Jesus’ 
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Kathryn Summerwill. See eyrecrowe.com/pictures/1860s/dean-swift-looking-at-a-lock-of-stellas-hair/ 
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feet with ointment in the Gospel of Luke: “And still she bathes the sacred feet with tears, / And 
wipes them with her hair.”403  
 “Only a woman’s hair.” Surely not only. I want to suggest, with Crowe and Carroll, that 
this moment is an example of a conspicuously failed desire to despiritualize—or, if you prefer 
Max Weber’s term, to disenchant—the material traces of his deceased friend. The phrase seems 
to want to reduce Stella—and, by extension, “woman,” and perhaps “the human”—to mere 
matter, and at the same time, it seems to want to be seen failing to rid this private human residue 
of the spirit that haunts it. In appearing to attempt to wring from this relic its significance, Swift 
draws this significance out. This is the torque of the inscription. It is a conspicuously failed 
attempt at materialist reduction, which captures something more than material about the object 
of its conspicuous failure. 
 And this, I will suggest in this chapter, is one quality, beneath and beyond his more 
obvious anti-sectarian engagements, that Swift brings to the discourse of enthusiasm. I will argue 
in this chapter that Swift has two approaches to enthusiasm. Both are what we could call satirical. 
That is, both depend upon the effects of literary irony, and both exploit the gap, at once obvious 
and famously enigmatic in Swift’s work, between his personae (the range of anonymous and 
pseudonymous fools, gulls, wise men, conmen, and so on, that he inhabits in his writings) and his 
person, Dean Swift of St. Patrick’s, Dublin.404 But these two satirical modes do very different 
things. The first, which I will call his polemical satire of enthusiasm, works through travesty. That 
is, it works through undermining, in various ingenious ways, the dignity of the enthusiasts who 
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are the objects of his satire. We will see a few of examples of this—largely drawn from A Tale of a 
Tub, his astonishing early satirical allegory of Christian history, and the brilliantly engineered 
literary hoax known as the Bickerstaff Papers, which I argue should be read as a sequel to the Tale, 
extending his polemical travesty of enthusiasm from the virtual fields of literature to actual social 
reality. The second mode, which is perhaps more unexpected, but which I want to claim is 
ultimately just as important for understanding Swift and his place in the literary history of 
secularization, I will call Swift’s prophetic satire of enthusiasm. This satire, like the polemical, 
operates through the ironic inhabitation of personae. But it works not to travesty the object of 
satire—however much it appears to want to do this—but to transfigure this object. In this 
second satirical mode, irony creates a space for ineffable connection between author, reader, and 
text, on the basis of a conspicuous failure to despiritualize the object around which these 
rhetorical positions are situated. In the terms we have used so far in this study, this second form 
of satire is thus intermodal—concerned with the mixing and balancing of emphases or stresses 
within the complex act of signifying.  
 It is worth laying out what I mean by this in some detail at the outset. We have seen how 
Henry More’s approach to enthusiasm ultimately finds purchase in the question of where the 
body—or, more generally, abstract embodiment—is located in the theorization of the word. 
More projects through the figure of the enthusiast an allegory of language that locates incarnation 
with the prophetic utterer—the speaker or writer of demotic prophecy—rather than with the 
historical Incarnation of Jesus, the divine word made human flesh. He proposes to restore this 
divine word to the center of language, and to conceive of proper language users—that is, true 
Christians—as participating mindfully and transparently in this miracle rather than idolatrously 
recreating it in their own immanent speech situations. Locke, two decades later and equally 
responsive to the problems of enthusiasm as he sees them, takes a different approach to the 
situation of embodiment vis-à-vis language. On one hand, he reframes the enthusiastic centrality 
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of the utterer pathologized by More, arguing that each speaker or writer retains the Adamic right 
to coin new words. Locke thus prefers to recognize the centrality of the first rather than the 
second Adam in the counter-enthusiastic theorization of language. But he maintains that, given 
one’s inevitably recent situation in the long line of language coiners, this should be understood as 
a trivial rather than a significant charism. Further, he distinguishes—with unprecedented 
precision and revolutionary consequences—between two major categories of words. Some words 
represent mixed modes—that is, complex associations of things; in these cases, the significant 
body must be understood as the first coiner of a given mixture, the first person to put together, 
say, the notions of “murder” and “father” and coin the word “parricide.” Other words represent 
approximate understandings of the properties of natural objects which are not yet (and perhaps 
can never be) plumbed to the bottom; in such cases, the significant body is the natural object 
itself, known in full only to the creator of all things. Thus Locke distributes embodiment—
significant incarnation—between physical nature and conventional society, with some words 
tethered to the one, and other words to the other sphere.  
 Swift, as we will see, does something quite different. Once again, he proposes a 
retheorization of signification that is centrally responsive to the problems of enthusiasm. Once 
again, this retheorization displays the signature double structure of the discourse of enthusiasm in 
general: it refutes enthusiasts with one hand while engineering viable versions of their 
purportedly radical views with the other. But he solves the problem of enthusiasm in a very 
different manner than either More or Locke. Put simply, he prefers ironies to reasons. In his 
polemical satire of enthusiasm, he displays an awareness of the dependent structure of counter-
enthusiastic rationalists on so-called enthusiastic radicals—and in this display of awareness finds a 
new polemical weapon in the struggle to change and fix prophetic signification. He thus centers 
the significance of the discourse of enthusiasm not in the doctrinal battle of dissenting utterer 
and Incarnate Word, or in a semiotic distinction between social convention and natural physics, 
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but in the author’s virtuosic ability both to be and not to be a signifying body—both to speak 
with a clarity rivaling divinity, and to disappear into pseudonymity, irony, and silence. In his 
prophetic satire, then, he exploits the ironies inherent to written (rather than spoken) expression, 
floating the prophetic body, as it were, between the contrary-pulling forces of text, reader, and 
author. To rely once more on the vocabulary of rationalization and language, he transposes into a 
new discursive register the epistemological-ontological distinction of self, thing, and other which 
(as I have argued) is a central upshot of the reaction to popular prophetic authority. He invites 
you to join him on this plane of indeterminate signification—partly as a polemical strategy of 
diversion (so that you won’t do something awful like propose some new project for fixing the ills 
of church, state, or society), and partly for the spectral company.  
 I will further suggest that in this second form of the satire of enthusiasm—the prophetic 
satire—Swift offers a valuable model for what Talal Asad and others have invited us to call 
“post-secularity,” though my chapter will further suggest, as Asad does too, that the “post” in 
that conceptual formation is an overstatement, as enlightenment literary affects and genres such 
as those stemming from Swift have always been profoundly invested in retaining a space for what 
we might call ineffability—a space for transfiguration.  
* 
2. Becoming the Enthusiast 
 But first, it is important to account briefly for some of the tectonic shifts in the discourse 
of enthusiasm between Locke and Swift. We have seen in the discussion of the Cambridge 
Platonists in Chapter Three how the counter-enthusiastic project of despiritualization, designed 
to preserve spiritual authority from base usurpers, finds a conceptual ally in a provisional 
materialism that they might at once project outward through the philosophical enthusiast’s 
eyes—declaring various thinkers and schools to be Epicurean materialists—and at the same time 
project into political enthusiasts’ humoral psychology—declaring various disestablishment 
 195	  
movements symptomatic of disordered spleens. We have seen that Locke abandons this 
emphasis on the humors, instead focusing on the theory of language that empowers enthusiastic 
language—the Adamic theory of the word. He concedes that present speakers participate in 
Adam’s spiritual gift of naming, but he spreads this gift so thin that it ceases to mean anything 
special in any given case. In other words, in order to rob enthusiasts of their prophetic power, he 
proposes that everyone is potentially an enthusiast—and that enthusiasts are merely headstrong 
or bullying ordinary language users, who either lazily believe that the voices in their heads come 
from God, or invent such voices in order to manipulate others.  
 Both of these counter-enthusiasts thus model themselves on those they wish to diagnose 
as dangerous and deranged: they provisionally adapt materialism and universalize Adamism. But, 
crucially, they also assiduously reserve a place for true religion which enthusiasm cannot touch. 
More emphasizes the historical reality of the Incarnation. Locke defends the core message of the 
Gospels. They imagine their counter-enthusiastic philosophies as defending the heart of 
Christianity from demotic incursions. At the same time, on the whole, given that a doctrinally 
minimalist Protestantism dominated the Established Church of England for the next two 
centuries (albeit flexing now toward dissenting, now toward Catholic spirituality), it seems as 
though these efforts and the similar efforts of many broadly like-minded counter-enthusiastic 
theological philosophers were not in vain.405  
 However, the ironic appropriative nature of counter-enthusiasm—namely, the degree to 
which counter-enthusiasms adapt the positions they appear to be dismissing—did not pass 
unnoticed in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the decades between the 
publication of Locke’s Essay and Swift’s Tale, this observation becomes increasingly important. 
As already mentioned, the enthusiasms of Henry More are almost proverbial in the decades 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 For an excellent account of Locke’s theology and its long influence, see Nicholas Woltersdorff, “Locke’s 
Philosophy of Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, edited by Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 172-198. 
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following his own era—as Shaftesbury puts it in 1709, More “was perhaps as great an Enthusiast 
as any of those, whom he wrote against”—and his balancing of enthusiasm and anti-enthusiasm 
remains a common starting point for intellectual historians contemplating his legacy.406 Locke’s 
affiliation with enthusiasm is less well-known today—but it was widely debated, if often in proxy 
terms, during the very early eighteenth century, when the question of the degree to which his 
thought might be secretly Socinian (that is, Unitarian or at least non-Trinitarian), or might have 
encouraged the open Socianian Deism of writers like John Toland and Anthony Collins (who 
openly professed admiration for Locke’s philosophy and were indeed closely acquainted with him 
personally) engaged, most famously, Bishop Stillingfleet’s careful attention, and prompted much 
speculation beyond that well-known correspondence.407 Anti-Trinitarianisms—whether Socinian, 
Deist, or of another sort—are often considered views very much opposed to enthusiasm. Where 
the one is cold, the other is warm; where the one is overly rational, the other is overly emotional; 
etc. But while to a large degree this contrast is true of Continental Catholic considerations of the 
contrast—which are frequently comfortable opposing a true enthusiasm, wherein reason is 
subject to faith, to a Socinianism destructive of all religion—English counter-enthusiasms 
generally see the two as foundationally linked.408 We’ve seen how central this connection is to 
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many of the Doctrines of Socinus, and his Followers.” See Milner, An account of Mr. Lock's religion, out of his own writings, 
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minds, with Locke arguing that words are “reserved for the understanding” and Stillingfleet insisting that they must 
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408 For an example of the continental defense of a minimal enthusiasm against Socinianism, see H.C. de Luzancy, A 
conference between an orthodox Christian and a Socinian in four dialogues: wherein the late distinction of a real and nominal Trinitarian 
is considered (London, 1698), 120 ff. For a clear and thorough example of the English conflation of Socinianism and 
enthusiasm, see Francis Fullwood, A parallel wherein it appears that the Socinian agrees with the papist, if not exceeds him in 
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More’s counter-enthusiasm—particularly in its final formulation in the Explanation—which is 
finally premised on the enthusiast’s denial of the Incarnation and hence his self-idolatry. In this 
context, considerations of Locke’s Socinianism carried suggestions that this thinker, too, was 
potentially an enthusiast. 
 My point is finally quite simple. Those who opposed enthusiasm on philosophical 
grounds tempted others to accuse them of being themselves enthusiasts. (And this is true not 
only of English thinkers like Hobbes, More, and Locke, but—even more so—of French counter-
enthusiasts like Descartes and Malebranche.)409 There are a number of reasons for this. 
Enthusiasm was, as discussed in my first two chapters, a powerful polemical term. Most basically, 
“enthusiast” was thrown around much like “communist,” “fascist,” “reactionary,” “terrorist,” 
and other treason-denoting terms in similarly heated discourses of recent centuries, as an 
unanswerable smear largely independent of any particular context—even while responsive to 
deeply meaningful structural anxieties regarding legitimation and authority. But beyond its 
polemical usefulness, the discourse of enthusiasm operated largely via the provisional imitation of 
the enthusiastic target. Effective counter-enthusiasms abandon the heresy paradigm and accept 
the idea that the problem called enthusiasm—unlicensed hermeneutic access to the legitimating 
source of worldly authority—is not going back into Pandora’s box. In order to defeat this 
particular threat, one had to indulge it—become it, generalize it, historicize it, situate it into a 
newly sharpened epistemology distinguishing self, others, and nature, and, in general, take it as an 
occasion for the redescription of the basic parameters of human nature. This is not to say, of 
course, that one had to actually believe what a Familist or Quaker or Baptist believed. But one 
had to loop one’s theory of rationality through a figure generalized from these sectarian examples, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
idolatry, antiscripturism and fanaticism (1693), 24-28. See also Heyd, 234, for a discussion of the ways in which 
Shaftesbury inspired conservative polemics to link deism and enthusiasm. 
409 For a good summary of Descartes’ reputation as an enthusiast, see Heyd, 107-44. Malebranche, as a Cartesian, 
shared this reputation—and indeed for many expanded it. Malebranche’s example prompted William Molyneux to 
ask Locke to add a chapter on philosophical enthusiasm to the Essay, which he subsequently did in the fourth edition 
of 1700. See Molyneux to Locke, April 18, 1693, in de Beer. 
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a figure comprised of the common elements of Familist-ness, Quaker-ness, Baptist-ness, etc. One 
had to project through this abstract heretic of heretics a new common reasonableness 
comfortable with and conformable to legitimate authority. One had to know—and hence, 
provisionally, to become—not any given enthusiast, but the enthusiast. 
 For the philosophical discourse of enthusiasm, then, there is a danger—even a 
necessity—of self-replication. The hunter becomes the game. But for Jonathan Swift, to whom 
we now return, this danger is recast as a literary advantage. He embraces enthusiasm’s viral 
nature—proliferating its capacity to proliferate itself. This is the essence of his polemical satire of 
enthusiasm—his travestying satire.  
* 
3. Swift’s Travestying Satire 
 By way of introducing at once the subject and the effect of Swift’s polemical satire of 
enthusiasm, consider the following summary from Marcus Walsh’s recent edition of the Tale: 
 In all of Swift’s anti-sectarian satire the major target is enthusiasm, the fallacious  
 claim to the individual gifts of the Holy Spirit: visions, prophecies, a Pentecostal
 Babel of languages, delusive claims to inspiration and inward illumination, driven  by 
winds and airs, hydraulic and pneumatic promptings mostly from below, to  which the minds 
and bodies of the zealot, male and especially female, are well  adapted and receptive.410 
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For those who haven’t read the Tale lately, Walsh’s remarks call to mind Section VIII, where the 
Tale-teller departs from the story’s main thread to describe the “Learned Æolists,” that is, devotees 
of the wind god, Aeolus, who literally puff each other full of “Spirit,” in the form of sour and 
mucus-intincted belches.411 This is an outrageous send-up of those—mostly, again, Quakers—
who claim to know God through the movement of spirit. What I want to notice, however, is not 
so much Walsh’s basic claim (that enthusiasm is central to Swift’s anti-sectarian satire, which is 
certainly correct) but the way he makes it. He begins close to what we might call facts. The 
enthusiast claims “the individual gifts of the Holy Spirit” including access to “visions” and 
“prophecies.” He then veers nearer to polemic. The enthusiast speaks “a Pentecostal Babel of 
languages.” And finally he simply reproduces directly the Tale’s satirical etiology of enthusiasm: 
the  “winds and airs,” the “hydraulic and pneumatic promptings mostly from below,” the bodily 
receptiveness of the “zealot, male and especially female.” In the course of one long sentence, 
Walsh has allowed Swift to ventriloquize him—to steer his attention from the theological subject 
at hand to the array of comic-materialist vehicles Swift uses both to figure and to undermine that 
subject—hydraulic promptings, winds and airs, and so on. I don’t mean to suggest that Walsh 
doesn’t know that there’s a difference between Swift’s enthusiasts and the actual Presbyterians, 
Baptists, and Quakers whom Swift was sending up. Of course he does. But I would submit that 
he likely doesn’t much care. Like so many readers of the Tale, he prefers Swift’s Aeolist’s to 
history’s Quakers.  
 This is the way that Swift’s polemical satire of enthusiasm tends to work. He recognizes 
that enthusiasm is less a theological category or medical condition than a circuit of allusions 
reinforced by generic expectations which can be turned to advantage. In other words, he 
recognizes that—however assiduous thinkers like More and Locke have been in taxonomizing 
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and situating the enthusiast in larger philosophical considerations of ontology and 
epistemology—enthusiasm is already, and in a sense always has been, a literary strategy.  
 And like all literary forms, the discourse of enthusiasm is rooted in what we might call a 
common illusion of reality. We have discussed the role of the discourse of enthusiasm in shifting 
this common illusion—largely through changing the common understanding of the mediating 
role of language in the understanding of the categories of self, society, and nature. The figure of 
the enthusiast inspires a new social theory of language. Enthusiasts are variously depicted as 
those who have no control over their language (who are thus at the mercy of their disordered 
physiology, having surrendered their human right to reason), as those who control others 
through their language (using rhetorical fascination to overcome people’s stable sense of reality), 
as those who believe implicitly that their own bodies are the final signified in the allegory of 
language (as More argues), as those who treat their ordinary inheritance of the Adamic gift of 
naming as though it marks them as special vessels of divine news (as Locke argues). They jumble 
self, group, and natural world—and demonstrate the necessity of clarifying these categories. To 
put my account plainly: 1) the vernacular Bible and lay hermeneut represent real threat to the 
feudal legitimation schema; 2) the figure of the enthusiast is cobbled from heresiological, medical, 
philosophical, and literary sources to understand, manage, and appropriate this threat; 3) in so 
doing, the enthusiast helps facilitate—or, better, helps bring to early bud—the distinction of 
validity domains central to the process called rationalization.  
 The weak point in this process is clearly the second—in which the enthusiast plays a role 
between fact and fiction, history and fantasy. Those called enthusiasts, as we’ve seen, strongly 
object to the label, claiming that they are being misrepresented, made into irrational monsters, 
and so on, when they are in fact perfectly aware of what they are about, and perfectly consistent 
with Christian theology—indeed, much more consistent than the establishment figures whose 
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power allegedly depends on taking such theology seriously.412 And of course they are right to level 
these claims. The enthusiast is a monstrous, fictional, polysemous abstraction, not, say, a Quaker 
(itself already a polemicized term for a member of the Society of Friends), let alone any given 
Quaker. In hindsight, writing from an era when the theological insights of the Society of Friends 
have been adapted by Catholics, Anglicans, etc., this is only too obvious. 
 Swift recognizes this weakness and, rather than avoid it (as Locke does) or justify it (as 
More does), pours everything he has into it. Thus his polemical satire assumes a relationship to 
that common reality such that, carefully managed, it avoids counter-enthusiasm’s philosophical 
problems while realizing counter-enthusiasm’s polemical aims. More misrepresents Quakers and 
(as we saw in the Introduction) Anne Conway objects. But Swift cannot possibly misrepresent 
Aeolists. Instead of even attempting to hook his polemic up with the empirical world, as it were, 
he sticks to virtuality, representing an enthusiastic narrator representing a ludicrous sect of 
enthusiasts. Thus he overcomes—even embraces—the contradiction in the provisional 
inhabitation of philosophical enthusiasm in order to combat political enthusiasm. Swift recasts 
the philosophical enthusiast as the author position itself, and the political enthusiast as the subject 
of his satire. He makes the discourse of enthusiasm about the problems of representation, and he 
leverages a new sort of authority from the ironic communication of this metageneric awareness.  
 For example, consider this passage from the satire of the Aeolists in A Tale of a Tub. This 
is one of the digressions in the Tale, during which the narrator—himself a self-confessed 
Epicurean Atomist (that is, in More’s terms, a philosophical enthusiast)—travesties the Aeolist’s 
claims to divine inspiration: 
 [S]ome Authors maintain these Æolists to have been very anctent in the World. 
 Because, the Delivery of their Mysteries, which I have just now mention’d, appears 
 exactly the same with that of other antient Oracles, whose Inspirations were owing   
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 to certain subterraneous Effluviums of Wind delivered with the same Pain to the Priest [i.e. 
 the priest receives the effluvium through the bowels], and much about the same Influence 
 on the People. It is true indeed, that these were frequently managed and directed by 
 Female Officers, whose Organs were understood to be better disposed for the Admission 
 of those Oracular Gusts, as entering and passing up through a Receptacle of greater 
 Capacity, and causing also a Pruriency by the Way, such as with due Management, has 
 been refined from Carnal into a Spiritual Exstasie.413 
A few obvious features of Swift’s approach here are worth pointing out. First, he travesties all 
claims to spiritual authority, refusing to associate his objects with the Bible (or even, as John 
Taylor did in his earlier Tale of a Tub, with the apocrypha) and instead paganizing them. He thus 
immediately casts them as false prophets. Further, he grotesquely feminizes the Aeolists—and 
this is usually taken to be a mockery of Quakers. But there is more than one sort of allusion 
going on here. As the discussion in Chapter Two has helped prepare, Swift is far from the first to 
introduce these paganizing and feminizing strains to the discourse. They are there for instance in 
More: “Enthusiasts for the most part are intoxicated with vapours from the lowest region of their 
Body, as the Pythia of old are conceived to have been inspired through the power of certain 
exhalations breathed from those caverns they had their recess in.”414 And in fact one can trace 
this comparison back further. A particularly grotesque example appears, for example, in Johann 
Weyer’s De praestigiis daemonum (1563), a work famous for arguing (in a striking prefiguration of 
the discourse of enthusiasm) that what were called witches should be thought of instead as 
melancholiacs: 
 [I]n one way only did the demon issue his pronouncements from the Pythian 
 women at Delphi: from the private parts, after the thighs had been spread apart. 
 Indeed Tertullian, an author of the utmost gravity, affirms that he saw women 
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 ‘belly-talkers,’ from whose pudenda (as they remained seated) a small voice was 
 stirred which responded to the questioners.415 
From Swift to More to Weyer to Tertullian—a tissue of allusions and references supports this 
heresiographical chain of false prophets, feminine and material, pagan and idolatrous, 
promiscuously open to the earth, ventriloquized—and ventriloquism means, literally, “belly-
talking”—by the swirling vapors of nature.416  
 Swift’s innovation, as a participant in this long counter-prophetic chain of references, is 
to admit—to confess indirectly—that his own voice too is a textual ventriloquization. Where 
earlier authors are at pains to insist upon the earnestness and seriousness of their testimonials, 
Swift’s narrator constantly signals his unreliability—his enthusiasm. “The delivery of their 
mysteries,” he insists, “appears exactly the same with that of other ancient oracles.” And in this 
“exactly” one feels the force of an enthusiastic discovery. Everything is connected. The Aeolists 
are exactly like the Quakers are exactly like the Witches are exactly like the Sybils are exactly like 
the Aeolists. This is the lure of philosophical enthusiasm—to discover, with Mr. Casaubon, the 
key to all mythologies. And, as I’ve suggested, it’s the Achilles heel of the official discourse of 
enthusiasm—that in order to diagnose one sort of enthusiasm, one must entertain another. In 
order to call out a false prophet, one must insist that oneself is a true prophet. Swift finds a way 
around this problem. He reproduces philosophical enthusiasm not unconsciously, not despite 
himself, but purposefully, noticing and reinforcing its resonance with the general problem of 
authorial reliability. Thus he finds an ironic backdoor to the representation of authorial sanity. 
Swift wants us to recognize that he wants us to recognize that his narrator is a lunatic.   
 Swift’s polemical, travestying satire, in short, totally refuses to play the game of spiritual 
authority toe-to-toe with his opponents. He doesn’t care about the facticity or falsity of their 
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actual claims. He doesn’t care about the facticity or falsity of his actual claims. He creates a new 
form of polemical authority through the force of authorial self-awareness. His persona confesses 
his own enthusiasm—and in so confessing, distinguishes itself as a front for a perspective worthy 
of the reader’s trust. 
 These confessions of philosophical enthusiasm are quite clear in the text. The narrator 
regularly alludes to himself as a Lucretian Modern.417 He charmingly admits this at a number of 
points, as when he writes, “I my self, the Author of these momentous Truths, am a Person, 
whose imaginations are hard-mouth’d, and exceedingly disposed to run away with his Reason, 
which I have observed from long Experience, to be a very light Rider, and easily shook off.”418 
Of course the philosophical enthusiast who knows himself to be such is not such. He has 
escaped. He is perspicuous. And this is, to put it simply, the insight at the heart of Swift’s 
counter-enthusiasm.  
 Swift himself remains outside of this process—behind three or four layers of voices and 
at least as many bracketing textual conceits. It is worth recalling that A Tale of a Tub is a textual 
onion—opening with an Advertisement; an Apology; a Dedication by the Bookseller; an Address 
to the Reader by the Bookseller; a Dedicatory Epistle to His Royal Highness, Prince Posterity; a 
Preface; and a Philosophical Introduction on the Pulpit, the Ladder, and the Stage; before finally 
arriving at the central narrative. This is a heavily buffered tale. Indeed, the one place in the Tale 
where he loses his otherwise impeccable control of tone is in the Apology of the 1704 fifth 
edition, when responding to a number of contemporary charges of sacrilege leveled at earlier 
printings.419 The voice protests, “[T]here generally runs an Irony through the Thread of the whole 
Book, which the Men of Tast will observe and distinguish, and which will render some 
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Objections that have been made, very weak and insignificant.”420 Through the whole Book, I’d 
say, less this one sentence. 
 Swift’s use of Lucretius is also important to mention as it works within his larger counter-
enthusiastic strategy. Swift lards his text with interjections, confessions, digressions, and abundant 
citations from Thomas Creech’s 1684 translation of Lucretius. It is documented that Swift read 
De Rerum Natura at least three times while writing the Tale.421 Some recent critics of Swift’s work, 
including (most powerfully) Laura Baudot, have focused attention Swift’s allusions to Lucretius, 
arguing that Swift is much closer to endorsing Epicurean materialism—or at least finding in it a 
philosophically serious and potentially terrifying vision of the world totally sapped of spiritual 
meaning—than had been previously supposed.422 While such hints of dread are certainly 
detectable in Swift—for instance in the inscription with which this chapter began, and in the 
more personal writings with which this chapter will close—as they work in the Tale these 
Lucretian allusions tend to reinforce the central concern of the discourse of enthusiasm with the 
theoretical disfiguration of human language as a medium capable of transmitting spiritual 
authority—and disfigured in the cosmic mimetic sense discussed in the introduction: denied the 
capacity to bear the figuration of meaning symbolized in the typological relation to of humanity 
to the Word of God.423 Consider his description of Aeolists’ mode of apostolic transmission: 
[A]fter certain Gripings, the Wind and Vapours issuing forth; having first by their 
Turbulence and Convulsions within, caused an Earthquake in Man’s little World; 
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distorted the Mouth, bloated the Cheeks, and gave the Eyes a terrible kind of Relievo. At 
which Junctures, all their Belches were received for Sacred, the Sourer the better, and 
swallowed with infinite Consolation by their meager Devotees. And to render these yet 
more compleat, because the Breath of Man’s Life is in his Nostrils, therefore, the choicest, 
most edifying, and most enlivening Belches, were very wisely conveyed thro’ that Vehicle 
to give them a Tincture as they passed.424 
The passage of sour air “through the nose,” a frequent motif in parodies of Puritanism, gives 
these belches “a tincture” — as though they weren’t quite material enough already. Tincture, it is 
important to mention, is a key word for the practice of alchemy, and thus for polemical 
comparisons of enthusiasts both to mad alchemists and to alchemical experiments in 
themselves—volatile mixtures of chemistry. This is, I think, in addition to an allusion to these 
familiar counter-enthusiastic motifs, also a play on Lucretius’ notion that matter gives off “films,” 
which the sense organs receive as a series of vanishingly thin layers of data.425 Here these films 
become literal coatings of mucus transmitting not knowledge but just themselves—their own 
mucous essence. Swift also plays with the materialist blending of externality and internality. The 
Aeolists suffer earthquakes—the ground shakes through them. These enthusiasts are little worlds 
not in the sense of microcosmos, which would see the world ordered in symbolic patterns within 
and without, but as mere continuity with nature. 
 Swift’s Lucretian handling of unlicensed pretentions to participation in Logos is still 
clearer in his speculations on why lay preachers ascend pulpits to preach. He writes:  
  The deepest Account, and the most fairly digested of any I have yet met  
 with, is this, That Air being a heavy Body, and therefore (according to the System  
 of Epicurus) continually descending, must needs be more so, when loaden and  
 press’d down by Words; which are also Bodies of much Weight and Gravity, as it  
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 is manifest from those deep Impressions they make and leave upon us; and therefore must 
 be delivered from a due Altitude, or else they will neither carry a good Aim, nor fall down 
 with sufficient Force. 
  AND I am the readier to favour this Conjecture from a common  
 Obsrvation: that in the several Assemblies of these Orators, Nature it self hath 
 instructed the Hearers, to stand with their Mouths open, and erected parallel to the 
 Horizon, so as they may be intersected by a perpendicular Line from the Zenith to the 
 Center of the Earth. In which Position, if the Audience be well compact, every one 
 carries home a Share, and little or nothing is lost.426 
Tagged to this is a quotation from Book Four of De Rerum Natura: “’Tis certain, then, that Voice that 
thus can wound / Is all Material; Body every Sound.”427 What is most interesting about this passage—
beyond its obvious travestying of enthusiastic aspirations to the Word of God by substituting for 
Christian Logos the Lucretian material word—is that Swift won’t give his auditors ears. Instead, 
they catch words in their mouths. This might be a sly way of winking at the fact that Dissenters 
were often punished with the removal of their organs of hearing. Indeed, the voice of the Tale 
alludes to his intention to write a “General History of Ears” for precisely this reason.428 But it 
also turns the audience into a bunch of worms, into beings of pure digestion, perhaps into 
bookworms. It renders the supposedly inspired language of the preacher not just tactile, but 
subject to the grossest sense. 
 In this way, as has often been noticed of the Tale, language is treated as a purely written, 
purely material entity. One might be tempted, perhaps recalling Jacques Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence, to celebrate this dimension of the Tale—its refusal to locate language 
within any given speaker, and thus to free it from the chains of power that determine who is 
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listened to and who is not.429 But this Derridean perspective ultimately misses the context of 
power and representation in which Swift’s Tale participates. Swift turns the enthusiastic utterer 
into a being of writing—a spectral thing of ink and paper. But this is not emancipatory. On the 
contrary, Swift’s travestying satire of enthusiasm removes those called enthusiasts from the public 
sphere. It replaces actual dissenters who have actual grievances with virtual replicas taken to be in 
some way satirically accurate—replicas which overshadow and distort the living voices, ears, and 
bodies of those called enthusiasts. The refusal of presence is, at least in this case, the triumph of 
caricature.  
 That said, the rearticulation of enthusiasm as a purely literary problem of virtual 
representation, which can be resolved via purely literary means, is one of Swift’s most important 
discoveries. It is also one of the key conditions for the emergence of what we might recognize as 
the enlightenment style in general—the perspicuous style wherein the author’s body seems to 
dissolve, and the writing hand to disappear into a witty, arch, half-insincere imitation of the voice 
from nowhere.430 And it is worth reiterating that these travestying transpositions of the back-and-
forth of living controversy into the meaningless jostling of tropes, words, figures, pages make for 
extremely effective polemical satire. Nobody near Swift’s satire is talking about “tak[ing] up the 
sword of the spirit, which is the word of God, the sword I understand and prove, that it 
signifieth Christ and his word,” and freeing the true Christians, who are in prison, and beheading 
the false ones, who sit on the thrones and the benches. Swift succeeds in diverting attention from 
actual theological, political, and linguistic issues, and redirecting it to the interpretive tangles of 
author, text, and reader. He relocates the drama of authority from the substantive to the 
metadiscursive. For Anne Conway, Quakers are more than chess pieces in the struggle for 
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authority. They are living examples of the limits of the discourse of enthusiasm. For Swift, 
Quakers are virtual objects in a struggle for representation. Their actual beliefs matter—but only 
insofar as they can be distorted, avoided, delegitimized.  
* 
4. Being Isaac Bickerstaff 
 Thus in his travestying satire of enthusiasm, Swift relocates intermodality from experience 
to textuality. Where the earlier counter-enthusiasts rearrange the coordinates of communication 
on the basis of a word imagined to be primarily oral, Swift imagines this word to be literary. He 
treats enthusiasm as a literary production—and as capable of being produced, as it were, 
involuntarily in not-astute-enough readers.  
 This upshot, implicit in A Tale of a Tub, is central to Swift’s subsequent literary-political 
project—a series of occasional writings known collectively as The Bickerstaff Papers. These 
writings—including a mock almanac, “Predictions for the Year 1708” (1708), a follow-up, “The 
Accomplishment of the First of Mr. Bickerstaff’s Predictions” (1708), and finally, “A Vindication 
of Isaac Bickerstaff Esq.” (1709)—serve to hoax the astrologer, almanac-maker, and Dissenting 
Whig John Partridge.431 Following a general excoriation of “Sottish Pretenders to Astrology” in 
the voice of Isaac Bickerstaff, a fellow astrologer who presents himself as of a higher class than 
Partridge (both professionally and financially –- he emphasizes that he does not need to earn his 
money through almanac-making), the “Predictions” observe off-hand that “Partridge the 
Almanack-maker … will infallibly dye upon the 29th of March next, about Eleven at night, of a 
raging Feaver.”432 It is worth pausing to notice that here we have another variation on the central 
authorial strategy of the discourse of enthusiasm. Swift impersonates an honest astrologer 
discrediting a dishonest astrologer—just as in a Tale he impersonates an honest (if still quite mad) 
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philosophical enthusiast discrediting a fleet of dishonest (and still madder) political enthusiasts—
just as Locke hermeneutically resuscitates an honest Paul discrediting dishonest appropriations of 
Paul—just as More provisionally inhabits Epicurean monism in order to expose the inner 
workings of Familists and Quakers. The associations of astrology with enthusiasm, though not 
emphasized in this account (at least in its present form), are presumably intuitive enough—and 
Partridge’s enthusiastic bona fides are further established when it is revealed, in the 
“Accomplishment,” that he is “a Nonconformist” with “a Fanatick Preacher” as his “Spiritual 
Guide.”433  
 In this “Accomplishment,” Swift assumes another voice—that of “a Person of Honour” 
who stops by Partridge’s house on the 29th of April only to find, to his astonishment, that 
Bickerstaff’s prediction appears to be accurate—Partridge is indeed dying of a fever.434 The 
narrator is just in time to record Partridge’s deathbed confessions. For about a fortnight, 
Partridge says, Bickerstaff’s prediction of his death had “affected and work’d on his Imagination,” 
taking “perpetual Possession of his Mind and Thoughts,” which, he is persuaded, is the “true 
Natural Cause of his present Distemper.” For, he continues, “I am thoroughly perswaded, and I 
think I have very good Reasons, that Mr. Bickerstaff spoke altogether by Guess, and knew no 
more what will happen this Year than I did my self.”435 He then provides these reasons:  
 I am a Poor Ignorant Fellow, Bred to a Mean Trade, yet I have Sense enough to  
 know that all Pretences of foretelling by Astrology are Deceits, for this manifest  
 Reason, because the Wise and the Learned, who can only know whether there by  
 any Truth in this Science, do all unanimously agree to laugh at and despise it; and  
 none but the Poor, Ignorant, Vulgar, give it any Credit, and that only upon the  
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 Word of such silly Wretches as I and my Fellows, who can hardly Write or Read.436  
Bickerstaff’s prediction, in other words, had no connection with nature aside from its prompting 
his own internally roiling worries and cares—of his own troubled imagination—which led to his 
fever. This is truly the confession of an enthusiast—a being exposing himself as a humorally 
imbalanced, over-imaginative, lower-class, conniving, cheating, aspiring illiterate fellow. It is as 
though Prophet Hunt has produced his accusers’ charges out of his own mouth. And in fact, it is 
still more complex, more elegantly travestying than that. In the “Accomplishment,” Swift inhabits 
a persona who beholds an enthusiast, Partridge, accusing the enthusiast (Bickerstaff) he formerly 
inhabited to denigrate that enthusiast of being himself a charlatan and a cheat—which he knows 
because he is, just as Bickerstaff said, a charlatan and a cheat as well. Meanwhile, Swift depicts 
Partridge not in an outwardly polemical fashion—as a raving lunatic—but sympathetically, as 
someone who is pleasantly “surprized” at the “Condescention” shown by the narrator in visiting 
him on his deathbed, who confesses modestly and plainly his sins, and who ascribes, in the end, 
to the standard of judgment Swift wishes to uphold—the veneration for literacy, wisdom, 
learning, and nobility common to those called ancients in the battle of ancients and moderns.437 
 Swift has thus turned the discourse of enthusiasm into a literary perpetual motion 
machine. He inhabits voices inhabiting voices inhabiting voices. In an unpublished addition to 
the Bickerstaff Papers, “An Answer to Bickerstaff,” Swift plays with this dimension of the hoax still 
further—pretending to be a skeptical observer of Bickerstaff’s original predictions detecting 
certain signs that Bickerstaff might be a phony. As Irvin Ehrenpreis remarks, “For its complex 
brilliance of impersonation, this Answer has never been suitably praised. Here is Swift pretending 
to be a man who sees through a man whom Swift is pretending to be.”438 As delightful as the 
“Answer” is, it is worth pointing out that he already did something like this in the 
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“Accomplishment,” where his Partridge sees through his Bickerstaff—while further confessing 
his own humoral disposition toward being affected by such ridiculous predictions—his own 
susceptibility to enthusiastic fascination.  
 The Bickerstaff hoax was very successful. On April 1—and the timing of the 
“Accomplishment” to fall just before All Fool’s Day was very much deliberate—large crowds 
gathered in front of Partridge’s house to pay their respects or to see for themselves whether 
Bickerstaff’s prediction had really come to pass. Partridge issued a furious rebuttal pointing out 
that rumors of his death had been greatly exaggerated, but this only perpetuated the hoax. Not 
only did Swift reply with another pamphlet in the guise of Bickerstaff—the “Vindication”—but 
many other writers jumped into the fray, composing additions to the controversy in all of the 
available guises and a number of new ones.439 The portability of the Bickerstaff persona soon 
outstripped the immediate hoax. The most famous appropriation was Richard Steele’s in The 
Tatler.440 Matthew Prior would write in 1720 that, in creating Bickerstaff, Swift had equipped 
Steele with an “Occasion of living seven Years upon One of yr: thoughts.”441 And this was not 
the last such borrowing of Swift’s astrological avatar. As Valerie Rumbold writes, 
“Appropriations of the Bickerstaff ‘brand’ were to prove exceptionally diverse, pervasive and 
long-lived: almanacs attributed to him were still being published in America in the nineteenth 
century.”442 
 We are well situated to perceive in Bickerstaff—a figure whose very name evokes a 
Mosaic beard, a prophetic rod, an inclination to stir up controversy—something like a true 
triumph of enthusiasm, not as a real pathology, or dangerous heresy, but as a role available for 
imitating, stepping-into, perpetuating. If A Tale of a Tub recasts counter-enthusiasm as Mennipean 
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satire, The Bickerstaff Papers recast counter-enthusiasm as pseudo-history. Bickerstaff is an ideal 
diversionary figure designed not (like the Tale) to distract readers from taking seriously the more 
ominous counter-enthusiasms of Hobbes and Toland, but to arm readers with something like his 
own insight into the basically textual nature of all the polemical squabbling over enthusiasm. 
Swift has gifted his readers and his fellow writers with a pseudonym who yearns to be seen 
through—to expose and to be exposed—and to thrive in the gap between ordinary language and 
the social world. Ehrenpreis notes that the Bickerstaff hoax “has perhaps more significance as 
social history than as literary achievement”—and it is quite clear what he means.443 This is a 
literary work that refuses to remain confined to its pages. It wants to leap out and move bodies in 
the world. It wants to prod gullible readers to venture to Partridge’s house on the morning of 
April Fool’s Day and ask whether he is still alive. It wants to encourage savvy readers to find a 
seat at the coffee house across the street (imagining there is such a place) and laugh at the queue 
of concerned almanac buyers worried about the fate of their favorite horoscopist. It has, as 
Speech-Act Theory would put it, an unusual word to world fit for a literary work—it desires, well 
before Marx, not to understand the world, but to change it.  
 But it wants to change it in a very peculiar, ultimately deflationary way. It wants to 
encourage reflection on its own ability to manipulate people, to heat and trouble minds, and it 
wants to guide people to extrapolate from its own example a dismissal of all claims to what we 
would now call supernatural powers of communication. The Bickerstaff hoax plays out as though 
in puppet miniature the larger goal of his travestying counter-enthusiasm—not to convince 
readers that he is telling them the truth, but to convince them that they can never know who is 
telling them the truth, particularly in print. The hoax is, in Shapin and Schaffer’s terms, an 
argument against “virtual witnessing”—against the idea that language can be manipulated in such 
a way as to appear to show events before one’s very eyes, that one can trust certain accounts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Dr. Swift, 208. 
 214	  
(particularly coming from Persons of Honour), that one can know truth through style. Or, more 
precisely, it is a partial critique of such witnessing, and a partial defense; one can take a work of 
words as an occasion to witness oneself, to clarify one’s own person-personae distinctions, to 
separate the private from the public from the natural as these forces press on one’s own inner 
experience, but one should not take anything “demonstrated” in any work of words—aside, of 
course, from the Bible—on faith. One who believes another’s published word without taking that 
word as an occasion to reflect on the situation of this very belief in one’s own reading eyes and 
thinking mind is no better than Swift’s imitation Partridge, whom Bickerstaff is able to drive to a 
feverish self-fulfillingly prophetic death simply by occasioning the over-activity of his own 
imagination. The Bickerstaff hoax thus blurs the lines separating self, natural cause, and society—
but only, finally, to sharpen those lines, to show that one should distinguish between oneself and 
one’s larger discursive context, and to show how easily one might fall prey to the power of 
suggestion, and how readily one might attribute either to nature or to some spiritual agency 
internal convictions that have no basis beyond the cooperation of one’s own expectations with 
the occasional scribblings of some resourceful and timely fraud.  
 Swift’s polemical enthusiasm of travesty is finally not interested in whether or not there is 
such a thing as enthusiasm. It doesn’t need enthusiasm to be anything more than a set of literary 
conventions and resonances marshaled at various moments in various ways—and occasioning, in 
those who can see through this literary nature of the concept, a capacity to appreciate and even 
replicate this strategy of other-inhabitation and self-ironization. After Swift, as has been 
mentioned, a legion of English literary spectators, French philosophes, and American editorialists 
take up the nom-de-plume not just of Bickerstaff—later, they also try on Gulliver’s curious 
combination of everyman and no-man, idealist and misanthrope, rationalist and lunatic. These 
appropriators carefully reproduce Swift’s insight, that one’s counter-enthusiastic authority rests 
upon readers’ recognition that one tonally signals one’s own performance of enthusiasm. I will 
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only mention in passing that one might follow this strategy forward to our own day—to The 
Onion, to Stephen Colbert, and to the seemingly inescapable everyday expectation that one to 
swath one’s opinions in sarcasm, snarkiness, and (in Peter Sloterdijk’s phrase) “cynical reason.”444 
* 
5. Swift’s Prophetic Satire 
 This dimension of Swift’s counter-enthusiasm is extremely influential. But there is more 
to Swift’s satire than the prevailing injunction to signal one’s awareness of one’s enthusiastic 
impersonations. Even in such a moment as that mentioned above—where Partridge is softened 
and (for lack of a more precise term) humanized even in the course of being pilloried—one sees 
that Swift’s satire involves more than self-aware caricature. Something about it reaches for a 
clarity that acknowledges but exceeds the cynicism of the travestying dimension. Indeed, the 
notion of literary clarity—of the communication of something otherwise incommunicable—
might help to bring out this dimension. To rely once more on the schema of intermodality, what 
is being communicated in Swift’s satire is not just the distinction of self, other, and matter, but 
the participation of these dimensions in a complex act of significance—their merging and 
blending in a given point of shared experiences, both virtual (belonging to the author and the 
represented figure) and real (belonging to oneself as reader). Swift’s satire, then, is not just a 
didactic mode insisting that one recognize one’s own ignorance and stop taking so seriously 
everything one reads. It is this. And this is important. But it has a positive communicative force 
as well. 
 I have framed this force in terms of a prophetic satire working not through travesty but 
through transfiguration, and I provided an example of this at the opening of this chapter in the 
conspicuously failed disenchantment of Stella’s lock of hair. One can find another, more complex 
example of this prophetic strain in what is probably the best-known passage from A Tale of a Tub. 
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The enthusiastic narrator is discussing the advantage of surfaces over interiors of objects and 
lamenting the tendency of reason toward unnatural dissections: 
 Now, I take all this to be the last Degree of perverting Nature; one of whose Eternal 
 Laws it is, to put her best Furniture forward … Whereof I have been farther convinced 
 from some late Experiments. Last Week I saw a Woman flay’d, and you will hardly 
 believe, how much it altered her Person for the worse.445  
Critics have frequently noticed the sudden combination of casualness and brutality interrupting 
the narrator’s pseudo-philosophical blather in the second sentence here: “Last week I saw a 
woman flayed, and you will hardly believe how much it altered her person for the worse.”446 This 
resonates, of course, with the more general grotesquery in Swift’s representations of women—
and we’ve seen examples of this, and how it works in his enthusiastic rhetoric and in the wider 
rhetoric of despiritualization he inherits.447  
 But in a way oddly like the moment with which we began—“Only a woman’s hair”—
there’s another current here also worth identifying. This anonymous woman flayed is subject here 
to something like the most horrific disenchantment imaginable—a literal reduction of her human 
surface to its material parts. But this process, precisely in its insistent reductionism, its casual 
sadistic experimentalism, twists against itself, conspicuously failing to disenchant its object. This 
woman flayed, in other words, survives, or comes to life. She is transfigured in being so callously 
anonymized, anatomized, and atomized by a literary voice we have learned not to trust. Another 
way of putting this: the sentence notices, despite itself, her spiritual dignity.  
 I would like to offer that what’s going on here is a new kind of holy foolishness expressed 
within but reaching beyond the limits imposed by Swift’s polemical satire of enthusiasm. Swift’s 
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holy foolishness is of course clearly indebted to the long tradition of Christian satire evident, for 
instance, in Erasmus’ Praise of Folly, which subtly shifts in the course of its unfolding from a 
castigation of the foolishness of the fallen world to a celebration of a sublime foolishness 
appropriate to the contemplation of an unthinkable divinity. But whereas Erasmus—and most 
literary champions of the holy fool—ironically celebrates the persona of his satire, the voice of 
folly itself, Swift ironically dignifies or spiritualizes the object wrongly noticed and described by 
his persona’s voice. His prophetic satire requires the authorial occupation of a persona marked by 
the discourse of enthusiasm. He must inhabit an enthusiast. But at the same time, this 
inhabitation allows for the opening up of a horizon of meaning that exceeds the polemical and 
travestying effects of the more straightforward satire of enthusiasm. That which is figured in the 
polemical mode—the enthusiastic material body—becomes transfigured in the prophetic mode. 
It becomes an occasion for the communication of a persisting spirit that seems to rise unnoticed 
behind the literary speaker. The irony of this effect is compounded, of course, by the fact that 
Swift’s polemical satire is so vehemently anti-prophetic. Despite, or perhaps one dialectical twist 
beyond, his satire of prophets, Swift produces a prophetic satire—a communication, as though 
through fumes and mists, that reproduces something like a literary Aeolism.  
 One might perceive this effect in Gulliver—a character who is, on the whole, very much 
an enthusiastic bodysuit filled with a variety of strong opinions, but who at the same time evokes 
pity, wonder, and even terror, particularly following his adventures in Houyhnhnmland, as he 
munches hay in his stable with his horses, trying to recall them to reason.448 Such moments of 
missed or misdirected humanity seem designed to make readers’ feelings think, if one might put it 
this way—thus to use the enthusiastic figure of Gulliver (or the narrator of the Tale, or Partridge, 
or many others) as a sort of alchemical vessel in which one might pour one’s own mixture of 
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affects. The inhabitation of the enthusiast in this case allows for a reaching into the reader. Better, 
it opens a plane of meaning where author, reader, and text can meet on equal terms.  
* 
6. Doggerel Confessions 
 Such claims surely require a good deal of close explanation. Rather than proliferate 
examples from Swift’s fictions, I would like to close this chapter by turning to his intentionally 
doggerel autobiographical poem, “Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift,” in which a verse form 
inflected by the discourse of enthusiasm serves as an unlikely vehicle for something like genuine 
confession. Rather than wear the figure of the enthusiast, Swift here wears one of the key literary 
forms of enthusiasm—doggerel rhyme. This should further help to connect the end of this 
narrative of the rise of the discourse of enthusiasm to its beginnings in the post-Reformation 
anxieties regarding the vulgar appropriation of scripture. 
 For many years, Swift’s poetry was not widely considered serious. Samuel Johnson’s 
judgment, so often a substitute for that of those who follow—that Swift’s poems are stylistically 
clear and accomplished (“often humorous, almost always light,” “correct” in diction, “smooth” in 
numbers, “exact” in rhymes, “all easiness and gaiety”) and thematically too often obviously 
“gross” and “trifling”—was taken for the last word on the subject.449 In recent decades, the 
consensus has certainly changed, and rightly so.450 The context of this project—with its 
observation that the discourse of enthusiasm centrally involved the figuration and inhabitation of 
the enthusiast as stylistic and psychological proxy for the abstract self confronted with the 
legitimation crises of the long Reformation—should contribute to this re-evaluation. It should 
help reveal, to put it simply, the degree to which Swift’s poetry—by far his most personal literary 
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form apart from his letters—depends for its formal structure on the discourse of enthusiasm, and 
provides him with allegorical leverage for what I have called his prophetic satire of the 
enthusiast—his attempt to reach readers, to deposit his complex emotions within them, to evoke 
a larger, even an evangelical horizon of meaning. 
 So how does this work? Swift wrote poetry largely in the form known as Hudibrastic 
verse, named after Samuel Butler’s massively popular satire of the English Civil Wars.451 Butler’s 
verse form—iambic tetrameter—is jangling and absurd, suited to his relentless mockery of 
Parliamentarians, Puritans, Presbyterians, Astrologers, Fortune-Tellers, and other so-called 
enthusiasts.452 Swift’s debt to Butler has long been acknowledged—and indeed might be felt in 
the deliberately corrupted rhymes and scatological images of lines such as these, from the Third 
Canto of Book Two: “He would an Elegie compose / On Maggots squeez’d out of his Nose; / In 
Lyrick numbers write an Ode on / His mistress, eating a Black-pudden: / And, when imprison’d 
Aire escap’d her, / It puft him with Poetic Rapture.”453 Butler’s debt, in turn, to the great 
burlesquing Mennipean satirists of the European Renaissance—above all, to Rabelais, Spenser, 
Cervantes, and Scarron—has likewise long been acknowledged.454 But this genealogy misses a 
crucial dimension of influence—the degree to which both Butler and Swift choose a verse form 
that resonates with the popular appropriations of lofty language that we’ve identified with the 
discourse of enthusiasm from its inception. They are more than high satirists—they are, perhaps 
like all Menippean satirists, ironic appropriators and clever rehabilitators of outrageously 
overweening “vulgar” numbers. 
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 This association of usurped spiritual authority and doggerel rhyming remained strong 
through the seventeenth century and beyond. Recall Henry VIII’s disgust at the proliferation of 
“printed books, printed ballads, plays, rhymes, songs, and other fantasies” playing with “the 
sacred and holy scriptures.” Recall the example of Prophet Hunt, with whom we began, who 
merrily declares in vulgar rhyme, between his many appropriations of holy language, that “the 
deepest scholler in Cambridge Schoole, / May be taught wisdom by Christs foole.” By the 1660s, 
this association of unlearned hermeneutics with “casting holy things into Doggerel, which is 
worse and more abominable then unto Dogs,” was so widespread as to be proverbial.455 The 
High Church divine Richard Allestree, author of The Whole Duty of Man (1658), lamented in The 
Government of the Tongue (1667) those “impious discourses” which are “bottom’d on the most 
sacred,” including, in addition to “profane paraphrases,” those which “use the Scripture as they 
do odd ends of Plaies, to furnish out their Jests; clothe all their little impertinent conceits in its 
Language, and debase it by the mixture of such miserable trifles, as themselves would be ashamed 
of, were they not heightned and inspirited by that profaneness.”456 Much like Locke in his 
“Preface” to the Paraphrase of Paul’s Epistles, Allestree compares such abuses of scripture to 
ordinary circumstances, asking how one would feel if, after having received a letter from a friend 
full of “exact instructions” and “the most moving expressions of kindness and tenderness,” one 
was to find chunks of this letter transformed suddenly into “doggrel rime, to be made sport for 
the rabble, or at the best have the most eminent phrases of it pickt out and made a common by-
word.”457 Samuel Butler himself strengthens the association of lay scriptural appropriation with 
doggerel controversialism—of a lowly seizing of the highest matters—in two satirical letters 
between a Puritan (William Prynne) and a Quaker (John Audland), in which his imitation Prynne 
is especially prone to punctuating his discourse with such Hudibrastic howlers as: “Of this Opinion 
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William Prynn was the / Sixt day of March six hundred thirty three.”458 The viciously anti-Roundhead 
Royalist poet Robert Gould provides in 1685 a summary example of this association: “The 
Tuneful Smec, once left his hungry Prose, / In Doggrel twang’d his Calvin through his nose.”459 
Gould concludes: “Lampoon’s, dull Libels, Satyrs, Pasquils, Jests, / The dangerous Weapons of 
the Rebel Beast.”460 
 The success of Hudibras, in this context, owes much to the adroitness with which it 
recasts a verse form associated with Dissenters as a satirical weapon for exposing those very 
Dissenters. This is a formal variation on the theme we have seen so often in the discourse of 
enthusiasm—the dipper dipped, the Quaker set quaking, the devil beaten at his own game. Butler 
shows that he can appropriate the doggerel form of the impious appropriators. And his example 
is exceedingly influential. Following the publication of the First Book of Hudibras in 1663, a 
catalogue of counter-enthusiastic imitators follows Butler’s lead—notably including two 
Hudibrastic imitations by Henry Sacheverell, whose fiery sermons against Dissenters would incite 
popular riots in 1710.461 This context gives new torque to the standard observation of ensuing 
critics, that “Four-Foot-Rhymes, or Hudibrastic Metre, attempts to talk of great Things in little Verse,” 
or “express[es] the high in terms of the low.”462 Low and high mean many things here: these terms 
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catch the play of class appropriation in the Hudibrastic form; they evoke the politics behind the 
traditional delineation of style into low, middle, and high modes of expression; and, beneath it all, 
they allude (likely unconsciously) to the most outrageous violation of style and form ever 
committed on English soil, at least from the point-of-view of that country’s defenders of 
Established institutions: the casting of Holy Writ into the vulgar, doggerel fetters of ordinary 
language. 
 This, I would maintain, is the proper background for appreciating the poetry of Jonathan 
Swift—which, again, displays a double relationship to the discourse of enthusiasm. On one hand, 
his poetry travesties the form, the subject, and the figure of the enthusiast, frequently providing 
for the comical embodiment of prophets, wizards, magicians, doomsayers, and dealers in 
brimstone (“A Famous Prediction of Merlin, the British Wizard,” “Sid Hamet the Magician’s Rod,” 
“The Windsor Prophecy,” “The Day of Judgement,” “The Place of the Damned”), or reflecting 
on classical enthusiastic themes like dreams, desire, and poetry itself (“On Dreams. An Imitation 
of Petronius,” “Desire and Possession,” “On Poetry. A Rhapsody”), or commenting on seditious 
echoes of the mid-century troubles (“The Revolution at Market-Hill,” “An Excellent New Song 
on a Seditious Pamphlet”), and nearly always in rhyming iambic tetrameter couplets or some 
other “low” form (ballad meter, anapests, etc). In this manner, he continues and expands the 
scope of the Hudibrastic satire of enthusiasm. On the other hand, and to a degree Butler certainly 
never attains, Swift finds in these counter-enthusiastic themes and forms a vehicle for self-
exposure, for confession, for friendship, for love—for reaching, connecting, communicating. He 
wears the so-called enthusiast’s poetic garb not only to mock and undermine that enthusiast—but, 
to put it very plainly, to express himself as a spiritual being.  
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 Consider “Verses on the Death of Dr Swift” (1731), a quasi-mock-paranoid 
prognostication—hence, already, prophetic—of the world’s reception of the news of his death.463 
He imagines this news spreading in ripples from intimate to more distant circles; few appear 
much to care about his death except insofar as they have some social interest in appearing 
sufficiently mournful (“My female friends, whose tender hearts / Have better learned to act their 
parts, / Receive the news in doleful dumps, / ‘The Dean is dead, (pray, what is trumps?)’” (ll. 225-28)), 
some prideful stake in appearing to have accurately predicted the severity of his symptoms 
(“He’d rather choose that I should die, / Than his prediction prove a lie” (ll. 131-32)) or some 
financial hopes in his last will and testament (“O, may we all for death prepare! / What has he 
left? And who’s his heir?” (ll. 153-54)). His long-anticipated death finally arrives: “Now the 
departing pray’r is read. / He hardly breathes. The Dean is dead” (ll. 149-50). His body, like that 
of the woman flayed—or the beau whom the Tale-teller has “stripped” and dissected in his 
presence, only to find “so many unsuspected faults under one suit of clothes”—is opened and 
examined.464 The doctors who perform the examination exempt themselves of any blame, finding 
that “all his vital parts were sound,” and that his death is attributable merely to his refusal to 
“take advice” (ll. 176, 172).  
 With the Dean’s body thus apparently despiritualized, the poem next chases his paper 
afterlife—his literary works and the reputation they (he hopes) sustain. More bad news. Within a 
year of his death, his pages have been usefully repurposed as pastry wrappers: “I sent them with a 
load of books, / Last Monday, to the pastry-cook’s” (ll. 259-60). Other authors—suspiciously 
enthusiastic—are recommended in his stead: “Next, here’s Sir Robert’s Vindication, / And Mr. 
Henly’s last Oration” (ll. 277-78).465 Swift describes Henley, in his own note, as  
 a clergyman who, wanting both merit and luck to get preferment, or even to keep  
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465 The famous Sir Robert Walpole was among Swift’s political enemies.  
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 his curacy in the Established Church, formed a new conventicle, which he calls an  
 Oratory. There, at set times, he delivereth strange speeches compiled by himself  
 and his associates, who share the profit with him: every hearer pays a shilling each  
 day for admittance. He is an absolute dunce, but generally reputed crazy.466  
Thus it appears that all of Swift’s efforts to travesty and expose enthusiasts have been in vain. 
Not only are his own works forgotten, but those of “Orator” Henley (as he was known) are 
triumphant. Same with the tracts of Thomas Woolston, “a clergyman” who (as Swift again puts 
it) “hath in several treatises, in the most blasphemous manner, attempted to turn Our Saviour 
and his miracles into ridicule”:467 
 “He doth an honour to his gown, 
 By bravely running priest-craft down:  
 He shows, as sure as God’s in Glo’ster, 
 That [Jesus] was a grand imposter, 
 That all his miracles were cheats, 
 Performed as jugglers do their feats.  
 The Church had never such a writer: 
 A shame, he hath not got a mitre!” (ll. 291-98) 
Swift emphasizes Woolston’s attempts to debunk the miracles of Jesus—which he did in the 
wildly popular Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour (1727-29).468 But perhaps his more corrosive 
influence, from the perspective of counter-enthusiasm, is his perpetuation of the materialist-
Familist-Quaker message so feared by Henry More—that Biblical events should be understood as 
allegories anticipating present spiritual truths. As William Trapnell summarizes Woolston’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Ross, ed., 523. 
467 Ibid. 
468 William H. Trapnell, ‘Woolston, Thomas (bap. 1668, d. 1733)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29963, accessed 29 March 
2016] 
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approach: “Woolston soon began to read Origen and, ascribing to other church fathers his belief 
in the figurative, rather than the literal, significance of the events recorded in the Bible, he 
concluded that only a figurative exegesis of biblical texts could yield the ultimate truth of 
scripture. Thus he believed that the material events recorded in the Bible prefigured spiritual 
events.”469 This is as though to say—Jesus is not an equal part of the Godhead. He is an ideal 
emanation whom you, dear interlocutor, might find within yourself, in your own incarnate body, 
in your own spirit, in a universe allegorically centered on your own existence. 
 This is the nadir of Swift’s poem. His body is so much dissected meat. His paper soul is 
pastry-wrappings. The impious frauds whom he worked all his career to travesty are thriving. But 
it is at this point that a pulse—already present but muted—picks up in the poem. This pulse has, 
to use a Swiftian heuristic, a simple surface and a deep surface. On the simple surface of the plot, 
voices—a “club assembled at the Rose” (l. 300), a stylish tavern—begin to form, between 
favorable, unfavorable, and indifferent judgments, his “character impartial” (l. 306). This 
chorus—and it does feel like a civil body out of a tragedy—comes to a few points of not-so-bad 
consensus. Swift was respected at court. His books sold. His intentions were moral. He was an 
original (ironically conveyed in a line stolen from Denham, “But what he writ, was all his 
own”).470 He did not genuflect to the great. He was ill used—banished to an Irish Deanery for 
sparing nobody in his satire; driven from England and mocked in the streets as a Jacobite 
following the death of Queen Anne; abandoned by many of his friends. And yet he did at least 
one truly noble act with his talent for impersonation—saving Ireland from debased currency in 
his papers written as the Drapier. And when the printer who allowed these papers to be 
published was brought to trial by a corrupt legal system, Swift—as the Drapier—opposed this 
Judge Whitshed, a “wicked monster on the bench, / Whose fury blood could never quench; / As 
vile and profligate a villain, / As modern Scroggs, or old Tressilian” (ll. 417-20). Interestingly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 Trapnell. 
470 John Denham, “On Mr. Abraham Cowley” (1677), l. 30. EEBO. 
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Whitshed is compared here to two judges whom one might expect the more purely counter-
enthusiastic Swift to applaud. Scroggs, Charles II’s Chief Justice, persecuted many Roundheads. 
And Tressilian was in charge of the genocidal backlash following the Peasant’s Revolt of 1381—
an “enthusiastical” uprising as feared in its context as that of the 1640s was in Swift’s. In short, 
Swift seems to be deliberately emphasizing the degree to which his counter-enthusiasm is 
forgiving, is tempered, finally chooses mercy over justice. The simple surface rehabilitation 
continues: Swift was too satirical, but he meant well, never mocked any who didn’t deserve it, felt 
pity along with bile, loved his friends, and with “the little wealth he had” helped found “a house 
for fools and mad: / To show, by one satiric touch, / No nation wanted it so much” (ll. 479-82). 
The poem concludes: “That kingdom he hath left his debtor, / I wish it soon may have a better” 
(ll. 483-84).  
 And so the public sphere of choral voices gathered at the Rose comes to a rather rosy 
consensus about Swift—and one not (oh, his prophetic soul!) so far off from posterity’s. In the 
terms of our reading, the simple surface of the poem cannot follow through with the apparently 
strong urge in the poem to despiritualize Swift’s body, to leave it as mere matter, and body of 
work, to treat it as so much wastepaper. But this is not the only way in which the latter part of 
the poem suggests a prophetic, redemptive satire of enthusiasm.  
 This second dimension is what I have called the deep surface pulse of prophecy in the 
poem’s final turn. This deep surface pulse is built from Biblical allusions. These are worth 
carefully tracking. The first arrives on line 241, as the Dean’s female friends are rather off-
handedly discussing his death while playing cards: “His time was come, he ran his race; / We 
hope he’s in a better place” (ll. 241-42). This alludes to Hebrews 12.1—“Wherefore seeing we 
also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the 
sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us”—a 
verse that, in addition to the at least somewhat Swiftian moral injunction to run one’s race with 
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patience, introduces a “great cloud of witnesses” which one might see as resonant with the Rose 
chorus and the larger swirl of voices for which that chorus is a metonym. This allusion feels 
rather lonely when it arrives in the downward arc of the poem. It finds company as the poem 
turns toward the better. As the Rose chorus reflects on the Dean’s behavior at court, they allude 
directly to a verse from Jude: “He never courted men in station, / Nor persons had in admiration” (ll. 
325-26): “These are murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts; and their mouth 
speaketh great swelling words, having men’s persons in admiration because of advantage” (Jude 
16). Thus this allusion at once praises the Dean and condemns the circles satirically represented 
in the earlier movement of the poem, who praise him for advantage only. As the chorus 
continues they bring in another direct allusion, this time to Psalm 146.3 (“Put not your trust in 
princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help”): “He follow’d David’s lesson just, / In 
princes never put his trust” (ll. 340-41). As the redemption continues, so do the allusions (and 
who to follow David but his most famous relation?). Remarking on how the Dean’s friends 
abandoned him in his hour of greatest need, the chorus at last brings in the Gospels—“When, 
ev’n his own familiar friends / Intent upon their private ends, / Like renegadoes now he feels, / 
Against him lifting up their heels” (ll. 403-6). This comes from the typological verse, John 13.18: “I 
speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen: but that the scripture may be fulfilled, He that 
eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against me.” And one more Gospel allusion—very 
fittingly, to Luke’s Parable of the Unjust Judge—is interlaced into the celebration of the Dean’s 
greatest hour, his opposition to Chief Justice Whitshed, who “long all justice had discarded, / 
Nor fear’d he GOD, nor man regarded” (ll. 421-22) (cf. “There was in a city a judge, which feared not 
God, neither regarded man” (Luke 18.2)). That word—GOD—jumps out on the page. It is the 
third such capitalization in the poem—the other two being SWIFT (l. 254) and LIBERTY (l. 
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347).471 This sequence of three words might too be read as an arc or short story about a peculiar 
man’s release from life into God. 
 Keeping in mind this deep surface of the redemptive arc, this poem, I want to suggest, 
can be read both as prophecy and liturgy. It weaves Swift’s life into the rhythms of the Bible in a 
manner that is by no means in jest even as it is deeply ironical—in the theological sense of irony, 
which stresses the simultaneity of one’s own profane life and God’s divine plan, and the distance 
between those levels, where this waking dream called life is taken to be a shadowy instantiation of 
the invisible divine reality in which it unfolds and into which, with death, it is released. The 
moments of Biblical allusion push into the narration of Swift’s death and life—and, crucially, 
those narrative elements are reversed, suggesting a life after death—like so many prophecies 
fulfilled. The poem thus evokes a temporal stream before (in both senses of the word, before in 
the past and before in the future) the life events therein depicted which is visible in glimpses 
during life’s hardest and most triumphant moments. This is Swift’s sense of real participation in 
prophetic figuration, these small moments when the contours of events reveal an affinity with the 
bigger story of eternity.  
 But how is this not just as bad, in its way, as the Biblical appropriations so excoriated by 
Allestree and countless other Anglican divines, Swift included?472 How is this not an instance of 
the dismemberment of the Biblical body—a pulling of the text into bloody chunks then 
selectively applied to one’s own private hermeneutic vision? How is this not, in short, John 
Locke’s hermeneutic nightmare all over again? Still worse, how is this different from the method 
attributed to Henry Nicholis by Henry More—where the worshipper’s own life is taken to be the 
allegorical center of the Incarnation of the Word? Perhaps it is not all that different, in the end. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 These words are capitalized in many editions of the poem, though it should be mentioned that this poem has a 
vexed textual history. Stephen Karian reviewed some fifty-seven editions of the poem and found many 
inconsistencies. See Karian, Jonathan Swift in Print and Manuscript (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 166, 
184. 
472 A Tale of a Tub in particular laments this practice in its satire of Peter, who abuses the plain meaning of his father’s 
will (i.e. the Bible) in order to embellish his coat (his profession of faith); and in the satire against Jack as well, who in 
reaction to Peter’s excesses reads the will so literally that he ends up tearing his own coat to shreds.  
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There is a strong sense in this poem that the end of one’s own life corresponds in some way to 
the end of the world; the eschaton is revealed to be one’s own death: “Behold the fatal day arrive!” 
(l. 147). But there is also the suggestion, as with both More and Locke (though, again, with a very 
different emphasis) that bad typologies—enthusiasms—reverse the proper tenor-vehicle relation 
in the allegory of reality. Oneself is not the tenor. Oneself is the vehicle. One’s life is a fragment 
off of which the source of meaning—the story of the Incarnate Word—might glint in glimpses. 
The pulse of prophecy is always there in the poem, before the life—but it only comes out 
occasionally (in both senses of that word). 
 It is significant too that Swift stages the upswelling of prophecy into his poem in a chorus 
of other voices. Actually, there are two choruses—first, the card-playing women, second, the club 
gathered at the Rose. This suggests, of course, that one cannot declare oneself the allegorical 
center. Insofar as one has a place in the allegory of truth, this must be recognized from without 
one’s own experience—and not simply by one person, by a confluence of views. The chorus is 
thus akin to a church. And so, as already mentioned, this prophetic enthusiasm has a liturgical 
dimension as well. It emerges not into private individuals but into groups—and (as Habermas 
might put it) out of the process of offering, hearing, and revising reasons. This is prophecy as 
common prayer. It is possible to read the gradual eruption of Biblical allusions into the poem as 
an adaptation of the Anglican liturgy—which begins with readings from the Old Testament (in 
this case, Psalms) and the New Testament writings (in this case, Hebrews and Jude), and 
culminates in a reading from the Gospels (here John and Luke).473 Perhaps Swift absorbed this 
rhythm from the hundreds of services he preached in his lifetime. Perhaps he intends it to be 
discerned. I think, given the prominence with which the Gospel allusions arrive at the key points 
of the redemptive arc, that the latter is much more likely.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 See “Concerning the Service of the Church,” The Book of Common Prayer (1662). 
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 In the end, Swift’s prophetic enthusiastic register seems bound not to satisfy. One feels 
obligated to point out that whether or not he stages the prophetic murmuring up as an 
emergence from a chorus of voices, his own poetic brain is finally the narrative’s horizon. He 
engineers the illusion of liturgical consensus—and for reasons which are only too obviously self-
serving. Faced with the prospect of oblivion, he is cheering himself up, a fact only partially 
alleviated by the tongue-in-cheek framing of the whole poem. There are too the more-than-hints 
of misogyny so endemic to his writings, where the chorus of women produce, Sibyl-like, 
unconscious Biblical allusion, and the chorus of men—true prophets coinciding with the 
redemptive turn—allude directly, knowingly, justly to the correspondences between the good life 
lived and God’s life on earth. Here the Christian tropology of false prophecy dovetails with the 
limits of Habermas’ original formulation of the public sphere thesis—in the one, the prophesying 
women are unconscious forebears of their male fulfillers; in the other, they are forgotten 
bystanders in a process of rational argument from which they were economically, scientifically, 
and socially excluded.  
 But there is a way in which this prophetic dimension is quite moving as well—and an 
important reminder of the degree to which, even as the problem of false prophecy inspired Swift 
(and More and Locke) to identify and readjust the balance of distinct epistemological spheres 
involved in one’s own life and shooting through one’s own language, the basic faith in 
communication—in finding, somehow, the capacity within language to reach—remained central, 
and remained, even if so disguisedly that within a few generations the strong shadows of God 
cast across Swift’s work were no longer so easily felt, theological.  
* 
7. How Swift Says, “I Love You” 
 With that in mind, I would like to close this chapter with a final, more everyday instance 
of Swift’s prophetic enthusiasm. About ten years after Swift was driven from London by the rise 
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of the Whig government, during which time he apparently had little contact with his former 
literary circle (famously known as the Scriblerians, also including John Gay and Alexander Pope), 
474 Gay finally took it upon himself to reach out to Swift in a letter.475 Pope soon did likewise. In 
these letters, Pope and Gay express themselves in familiar terms of affection, insisting that Swift 
remained in their thoughts and hearts despite his physical distance. As Pope puts it, “Dr Swift 
lives still in England, in ev'ry place & company where he woud chuse to live; & I find him in all 
the conversations I keep, & in all the Hearts in which I would have any Share.”476 The whole 
letter is a sequence of such literary Hallmark moments.  
 Swift’s reply, on the other hand, communicates a position that Hallmark has not yet 
ventured to commodify: 
 [W]hat can be the Design of your Letter but Malice, to wake me out of a Scurvy 
 Sleep, which however is better than none, I am towards nine years older Since I left you 
 Yet that is the least of my Alterations: My Business, my Diversions my 
 Conversations are all entirely changed for the Worse, and So are my Studyes and my 
 Amusements in writing; Yet after all, this humdrum way of Life might be passable 
 enough if you would let me alone, I shall not be able to relish my Wine, my Parsons, my 
 Horses nor my Garden for three Months, till the Spirit you have raised Shall be 
 dispossessed.477 
“If you would let me alone”—this phrase always lands, for me, with such moving force. Swift 
backs his curmudegeonliness up with a materialist theory of friendship: 
 Your Notions of Friendship are new to me; I believe every man is born with his 
 quantum, and he can not give to one without Robbing another[.] I very well know  
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475 “John Gay to Swift, 22 December 1722.” In Swift, Correspondence, ed. Harold Williams, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963-65), 3:439. All letters cited from this edition. 
476 “Alexander Pope to Swift, August 1723,” 3:458. 
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 to whom I would give the first place in my Friendship, but they are not in the way, I  
 am condemned to another Scene, and therefore I distribute it in penny-worths to 
 those about me, and who displease me least[,] and should do the same to my fellow  
 Prisoners if I were Condemned to a Jayl.478  
We are in a position, now, to see what Swift’s doing here. He is playing the enthusiast. He is 
putting on the bodysuit of mechanical spirit. But we also know, as his friends would have known, 
not to trust him. He plays the philosophical enthusiast here in order to say, more strongly than he 
could say it directly, “I love you.” 
 I mentioned Talal Asad near the beginning of my chapter. With Asad’s work in mind, we 
can recover from Swift a better sense of enlightenment affect and form—surely of its polemical 
history, and we are still navigating his contributions to the political-theological drama of who can 
speak and who can’t, who can represent interiority and who can’t—but also, as I’ve suggested, 
what I would like to call, relishing the irony just as he invites us to do, his prophetic dimension. 
Along with the recent work of Helen Deutsch, one might in this later Swift the author about 
whom Edward Said wrote, echoing Wordsworth’s call to Milton, “Jonathan Swift, thou should be 
living in this hour.”479 This prophetic Swift is something we need to keep in view— offering, at 
the enlightenment’s outset, a version of enlightenment discourse that is attuned through irony to 
ineffability. I hope to have shown, in part, where his literary perspective comes from, and why it 
is so crucial to study and perhaps to evoke, carefully, in this precarious moment called, too 
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6. ENTHUSIASM, HISTORY, AND SECULARITY 
      Multa novit vulpes, verum echinus unum magnum.480 
 
1) Enthusiasm and history 
 I have emphasized the historical roots of the discourse of enthusiasm in the post-
Reformation crises of spiritual authority following from the publication of the English Bible in 
the vernacular.481 I have called this the problem of popular spiritual authority—as distinct from 
the discourse of enthusiasm. This was, I have claimed, a real problem. Unlicensed hermeneuts 
like Prophet Hunt, James Nayler, and many others were able to exploit what amounted to a 
loophole in the medieval legitimation schema—the role of the prophet in legitimating 
institutional authority. Their efforts to claim prophetic authority they surely felt to be rightfully 
theirs—there is little reason to believe the polemical claims that such radical Reformation figures 
were charlatans or con artists—and to change the world to better reflect the Kingdom of God 
led to the construction of a discourse that diverted attention from particular doctrinal claims and 
readings of scripture and focused polemical attention instead on the figuration of “the enthusiast.” 
This virtual false prophet, constructed from a number of existing polemical resources and tropes 
(some of which we reviewed in Chapter Two), effectively shifted the conversation regarding false 
prophecy from a heretical paradigm (according to which those who claimed to be prophets were 
considered on the basis of their doctrinal opinions) to a new paradigm of enthusiasm (according 
to which those claiming to be prophets were judged on the basis of their discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Originally from a fragment by Archilochus, 
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I.v.100, translated by Margaret Mann Phillips (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 397. This aphorism was 
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481 I have focused on England in this project—albeit while drawing on some European sources. Obviously, 
enthusiasm is a bigger phenomenon than this country. I hope in a future version of the project to be able to account 
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of continental anti-Anabaptist heresiography. 
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comportment). The issue became not, “What do these enthusiasts believe?” but “How are these 
enthusiasts using language?” Not, “Look at these errors!” but “Look at this erroneousness!” 
 Doctrine remained an important concern, but took on a new role in this discourse. 
Enthusiasts were not judged according to their professed beliefs. Rather, they were taken to be 
signs of deeper structures of meaning which might be inferred and exposed. These deeper 
structures of meaning were understood as having doctrinal content of a sort. For More, the 
enthusiast was understood doctrinally in allegorical terms. The enthusiast allegorized revealed 
truth according to his own life. He prioritized himself as the tenor for which scriptural contents 
became so many expressive vehicles. For Locke, the enthusiast was understood as erroneously 
misunderstanding and abusing the basic structure of signification. He confused and jumbled 
crucial distinctions—above all between words, minds, and things—and claimed special 
illuminations that could not be validated outside of his own experience. For Swift, the enthusiast 
was understood in terms of a larger literary public sphere. He thrived on the credulity of the 
illiterate masses. 
 In addition to anchoring the historical account of the discourse of enthusiasm on these 
problems of significance and interpretation stemming from the problem of unlicensed prophecy, 
my account has emphasized another dimension of this discourse that previous studies have not 
stressed. The discourse of enthusiasm worked not only through the virtual construction of the 
enthusiast, a figure with a shadowy at best relation to actual dissident believers; it also worked 
through the imitation and inhabitation of this figure by counter-enthusiasts. The enthusiast was 
animated, then, by the same writers who constructed him. We have seen how this worked in all 
three authors. More animates David George and H.N. Locke animates Paul—a person who is 
not himself an enthusiast in Locke’s view, but someone who has been erroneously appropriated 
by enthusiasts, and thus must be reoccupied and reanimated. Swift, English literature’s greatest 
ventriloquist, animates the Lucretian materialist of the Tale, the astrologer Isaac Bickerstaff, and a 
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number of other enthusiasts. An important upshot of this dimension of the discourse is that 
enlightenment reason can be shown to have distinguished itself from earlier forms of reason on 
the basis of ironic and self-aware inhabitations of figures taken to be prophetic. The prophet 
worked in this way as a false totality within which one might express one’s sense of one’s own 
epistemological limitations--and thereby gain a new sort of authorial leverage over those who 
continued to oscillate between doubt and certainty as to whether they were damned or saved, 
illuminated or abandoned by God. The discourse of enthusiasm defined what came eventually to 
be enlightenment rationality through the knowing imitation of irrationality. Thus this project 
helps establish in a new way why irony, satire, and other modes of indirect representation were so 
fundamental to enlightenment. 
 One basic but important upshot of this historical account can be put plainly. It is 
important to study the history of prophecy. This subject is generally consigned to particular 
religious traditions: “Prophecy in the Old Testament,” “Prophecy in Islam,” etc. It is easy to see 
why this is the case. Nothing—except perhaps the question of the existence of God—is more 
basic to monotheistic religion than prophecy. All the doctrinal particulars that make up a faith 
pass through a prophetic tradition. Hence the overwhelming majority of critical materials on 
prophecy are concerned with explicating and often defending the truth of a certain view of 
historical prophecy. Many of these materials are invaluable for the more general study of the 
phenomenon of prophecy.482  But, some important exceptions notwithstanding, few more general 
studies currently exist.483 I think of this study as a preliminary chapter in a larger study of the role 
of prophecy in literary history, with prophecy understood not primarily in terms of temporality or 
doctrinal particulars, but in terms of the concept of mediation between humanity and divinity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 For two examples informing the background of this project, see Abraham J. Heschel, The Prophets (New York: 
Perennial Classics, 2001) and Cornel West, Black Prophetic Fire (Boston: Beacon Press, 2015). 
483 See, e.g., James L. Kugel, editor, Poetry and Prophecy: The Beginnings of a Literary Tradition (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1990); Curry. Prophecy has, it should be mentioned, been a major focus in Milton and Blake studies. 
My hope would be to extend the implications of prophecy beyond such self-proclaimed poetic prophets.  
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immanence and transcendence, as it is related to the histories of institutional power and literary 
representation.484 Such a study—which would far outstrip this particular project, and indeed the 
book form this project will eventually assume—would, I think, illuminate the question of political 
legitimacy and its reliance on representation in new and important ways. At any rate, I hope this 
study has helped establish the suggestive and promising nature of the careful consideration of the 
role of prophecy in history, and in the history of representation.  
* 
2. Enthusiasm among the historians 
 Beyond that simple—but dauntingly vast—upshot, the historical aspect of this project 
leads me to another point related more specifically to the historical study of enthusiasm. My 
account of enthusiasm ends where most accounts begin—with the emergence of the eighteenth-
century version of this discourse, here represented by Jonathan Swift. As Jon Mee argues, 
enthusiasm never stops being a key term during what used to be called “the age of reason.”485 
Every decade or so, some event—the arrival in England of the Camisards, or the rise of the 
Methodists—prompts the resurgent fear of an imminent return to the theological-political 
conditions of the 1640s.486 Treatises on enthusiasm are somewhat regularly reprinted. Henry 
More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, for example, is republished in 1708, 1712, and 1739.487 Toward 
the end of the century, particularly during the 1790s, many new treatises are published adapting 
the counter-enthusiasms of the seventeenth-century. Meanwhile, some figures—such as, for 
instance, William Blake—reclaim the term enthusiasm for the revolutionary spirit. For the first 
time, groups and individuals emerge who are happy to call themselves enthusiasts—and not in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 Such a study would build on the work of Karl Löwith, among others. See Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological 
Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1949).  
485 Mee, 4. 
486 Rosenberg’s account emphasizes the importance of the Camisards. See Rosenberg, 41 ff. 
487 ECCO. 
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limited, polite, ironical, Shaftesburian sense. One might say, they embrace the nightmare dreamed 
up by their enemies. Or, perhaps, they become counter-counter-enthusiasts.   
 Although this study would certainly benefit from tracing this later transmogrification 
along the emphases it has introduced, it is worth remarking that my focus here on the early 
discourse helps to complicate and clarify the longer story told by Jon Mee and others. In 
particular, this study hopes to have shown the complexity of the stage of the discourse often 
treated as somewhat monolithic—the fanatical, zealous stage of “religious enthusiasm” taken to 
precede the more complex eighteenth-century concept. The drama Mee and others see unfolding 
over the eighteenth century is already present in so-called religious enthusiasm, which is already 
about the negotiation of the balance of self, others, and nature (a trifurcation which I think brings 
precision to an account like Mee’s), particularly as mediated by language.488 Religious enthusiasm, 
to put it plainly, is no simple term denoting excessive zeal. To reduce it to that definition eclipses 
the significant struggle regarding the nature of revelation, and the relative ownership of revelation 
enjoyed by the powerful and the powerless, which actually underpins the discourse of 
enthusiasm—and which has (as I hope I have shown) important implications for apparently 
larger projects such as the retheorization of language away from essentialism and toward the 
arbitrary word, the emergence of modern epistemology, the rise of scientific materialism, and the 
literary figuration of the relation of the virtual significatory system of self-author-text to the 
“ordinary” fit of word to world. 
 This account certainly does not aim to replace or undermine the arc traced by Mee—or, 
just as importantly, Jordana Rosenberg, whose account has the benefit (lacking here) of a careful 
history of economics. The present narrative simply provides our understanding of enthusiasm 
with much-needed foundational heft. In a longer version, the relation of the psychological 
economic balance of self-others-nature theorized in the discourse of enthusiasm might be very 
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productively linked to the capitalist economies of psychology and nature. Rosenberg's work 
would be a clear touchstone in this regard—as would A.O. Hirschman's classic text, which seems 
more relevant now than ever, The Passions and the Interests (1977).489  
 But it is worth stressing one of the conclusions that follows from limiting the study of 
enthusiasm to the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. This focus offers a very different 
perspective on the historical role of some ideas valorized by certain recent influential histories of 
enlightenment. Many scholars, as Mee’s example attests, see enthusiasm as an early or preparatory 
phase in the revolutionary processes of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. They read the 
enthusiast with the American or French or even Russian revolutionary in the backs of their minds. 
The ur-text describing this view of history is probably Friedrich Engels’ The Peasant War in 
Germany (1850), which saw the sixteenth century Anabaptist uprisings as rehearsals for bourgeois 
revolution—full of the proper anti-feudal spirit, but hamstringed by a commitment to religious 
(rather than materialist scientific) ideology.490 Subtler—and exhaustively sourced—versions of 
this bourgeois revolution-centered approach to religious history can be found with especially 
force in the work of Jonathan Israel.  
 Israel, in his recent trilogy of books, Radical Enlightenment, Enlightenment Contested, and 
Democratic Enlightenment, argues that enlightenment has a Spinozist kernel which is taken up by 
Denis Diderot, Baron d’Holbach, and some of the other encyclopédistes, and which (in an 
adulterated form) shapes later French enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire and American 
revolutionaries like Thomas Jefferson. The process of enlightenment as he sees it was largely a 
matter of understanding and accepting Spinoza’s insight into the unity of mind and nature—
“hylozoic monism,” or the idea that mind and matter alike are sides of one animate substance. 
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This idea undermined church teachings and the political and social orders they supported. And 
from this blow to the foundations of theological-political order followed everything. Israel writes: 
 [Of the many] diverse intellectual currents that fed into the Radical  
 Enlightenment [from] late medieval Averroism to Renaissance naturalism, from  
 early eighteenth-century English Deism and pantheism to Polish and Collegiant  
 Socinianism, from liberal Sephardic Judaism to forms of Cartesianism and the  
 rhetoric of the English Levellers […] the only kind of philosophy which could (and  
 can) coherently integrate and hold together such a far-reaching value  
 condominium in the social, moral, and political spheres, as well as in ‘philosophy,’  
 was the monist, hylozoic systems […] generally labeled ‘Spinozist’ in the ‘long’ 
 eighteenth century.491  
And Israel sees as the fruits of Spinozist materialism nearly all modern moral values: “democracy; 
racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression, and 
the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and education; and full 
separation of church and state.”492 For Israel, the God of the Bible and all his spiritual retinue is 
not just an unnecessary hypothesis; the expulsion of this belief from science and politics is a 
necessary condition of their thriving. 
 This view of enlightenment is certainly well supported in Israel’s books. And his sense 
that enlightenment can be defined by a change in ontological orientation, in his view an 
increasingly open embrace of Spinozist materialism, at least partially supports my sense that this 
shift can be characterized in terms of a movement from language-oriented to rationality-mediated 
appeal. But his account of enlightenment has a number of teleological features worth pointing 
out and questioning. Although he frequently argues that the real work of enlightenment occurred 
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a century before Voltaire and Rousseau arrived on the literary scene, it remains the case that the 
French Revolution is frequently the great endgame in Israel’s analysis. Historical currents are 
considered as either contributing to or impeding this revolutionary event. As he puts it: 
 [W]hat I am arguing is that the Radical Enlightenment [i.e. the atheist, materialist  
 enlightenment following from Spinozism] is the only important direct cause of the  
 French Revolution understood as a total transformation of the political, legal,  
 cultural, and educational framework of French life, administration, and  
 society.493 
Many enlightenment historians have disputed Israel’s intentionally bold claim. My concern is 
rather with the weight of the French Revolution itself in his—and, to be fair, most—accounts of 
enlightenment. Like a bowling ball on a trampoline, all apparently smaller objects roll eventually 
toward it. Ellen Meiksins Wood has discussed this tendency in her analyses of early capitalism in 
England, arguing that for historians of political theory like Perry Anderson and Thomas Nairn, 
the French bourgeois revolution, which so dramatically rejected the Ancien Régime, is understood 
to be the normative course of national development, compared with which other nations, very 
much including England, are shown to have failed to fully “modernize.”494 And even when the 
French Revolution is barely a glimmer in the angel of history’s eye, as in analyses of the political-
theological revolutions of seventeenth century England, it still casts a shadow. Christopher Hill, 
at least at times, sees the mid-century decades as an epoch of lost opportunity—a moment when, 
pace Milton in “The Ready and Easy Way” (1660), England had before it a chance to embrace 
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radical republican governing ideals like those of the more fully realized revolution of France, but 
balked.495  
 The primary problem with understanding English history through the skein of the French 
Enlightenment is that this tends to distort the very different role religion plays in each country’s 
revolutionary history. In France, anti-clericalism and enlightenment are frequently, if not so often 
as Israel assumes, parallel forces. This is far from the case in England. In the English context, the 
arguments and philosophical innovations that look most “enlightened” from the perspective of 
the long eighteenth century often begin as religiously motivated interventions into a deeply 
complicated tangle of post-Reformation Christianities. If later enlightenment figures like David 
Hume (who is hardly Spinozist or democratic, by the way) are clearly critical of the Church of 
England—and indeed of all churches, established or not—the earlier figures I have considered in 
this project, including Henry More and Jonathan Swift, were either ordained members or else 
devout defenders of this Church. (The figure who does not fit so neatly into the Church of 
England, John Locke, is also intensely devout; indeed, like his good friend Isaac Newton, he is 
led into heterodoxy by piety rather than skepticism.) As I have shown, these thinkers do much to 
create the conditions of later enlightenment thought. More and Swift describe the body as merely 
material—although, significantly, all bodies so described are heterodox bodies. Thomas Boyle 
and Thomas Sprat (two thinkers who would figure in a longer version of this project) treat nature 
as mechanical—although they do this to honor the creator and preserve divine revelation from 
natural philosophical speculators armed with no scientific instruments other than the Bible. John 
Wilkins and John Locke imagine language as an immanent system of empirical signification rather 
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than an immediate transcendent link to God—although they do so in order to quell controversy 
between Christians and promote common belief in God.  
 Although it might seem that Christianity works for these thinkers as a ladder that history 
would kick away, these motives matter. Not only does clarifying this theological context help to 
give a clearer sense of the origins of enlightenment in England, and usefully complicate the 
narrative that would see England post-1660 or post-1688 as a nation tired of religious quarreling 
and in the mood to embrace secularism—it also suggests the extent to which enlightenment ideas 
emerged precisely to manage and limit the power and authority available to a variety of popular 
voices in the course of the long English Reformation. Enlightenment in England, to put it bluntly, 
is a project of population management.496 And enlightenment, not only in the English-speaking 
world but more widely as well, has never completely lost this character. The now 
commonsensical opposition of religion and science, reason and faith, has tended to mask a 
history of theological-political gamesmanship whereby the rules of prophetic power were 
changed precisely when and precisely because they were theoretically democratized.  
* 
3. Secularity 
 As these reflections suggest, this is clearly a project centrally concerned with the changing 
shape of the theorization of religion in the humanities. It is important to articulate how I see my 
conclusions in relation to this important field of current academic discourse. These thoughts 
should serve to bridge the historical side of my project and the conceptual side, to which I will 
turn in the section that follows. 
 As is well known, since 9/11 a number of prominent scholars—among them Talal Asad, 
Saba Mahmood, Charles Taylor, Michael Warner, and Judith Butler—have registered 
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dissatisfaction with the paradigm opposing religiosity and secularity.497 Secularity, as these 
thinkers see it, is not the opposite of religion, nor is it the absence of religion. It is, rather, the 
dominant instantiation of a particular religious perspective, linked above all to Protestantism. 
Warner expresses this perspective while usefully qualifying it: “It is often said that liberal 
secularism is a religion: it is Protestant Christianity. It would be more precise to say it is the 
metareligious understanding of post-Calvinist Protestantism, generalized as an understanding of 
religion per se.”498 In other words, the concept of religion put forth by the secularist perspective 
is derived from a set of debates and concerns peculiar to Protestant religious history. When 
secularism “rejects” religion, it does so in a specific religiously inflected conceptual vocabulary—
in a way shaped, therefore, by the very religious history that it appears to renounce. Hence one 
does well to retranslate secular schema into religious terms -- to see such schema as responding 
to and contoured by now-silent cultural energies. 
 The present study clearly reinforces many of the findings of these scholars. The history of 
debates over the nature of prophecy—which are, at bottom, debates regarding the structure of 
divine-human relations, and (as I’ve suggested) policing the relative intelligibility of various 
religious perspectives—shows the emergence of secularity and the process of secularization to 
have been violent, difficult, and concerted. It has not been a process of simple advancement, 
where the secular banishes the religious through rigorous logic and reasoning, and where Western 
science is conceived of as a “candle in the dark” in a “demon-haunted world,” to borrow Carl 
Sagan’s evocative phrases.499 It is a process of polemical figuration. Some religious voices are 
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muted in this process. Others are amplified—often, as I have shown, through skillful imitations 
at one reflexive remove of the false prophetic figures banished from civilized discourse.  
 Thus this project supports many of the conclusions put forth by Asad and others. But at 
the same time, this project complicates some aspects of the scholarship on secularity. For one 
thing, as I have suggested, one cannot link secularism with Protestantism without further 
explanation. Theorists of secularity and secularization, from Weber forward, have tended to treat 
Protestantism as a uniform movement promoting salvation by faith alone as determined through 
a personal encounter with the evidence of scripture, and secularism as the detheologized or 
disenchanted wing of this movement. Many scholars—even, as Warner’s above quotation 
suggests, very careful ones—do likewise. This is understandable; secularism is unimaginable 
without the long and complex movement known as the Protestant Reformation and the various 
reactions to it. But at the same time, Protestantism must be seen as a sphere of profound 
disputation—not only with Catholicism, but within itself. Secular categories—in particular, as I 
have suggested, the distinct categories of nature, self, and society formed in the process of 
rationalization—result not from any Protestant consensus, but from a history of polemical and at 
times violent struggle. These categories emerge from a struggle over the largest terms of 
representation—regarding the fit of world and word, divinity and humanity. Secularity, then, is a 
sphere of procedural disputes regarding the correct way to decipher God’s will. The foregoing 
analysis proposes not to forget this dimension or leave it behind in pursuing the philosophical 
and literary questions to which this struggle gives rise. 
 In a roundabout way, keeping these dimensions of struggle and process in mind lends this 
study a perspective on secularity that has, around its critical center, sympathetic edges. (The 
centrality of Habermas for this project must have helped prepare such an admission.) Secularity is 
not a monolithic force. It is not uniform. As such, it cannot easily be reduced to its worst, most 
violent effects in the world—even if it remains extremely important to analyze the far from 
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neutral influence secular forces have had on the world. And its intellectual architects have to be 
understood as having had their reasons for rationalizing the world. The preceding chapters, then, 
have not attempted to denigrate Henry More, John Locke, and Jonathan Swift, even as they 
notice certain patterns and polemical strategies shared by these thinkers in their efforts to 
demolish “enthusiasm” while occupying provisionally enthusiastic positions of their own. In sum, 
this project, in a way that is perhaps unusual, 1) has sought to respect the critical positions on 
secularity that have emerged in recent years and to offer those theses a more detailed and 
concrete purchase on the histories of ideas and of literary representation via an emphasis on the 
importance and nature of prophecy in the constitution of modern reason and the shape of social, 
political, and economic discourse; while, at the same time, 2) it has sought to understand the 
forces driving secularization and the rise of secularity as though from within, as urgently felt and 
rationally motivated.   
 This mixed perspective on secularity follows in part from an acknowledgment that the 
sort of historical-critical work of which this project is an example is itself self-evidently secular. It 
is indebted to the tradition of dividing the world into discrete but related realms—self, society, 
nature—and analyzing the interaction of these realms. This is an acknowledgement usually 
missing, I think, in the academic work that problematizes the secular—while, in a roundabout 
way, perpetuating it. A simple way of putting this conclusion is this: I have stressed the problems 
involved in the rise of secularity and the rationalization of society. At the same time, I cannot see 
how the categories distinguished by rationalization could be, as it were, abandoned, or discarded, 
as Bruno Latour seems sometimes to wish to do. I have hoped here to make them visible and 
available for further thinking.  
 Thus the present account hopes to have helped trace to the problem of prophecy the 
orderly confusion of the modern world—in which, as Latour so often laments, science, law, and 
expressivity are theoretically sundered, even as we suffer financial and ecological catastrophes as a 
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result of the practical links between these dimensions, such that (to take a an obvious and 
ominous example) the private consumption of fossil fuels contributes to global warming. It 
should also help account, in a more careful way than currently practiced in academia, for the 
persistence of prophecy within our apparently secular horizon. This project has linked prophecy 
to the ambiguous and ongoing task of legitimation—whereby institutions must draw spiritual 
authority from the past while denying it to those who would reject or dispute those claims. It has 
connected that task to the formulation of persisting attitudes toward epistemology and language. 
And it hopes to have helped explain why the social presence of unlicensed revelation still 
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APPENDIX A – Two Frontispieces 
 
 
Fig 2.1: Frontispiece to The Great Bible (1539). Public domain.   
 
 
Fig 2.2: Engraved frontispiece to Daniel Featley, Katabaptistai  
kataptysoi. The Dippers Dipt, or, The Anabaptists Duck’d and  
Plung’d over Head and Eares (London, Nicholas Bourne, 1645).  
Image from the British Museum website. Used under a Creative  
















Appendix B: The frequency and percentage-to-total publications of “Enthusias*” in Seventeenth-Century English: 
A search conducted through EEBO, Dec. 2, 2013 
 
 
1600-1609: 50 hits in 23 records (2.17 hits/record) / 4,140 total records (0.005%) 
 
 
1610-1619: 33 hits in 25 records (1.32 hits/record) / 4,739 total records (0.005%) 
 
 
1620-1629: 80 hits in 41 records (1.95 hits/record) / 5,430 total records (0.007%) 
 
 
1630-1639: 172 hits in 44 records (3.9 hits/record) / 6,114 total records (0.007%) 
 
 
1640-1649: 246 hits in 135 records (1.82 hits/record) / 22,192 total records* (0.006%) 
 
 
1650-1659: 916 hits in 263 records (3.48 hits/record) / 12,914 total records (0.02%) 
 
 
1660-1669: 705 hits in 201 records (3.5 hits/record) / 11,320 total records (0.017%) 
 
 
1670-1679: 1,137 hits in 265 records (4.29 hits/record)** / 11,315 total records (0.023%) 
 
 
1680-1689: 1,174 hits in 422 records (2.78 hits/record) / 18,247 total records (0.023%) 
 
 




*The collapse of the Star Chamber in 1641 led to a de facto end of censorship. This permitted a vast and sudden 
increase in publication. The Licensing Order of 1643, against which Milton wrote Areopagitica, reinstated most of the 
censorship practices of the Star Chamber under a Parliamentarian rather than a Royalist aegis. 
 
 






















Appendix C: Recycled woodcuts of dissenting preachers in the 1640s and 50s 
 
 
1. Tub Preacher 
 
 









































[Anon., A Declaration of a Strange and Wonderful Monster (London, 1646).] 
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